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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND PART
OF PLATO'S *PARMENIDES*

by

LOUIS J.C. MIX ©

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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ABSTRACT

The chief purpose of this dissertation is to provide a systematic and sustained analysis of the second part of Plato's Parmenides. The dissertation belongs within the analytic tradition of Platonic scholarship. Hence, it focuses on the logical and conceptual problems of the second part.

Even though commentators writing within the analytic tradition are impatient with metaphysical interpretations of the dialogue, their commentaries nevertheless accept an assumption which is presupposed by the metaphysical interpretations. The assumption is that there is a dominant philosophical purpose to the Parmenides. Beyond the metaphysical interpretations, the dialogue has been variously interpreted as having a critical purpose, as being a didactic work, and as being aporematic in nature. In this regard, the present work offers a new approach to the dialogue. It is argued that the responsibility of stating the purpose of a philosophical discussion belongs to the philosopher, and not to his commentators. And it is further argued that Plato does not provide the dialogue with a dominant philosophical purpose. These considerations underpin the new approach. Rather than assessing the individual arguments in terms of a purported general purpose, the arguments are assessed on their own merits so that we may achieve an understanding of how the dialectical conflicts arise between the contrary movements. Towards this end, a new format for commenting upon the text is introduced.

The traditional exegetical format parallels the structure of the second part of the Parmenides. We are familiar with this structure. It ostensibly gives to the dialogue two hypotheses. Each hypothesis underwrites four movements; two movements of which concern the One, and two of which concern the Others. There are, of course, serious difficulties which attend this structure. The main difficulty is that the structure of the Parmenides makes it look as if one and the same hypothesis stands as a common source of contrary results. Thus, if we allow the structure of the dialogue to determine for us a format by means of which we are going to analyze its individual arguments, we will hardly be able to avoid the question "How do contrary results follow from the same hypothesis? It is argued that this question cannot possibly be answered.

This and other difficulties confront the traditional format. It is, then, important to keep the 'impossible' question in abeyance. In this connection, we will disabuse ourselves of the notion that the results of a particular movement spring from no more than the hypothesis of that movement. We will find it closer to the truth to say that the hypothesis together with the assumptions found in a particular movement make possible the results of that movement. And we will explain the conflicting results in terms of the further assumptions which Parmenides aligns under the hypothesis. Since any given argument within a movement is replied to by an argument to the contrary in a counter-movement, it is possible to consider each argument in the light of its counter-argument. This we will do. Each argument will be placed alongside its counter-argument, and the two will be considered together. With this format, we will see directly the sources of conflict.

The commentary on the second part of the Parmenides utilizes four interpretive theses. The first thesis is that most of the arguments employ logical techniques derived from a theory ubiquitous to Greek Philosophy. I am speaking of 'the theory of opposites'. In advance of stating and defending this thesis, assumptions which are basic to certain metaphysical interpretations will be discussed. There will also be a discussion of Owen's thesis that some key arguments depend upon a confusion between the identifying and predicative uses of the word 'one'. The second thesis is a revised version of Ryle's 'formal/material concepts' distinction. It is argued that some arguments treat formal concept expressions. The next thesis states, what we will call, the Separation Assumption. The assumption is this: The separation of the One and the Others (included among the Others are Being, Sameness, Difference, Likeness, etc.) prevents the Others from being one, and also prevents the One from being what the Others are. The assumption has immediate application to the first round, where it underpins the conclusion that the One does not exist. The final interpretive thesis states, what we will call, the Linguistic Pluralism Assumption. The assumption is that each word has a meaning by virtue of naming some one entity. In stating the thesis, we will discuss the ramifications that it has upon the separability of the One.

There is one other significant feature of the dissertation. It introduces new translations of certain key passages. On linguistic grounds, it is argued that the hypothesis of the first four movements is "The One is one" (rather than "The One is").

I would like to express my gratitude to the members of my examining committee for the careful attention and criticism which they gave to this dissertation. In particular, I wish to thank Professor Bosley, my supervisor, and Professors Pelletier, Shiner, and Wilson.

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CHAPTER I

A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE PARMENIDES

Some of the scholars who have commented on Plato's Parmenides possess a fascination with the dialogue that is very much like the fascination which theologians reserve for the Book of Revelations.[1] Such fascination comes about as a result of being concerned with the question "What does this really mean?". Other commentators, whose temperament holds them back from searching after philosophical mysteries, ask themselves a less troublesome question; that question being "What is the purpose of the Parmenides?"[2] Since we view Greek Philosophy from within an analytic tradition, we are more sympathetic to the answers which have been given in reply to the second question than we are with the answers which have been given to the first. But I think that we must realize this: although the second question requires less ambition than does the first, the dialogue provides little evidence to support answers given to either question. And so, allow me to bring a charge against both questions. To my mind, both questions require us to violate what ought to be a canon for philosophical commentaries. The canon is: The commentator ought not to assume or try to discharge responsibilities which belong to the philosopher. In particular, the responsibility for stating the doctrine which is to be presented in a work lies with the philosopher. But even if the philosopher has another purpose in hand, there again it is his responsibility to tell us what he is doing. The responsibility of the commentator, on the other hand, is to assess whether and to what extent the philosopher has achieved his stated aims.

The observance of this canon raises the following question--what are we to do with Plato's Parmenides? The dialogue deserves this question. Indeed, the question brings to voice what we all realize even after a first reading of the dialogue. We all realize that the Parmenides is a very unusual philosophical work. I wish to offer a new approach to the dialogue. This new approach is made possible by the disavowal of seeking either the doctrine or the purpose of the Parmenides. Towards justifying this disavowal, I will argue that the dialogue does not belong to any of the usual philosophical genres. My argument will proceed from a rather simple schema. And although the simplicity of the schema makes it susceptible to criticism, nonetheless it will prove useful in that it underlines the problem we are facing.

For the most part, philosophical works may be divided into three classes. In the first place, we have works which are doctrinaire. In such a work, we find philosophical issues grouped under the head of a central issue so that the philosopher can proceed to present us with a theory that 'resolves' those issues. (Needless to say, we find most of the great works in this class.) Second, there are those philosophical works which are exploratory. In these works, we find philosophical problems being forged. Here we have the workshop of philosophy. For the philosopher is trying to show us the things of which we ought to have philosophical understanding; he is trying to show us what features of human experience and activity are philosophically problematic. We recognize the Socratic dialogues as being of this class. But so also are Aristotle's Metaphysics and Wittgenstein's Investigations. Finally, there are those works which are critical. In these works, we find the philosopher reflecting upon the works which go under the first two classes.

This schema, is, of course, much too simple to have general application. Even though there are works which can be cited to make the schema look plausible (for example, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, being a work which brings together the epistemological concerns from Descartes on, makes the first classification seem somewhat plausible), few philosophical works present us with one face. Philosopical problems are forged so that they may be solved; such solutions being the beginnings of doctrine. As for critical works, they often stand on a doctrinal platform. If, then, one were to make general use of the schema, one would often misshape the work trying to fit it into one of the classifications. So, of what use is the schema? For our purposes, it is enough if it has a specific application to the Parmenides.

Let us view the parts of the schema as each laying down a part of the boundary of 'philosophy as it is usually done'. Now, for reasons given above, we concede that the areas within the boundary are not well-defined. We concede, for example, that we have no clear answer to give to the question "Is Aristotle's Categories doctrinaire or exploratory?". Notice, though, that this question already places the Categories within the boundary drawn by our schema. In this light, consider the Parmenides. I suggest that our initial questions about this dialogue ought not to commit us to a similar placement of it. Rather than asking "Under which classification does the Parmenides belong?", we ask "Does it belong within the boundary drawn by our schema?".

I will argue that the Parmenides is neither doctrinaire, nor exploratory, nor critical. Whatever the value of my argument, I urge that its general purpose be taken seriously. For the general purpose is to give some indication of the extent to which the Parmenides is an unusual work. You may think what you wish of my simple schema. Nevertheless, the idea which lies behind it is important. The idea is that we need some means of drawing comparisons between the Parmenides and other philosophical works. Without the appropriate comparisons, we cannot warrant the tasks of showing 'the doctrine of the Parmenides' or 'the purpose of the Parmenides'. For this dialogue is not like other philosophical works.

Concerning the first classification, our options are two. We may say either (1) that Plato does not state a doctrine in the Parmenides, or (2) that he does not explicitly state a doctrine. The second option does, of course, leave it open for one to find a doctrine which is implicit in the dialogue. A commentator who exercises this latter option will proceed by providing a residence under whose roof the conflicting rounds may all find a place. And so, for example, we find Wahl saying "L'Un c'est L'Un de Parmenide et Parmenide lui-meme a soin de dire que c'est de son hypothese qu'il parle. Mais en meme temps c'est l'idee Socratique en tant qu'elle est unite".[3] Wahl's comment reveals a move that is fundamental to any attempt to find an implicit doctrine. One of the conditions which we lay upon philosophical doctrines is that they be consistent. Wahl's move is an attempt to meet this condition. It is an attempt to show that the counter-rounds do not really conflict with one another. By showing that Parmenides is arguing from a different concept of Unity, Wahl hopes to remove the veil of contradiction and reveal a doctrine.

Wahl's interpretation faces two sorts of competitors. It must compete with those interpretations which take their start from the first option. But it must also compete with those that take their start from the same option as it does. Even if the interpretations under the first option are set aside, Wahl's interpretation has still to compete with Cornford's (who argues that Parmenides is concerned to show the different senses of the word 'one');[4] and after Cornford's, with Brumbraugh's (who argues that Parmenides is concerned to reveal the different levels of reality);[5] and with yet other interpretations. We ought to remind ourselves of how we adjudicate between conflicting interpretations of a philosophical text. Is it not the case that we try to resolve the conflict, so far as is possible, by returning to the text? But where in the Parmenides do we turn to do this? Our answer is, as it must be, "Nowhere". Nowhere does Parmenides say "Let us consider what happens to the One when it visits itself on the different levels of reality". Nowhere does he say "Let us compare my concept of Unity with Socrates' concept of Unity". Nowhere does he say any such thing. Moreover, the assumption that the second part of the dialogue can be consistently housed within one doctrine begs the question as to whether Plato is giving a doctrine or doing something else. If we were certain that Plato is presenting a doctrine, no doubt our task would be to see to what extent the results of the counter-rounds are consistent with one another. But we need more evidence for holding that Plato is presenting a doctrine than is afforded by the fact that the results can, in various ways, be made consistent. And since we have no means for adjudicating between the interpretations under the second option, such interpretations can have a ranking no higher than 'possibly true'. Curiously enough, that is both their virtue and their vice. The evidence does not allow us to say of any one of them that it is quite likely wrong. But for the same reason, we cannot say that it is quite likely right.

We may now turn to the question "Is the Parmenides an exploratory work?". Here we will consider the views of Ryle, and Owen.

I think that it will prove useful to bring into our view two works which are, without doubt, exploratory. They are Plato's Theaetetus and Aristotle's Metaphysics. Let us consider chapter three of Book Zeta of the Metaphysics. In this chapter, Aristotle forges one facet of 'the problem of substance'. The forging proceeds in the following way.

> Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicate of anything else. And so, we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance.[6]

On the basis of this claim, matter is offered as a candidate for substance, since it seems to meet the requirement set down by the claim. But Aristotle, in a compacted style which is only his own, goes on to say,

> When all else is stripped off evidently nothing but matter remains. For while the rest are affectations, products, and potencies of bodies, length, breadthand depths are quantities and not substances (for a quantity is not a substance), but the substance is rather that to which these belong primarily.[7]

I suggest that the above conceals a covert premise; a premise hiding behind the claim that substance is that to which affectations, products, etc., belong primarily. The premise is "Substance is that of which we may ask--What is it?". Supplying this to what Aristotle has already said, we may more easily understand his next claim. He says,

> But when length and breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left unless there is something that is bounded by these.[8]

The point which emerges from this is that if matter were substance, then substance would not be something of which we could ask "What is it?". (For matter lacks the things which are prerequisite for answering the question--namely, a species, a genus, a differentia.) This, by itself, is enough to discount matter as a candidate for substance.

You are, perhaps, wondering why I have taken the time to do some Aristotellian exegesis. I have done so, wanting to bring Aristotle's procedure to your attention. Aristotle begins by setting forth a characterization of substance. This is his first step. In his next step, he identifies the features of the characterization with which he will be concerned. These features are two: (a) that substance be that of which the items from the secondary categories are said;

(b) that substance be that of which we may ask "What is it?". Finally, Aristotle shows us that there is a philosophical tension between these two features when matter is assumed to be substance. This tension is meant to force our hand towards picking a candidate other than matter for the office of substance. But, from our point of view, what is of importance is Aristotle's three-stage procedure. I wish to suggest that this procedure is a quite natural motif for the forging of philosophical problems.

The motif which we have just seen in Aristotle's work is no less at home in Plato's work. Indeed, the motif is regularly put to use in the Socratic dialogues (where Socrates turns moral, political, and religious questions into philosophical problems.). At any rate, I would like us to consider 201e-205e of the Theaetetus. At 201e-202c, Plato has Socrates state his dream. This corresponds to the first stage of the motif. By 204a, it is clear that Plato's interest is focused on the notions of 'being simple' and 'being complex'; and two further notions which are subordinates to 'being complex'--namely 'being a whole' and 'being a part'. This is preparation for the third stage. At 205de, the discussion is brought to an end with the statement of a philosophical problem. Socrates says,

> To conclude, then, on the one hand, the syllable is the same thing as a number of letters and is a whole with the letters as parts, then the letters must be neither more nor less knowable and explicable than the syllables, since we made out that all the parts are the same thing as the whole . . . . But if, on the other hand, the syllable is a unity without parts, the syllable and letter likewise are equally incapable of explanation and unknowable.[9]

The motif allows Aristotle and Plato to achieve similar ends. Using the motif, Aristotle overturns an initial characterization of substance. With the same motif, Plato overturns a characterization of knowledge. Furthermore, the motif provides each of them with the means for forging a philosophical problem. In the one case, a problem about substance is forged. In the other, it is a problem about knowledge.

The purpose of the preceding has been to prepare the way for the question "If the second part of the Parmenides is meant to be exploratory, why does it not make use of the exploratory motif?". We should here contrast the first part of the Parmenides with the second part of the dialogue. It is to be conceded that the first part brilliantly demonstrates the motif. The first stage of the motif is easily recognized; at 128e-130a, Socrates states the theory of Forms. In his preliminary questioning of Socrates, Parmenides does straightaway identify those features of the theory against which he is going to press his criticisms. He asks,

> καί μοι εἰπέ αὐτὸς συ οὕτω διῄρησαι ὡς λέγεις,
> χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων
> αὖ μετέχοντα; (130b1-3)

Within the scope of this question, Parmenides has focused on the two notions of participation and separation. He proceeds from this question. His first four arguments are directed towards developing the problem "How do the things other than the Forms partake of the Forms?". Parmenides then goes on to direct two arguments against the notion of separation. From these arguments, there emerges the problem "How can the Forms, as truly separable, have any relationship with the things of the ordinary world?". Given these comments about the first part, I would like to emphasize two points. The various moments of the exploratory motif are easily recognized within the first part. Second, Parmenides explicitly announces that the theory of Forms suffers from certain problems. Let us now consider the second part. Do we see the moments of the motif being developed in the second part? I think not. Parmenides, when he states his hypothesis, cannot be understood to have instigated the first moment. Unlike Socrates, who at 128a ff. offers us a theory containing various philosophical elements, Parmenides offers us but a simple hypothesis. The difference is important. In the one case, it is possible to proceed with the motif. In the other, we are left with a series of questions.

> What is "the one"? Is it the single substance which Parmenides notoriously thought reality to consist of? Or is it unity? . . . Neither here nor later are we given any clues towards the answering of these questions.[10]

The second point of comparison between the two parts of the dialogue is this: whereas in the first part, Parmenides clearly identifies those problems which bear upon the theory of Forms, in the second he does not explicitly state any problems which would bear upon hypothesizing about the One. In light of these considerations, I wish to press the following question. To what extent ought we to appreciate the fact that the exploratory motif is not used in the second part? Let me just say that I take the absence of the motif to count against seeing the second part as exploratory.

Ryle has a very tempting thesis about the Parmenides; tempting, because it gives the dialogue a philosophical vitality.

Unfortunately, his thesis cannot be tested against the text. The thesis comes in two parts. The first part of it is that the Parmenides treats formal concepts as if they were material concepts. This part of the thesis is, I think, true. (Later on, though, I will offer an amendment to it.) The second part of the thesis is that the purpose of the dialogue is to reveal to us a distinction between formal concepts and material concepts. Concerning this, I would say: While it is true that the formal/material concepts distinction does map out a route which takes us through the tangle of arguments, nonetheless it is Ryle, not Plato, who lays down the route.

The basic argument which Ryle gives for his whole thesis is as follows.

> When we treat a formal concept as if it were a non-formal or proper concept, we are committing a breach of 'logical syntax'. But what shows us that we are doing this? The deductive derivations of absurdities and contradictions shows it, and nothing else can. (my italics) Russell's proof that x in the propositional function ∅x is only another exercise in the same genre as Plato's proof that 'Unity' cannot go into the gap in the sentence-frame '. . . exists' or '. . . does not exist'.[11]

Ryle seems to think that dialectic can, by itself, bring us to realize the need for a philosophical distinction. I believe this opinion to be false. For dialectic is as dangerous as it is useful. And nowhere is it more dangerous than it is in Greek Philosophy. Think of that brilliant dialectician, Zeno. We say that the results of Zeno's dialectical arguments point to the need for philosophical distinctions. But Zeno would not say this. He takes himself to be arguing truly. This fact underlines an awful truth about dialectic. Dialectic can make a good philosopher take leave of his senses. There is another dangerous feature of dialectic. Dialectic is the philosopher's technology. It allows a philosopher to lay out the consequences which follow from the various sides of an issue. But it is not within the power of dialectic to settle philosophical issues. The settlement of such an issue requires philosophical insight. And so, the second danger comes to this. Dialectic can get us into a philosophical bind while giving us no means by which we might extradite ourselves from the bind. This second danger is, I think, realized in the Parmenides. I think that the Parmenides is a brilliant exposition of a philosophical technology. But the brilliance is due to the exercise, rather than the results, of the technology. I can now state one reason for holding that Ryle's thesis is untestable. Although dialectic can prepare us for a philosophical insight, it cannot, by itself, give us the insight. And so, the fact that the Parmenides violates a formal/material concepts distinction is not yet grounds for holding that the purpose of the dialogue is to reveal to us such a distinction.

There is another reason, a more prosaic reason, for saying that Ryle's thesis is untestable. There is no hard evidence within the Parmenides which supports his thesis. But Ryle is under no misapprehension on this point. And I suspect this to be why he turns to the Theaetetus and Sophist to gather more evidence for his view. Concerning the Theaetetus, Ryle says,

> . . . Plato is now considering the places and roles of 'terms' in truths and falsehoods, with his eye on the underlying question of what are the principles of organization which govern the combination of such 'terms'.[12]

I think that Ryle is being overly generous with Plato. My view is this: The puzzle engendered by Socrates' dream is underpinned by the assumption that a mode of combination may have the same status as the elements which the mode combines; in particular, Socrates' dream presumes that a mode of combination is either nothing at all, or it is (like the elements which it combines) a simple. Need I say that the presumption is in violation of the formal/material concepts distinction? Allowing that my view is correct, we may pick up on an early point. Ryle's distinction is obviously relevant to the Theaetetus in that the distinction allows us to analyze the problem which issues from Socrates' dream. But this is not yet to say that Plato has realized the distinction. Rather, the contrary is true. Had Plato realized the distinction, he would not be raising the problem that he does raise. The Sophist would appear to be more amenable to Ryle's view, insofar as Plato identifies certain concepts as belonging to μέγιστα εἴδη. If I be allowed to simply state opinion, I would say that the συμπλοκη εἴδη thesis requires that the μέγιστα εἴδη shift between formal concept roles and material concept roles. But Plato would not have allowed such shifting, if he had realized the distinction. If these views are correct, then the most that can be said on Plato's behalf is that he is aware of the difficulties which arise from the lack of a formal/material concepts distinction. This is not to say that Plato saw a distinction which would undercut those difficulties.

Let us now consider Owen's view of the Parmenides. Like Ryle, Owen sees a purpose to the second part of the dialogue. But unlike Ryle, he does not think the purpose to be that of demonstrating a distinction. He says,

> That Plato is at grips with the logic of formal concepts here and in other late dialogues seems to me certain, and this certainty was established by Ryle. But an interest in proving the necessary distinctions does not seem to be central to the strategy of the Parmenides. As I shall represent it, the method that Plato explores with such enthusiasm is tailored not to the constructing of proofs but to the setting and sharpening of problems, and problems of a characteristically philosophical stamp. It is the first systematic exercise in the logic of aporematic and not demonstrative argument.[13]

We, of course, must concede that the Parmenides is full of problems. But at issue is whether the problems result from the systematic exercise of a single purpose. In this regard, Owen has presented a very strong case, containing many persuasive arguments. Nonetheless, I wish to bring various objections against his view.

In response to Owen, I will speak from a platform from which I have already spoken. I first would like to ask: If it is Plato's purpose to set and sharpen philosophical problems, why does he not use the problem-setting motif we find throughout his dialogues, and even in the first part of the Parmenides? For, in fact, the motif is eminently more suited to the setting and sharpening of problems than is dialectic. When the motif is skillfully used (which is how Plato uses it), conflicting philosophical elements are brought to the fore, where the elements stand openly for inspection. But, on the other hand, the dialectic of the Parmenides and the super-structure which is produced by it seem calculated to obscure the majority of the philosophical conflicts. We may infer a lesson from this difference. It would seem that the second part of the Parmenides is not a suitable vehicle for the purpose which Owen assigns to it.

I do not think that Owen has appreciated the philosophical significance, or rather the philosophical dangers, of dialectic. He says,

> The training in dialectic that he (Plato) acknowledges to Zeno, and illustrates in his own antinomies, is a training in the presentation of conflicts between theses each of which seems cogent in its own right. He neither adopts nor proposes any general training in resolving such conflicts.[14]

The general training of which Owen is speaking does, I think, presuppose a special philosophical awareness concerning dialectic. Insofar as a dialectic generally wears a face which purports to show that reality is in some way unreal, one needs Russell's 'healthy sense of reality' to cope with such arguments.[15] Zeno, though, lacked such an awareness. Accordingly, he would have disavowed any training that offered to show him the light. Viewing things in this way, we may emphasize the question "How does Plato stand vis-a-vis dialectic?". Quite frankly, there are times when Plato stands right alongside Zeno in his acceptance of it. This is particularly evident at 476 ff. in the Republic. From that passage and others, we may get the impression that Plato has been too well trained in dialectic, and not at all trained in resolving conflicts which arise between philosophy and reality. But Owen's Plato is the Plato of the later dialogue, the one who makes fun of the late-learners. And I would think that Owen is trying to find just such a man behind the Parmenides. In my opinion, though, the man behind the dialogue has not yet gained an understanding of the philosophical technology of which he is a master. He can run dialectic; he can even make it run wild. But the dialogue offers no evidence that he knows how to repair it.

We may now test the candidature of the Parmenides for the third classification. At issue is whether the dialogue is a critical work. In this connection, we ask "Of what is the Parmenides critical?". And we further ask "Who holds the philosophical theory of which the dialogue is supposed to be critical?".

It is almost always the case that when a philosopher wishes to criticize a philosophical theory, he will proceed by first stating that theory. (I say 'almost always the case', because there are exceptional cases.) It is, then, worth noting again that while Plato follows the standard procedure in the first part, there is absolutely no indication that this procedure is being followed in the second part. In the first part, Plato has Socrates state a theory against which he then has Parmenides argue. But in the second, there is no theory under inspection; rather Parmenides is scrutinizing an hypothesis. Thus, someone who holds that the Parmenides is a critical work will have to construct his view out of, what Taylor would call 'certain plain hints'.[16] And he will have to show us how those plain hints point to an exceptional case of critical philosophizing.

There are some very puzzling features of the dialogue; features by means of which Plato might very well be doing some hinting. For example, we may wonder why Plato has Parmenides criticize a theory which neither he nor its proponent (i.e., the Socrates of the dialogue) could have known. Also, we may wonder why Parmenides, after urging

Socrates to take up the difficult business of dialectic, chooses for an interlocutor a man who is the least capable of appreciating the dialectical exercises of the second part. We may wonder whether Plato is playing with us. At any rate, by reason of such puzzling features, Taylor says,

> . . . we are directed to regard these criticisms (of the theory of forms) as coming from opponents of the theory of "participation". And since Plato's imitation of the Zenonian method takes the form raising still worse puzzles about the consequences of the Eleatic doctrine, it is clear who these opponents must be. We must look for them among the formal logicians of the school of Megara who were the continuators of Eleaticism.[17]

Taylor holds, what has come to be known as, 'the parody interpretation of the Parmenides'. It is this sort of interpretation which is available for the third classification.

Taylor is in a predicament which we may easily appreciate. On the one hand, he holds that the dialogue is a critical work. There is, though, no ostensible indication to that effect in the dialogue. This means that Taylor can uphold his position only by suggesting that the criticisms are veiled criticisms. He says, "Plato does not, in the dialogue, offer any answer to these extreme 'idealists'; he simply sets himself to show that two can play at the game of abstract formal logic, and he can, if he pleases, play the game better than its professed champions" (my italics). And so, on the other hand, Taylor holds that the Parmenides is a critical work of a very special order. He takes it to be "an elaborate jeu d'esprit"; or, as we might say, a parody. The dialogue, under this interpretation, is supposed to be a parody of the Eleatics and their philosophizing. (There is here a point which could do with some emphasis. It is: Lacking some straightforward evidence for viewing the Parmenides as a critical work, Taylor suggests that it belongs to a very special kind of critical work.)

(Taylor's interpretation has not been well received. That is, perhaps, unfortunate. Whatever the merits of the interpretation, it has at least this much going for it. It represents an attempt to offer an alternative to those views which have as their basic assumption the assumption that the Parmenides is a profound metaphysical treatise.)

The major criticism which is brought against the parody interpretation is that the interpretation makes Plato out to be disrespectful of a philosopher for whom he shows great respect in the Theaetetus.[18] I am not so sure that this is a fair criticism. However great Plato's respect for Parmenides may be, that respect is not enough to keep Plato from torturing the child of Father Parmenides.[19] More important than this, though, is that the parody interpretation need not make Parmenides the victim of certain philosophical jokes. Indeed, Taylor sees those jokes as being directed against, not Parmenides, but rather the post-Parmenidean Megarians.[20] Now, it might very well be that the Megarians have a philosophical commitment to the assumption "The one is one"; in which case, the tour de force applied on the assumption in the dialogue would be embarrassing to them in two ways. In the first place, they would suffer embarrassment from the arguments of the second part. And in the second place, the fact that those arguments are put into the mouth of Parmenides would cause them yet further embarrassment.

There is a more potent reason why the parody interpretation fails. The Parmenides is not a philosophical parody. For the dialogue lacks what must be an essential feature of philosophical parody. Someone composing a parody will put the characteristic features of another's work to a humorous end. The philosopher writing a parody will do this as well. But he must do more than just this. His parody must make use of more than characteristic features. It must make use of characteristic assumptions found in the object of his parody. Otherwise, a philosophical parody would always run the risk of misrepresenting the position under attack. Where such misrepresentation is present, the subsequent criticisms must fail. I am saying that a philosophical parody must first of all be philosophical. The requirements under that head are no less stringent than the requirements we lay on the more ordinary kinds of philosophical criticisms. (Given these requirements, it is not surprising that we have but a few cases of philosophical parody.)

It is not enough to say that the Parmenides provides us with plain hints about its critical purpose. It is not enough to say that certain passages hint at the fact that the Eleatics and their philosophizing is going to be parodied. Rather, it must be shown that Plato steals a march on the Eleatics while using Eleatic assumptions. I do not think that such a demonstration is possible. To my mind, the anti-Parmenidean features (or, if you wish, the anti-Eleatic features) of the dialogue are underpinned by non-Parmenidean features. If this is so, then the Parmenides does fail to meet the basic requirement of philosophical parody. Here ends the task of showing that the Parmenides does not belong in the usual philosophical genres.

My general opinion of the dialogue is fairly close to Robinson's general opinion of it. I too think that the second part contains no statement of doctrine, either directly or indirectly; and also that it contains no statement of method, either directly or indirectly.[21] But Robinson further holds that, "Both parts of the dialogue are intended to provide Plato's pupils with practice in dialectic and in the detection of errors in reasoning."[22] As with Taylor's view, the basis for this view is formed from certain plain hints. The moral which we can, I think, learn from Robinson's work is that the temptation to provide the dialogue with a purpose is very great indeed. But, why should we supply the Parmenides with a purpose when Plato himself seems not to have had that concern?

What, then, are we to do with the Parmenides? The dialogue, particularly the second part of it, stands in need of sustained philosophical analysis. With respect to the second part, providing analyses of its many curious arguments is all that we should allow ourselves to do. We will, though, find this to be quite enough.

Notes to Chapter One

1. Cornford's preface to his Plato and Parmenides is a very useful summary of the commentaries which precede his work. Following Proclus, Cornford divides those commentaries into two groups--the logical and the metaphysical. It is the metaphysical school of interpretation which provides the mystical interpretations of the dialogue. Brumbaugh (Plato on the One) and Lynch (An Approach to Metaphysics Through Plato's Parmenides) are modern adherents of the metaphysical school.
2. Ryle, Robinson, and Owen have offered to answer this question. Their work constitutes, what we may call, the analytic tradition.
3. Etude, p. 107.
4. P&P, pp. 109-113 (esp., p. 111).
5. Plato on the One
6. Metaphysics, 1023b35ff.
7. Ibid., 1029a.
8. Ibid., 1029a.
9. Theaetetus, 205de.
10. Crombie, EDP2, p. 336.
11. SPM, p. 132.
12. Ibid., p. 140.
13. Ryle, pp. 347-348.
14. Ibid., pp. 367-368.
15. See "On Denoting".
16. Plato, p. 349.

17. Ibid., p. 350.

18. See Runciman's "Plato's Parmenides", SPM, p. 167.

19. The child in question is the philosophy of Parmenides. See Sophist, 241de.

20. Plato, p. 350.

21. Plato's Earlier Dialectic, pp. 239-264.

22. Ibid., p. 223.

CHAPTER II

THE ANALYTIC THESES

In this chapter, I state and defend the main theses of this work. Sections (A) and (B) are devoted to a question, the resolution of which depends largely on textual resources. The subsequent sections are devoted to questions more philosophical in nature. We will make use of the theses developed within this chapter to analyze the arguments of the second part; this being done in Chapter Four.

(A)

My first thesis answers a question which has not received the attention that it deserves. The question is "What are the hypotheses?". I hold that there are two hypotheses; the first of which is 'The One is one', and upon which are based the first four rounds. The second hypothesis is 'The One is not', and upon this are based the last four rounds.[1] In this section, I will be concerned with showing that 'The One is one' is the hypothesis of the first four rounds. In section (B), I will try to show that 'The One is not' is the hypothesis of the last four rounds.

There is very strong evidence for holding that the hypothesis of the first round is 'The One is one'. Our deliberations towards this view will begin from _prima facie_ evidence. At 137b2-4, we read,

> ... ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν;

Since περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ may be understood as supplying a subject for εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἕν, it is possible to read the above as "Shall I take the One itself and consider the consequences of assuming that the one is, or is not one?". There is, though, one difficulty with this reading. As Cornford points out, none of the rounds start from the hypothesis that the one is not one (μὴ ἕν).[2] In view of this, Cornford suggests that we read εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν and either εἴτε μή [ἕν] or εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν.[3] I accept this amendment to the text. But this amendment does not yet close the question as to how we are to read the text. Cornford would have us read it in the following way: Shall I take the One itself and consider the consequences of assuming that there is, or is not, a One. The difficulty with this reading is that it ignores the fact that περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ may be taken as supplying a subject for the ἕν ἐστιν of εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν. And so, there is another possible reading of the amended text. That reading is: Shall I take the One itself and consider the consequences of assuming either that it (the One) is one or that it is not (i.e., does not exist). I favor this latter reading, and will argue on its behalf.

Somewhat more decisive evidence is to be found within the opening of the first round. At 137c4-6, we read,

> ει εν εστιν, αλλο τι ουκ αν ειη πολλα το εν; – Πῶς γάρ ἄν; – Οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι.

Here the question is whether ἕν is the subject or the predicate of ἐστιν in the hypothesis. Cornford assumes that it is the subject of ἐστιν; accordingly, he translates the above as "If there is a One, of course the One will not be many".[4] Taylor, on the other hand, translates this passage as "If it is one, of course the one will not be many". So, Taylor takes ἕν to be the predicate of ἐστιν. If Taylor's translation is correct, we must then ask "What is the subject of ἐστιν?". The obvious answer is that it is τὸ ἕν.[5] I, of course, am in agreement with this understanding of 137c. And so, I will presently argue that Cornford's translation is implausible. Furthermore, I can point to a passage which does directly support the contention that the hypothesis is "The One is one."

Although Cornford stands with most other commentators in accepting an existential interpretation of the hypothesis, his translation departs from the usual translation. The usual translation is "The One exists". Cornford offers "There is a One", or alternatively "A One is". His translation is obviously motivated by the consideration that in Greek a subject-term stated without an article is to be translated with an indefinite article. But it is just this which makes the translation implausible. Even though the claim "A One is" requires that there be at least one thing which we may call 'a One', nonetheless the claim does not restrict a speaker to speaking of only one thing. This point has philosophical importance. It shows that the argument "If a One is, it cannot be many" is applicable to however many things may be said to be 'a One'. But, surely, it is not Parmenides' intention to consider 'the many, each of which is a One'. Rather his purpose is to consider the consequences of an hypothesis about the One. These considerations can be skirted, if the ἕν of ἕν ἐστιν is taken to mean τὸ ἕν. Yet, to do so would involve ignoring a feature of the Greek language; and for Cornford, a feature which he thinks to be worth observing.

Direct confrontation with the text is a surer guide than is reflection upon it. And so, it pleases me to direct your attention to 137d2-3.

> Οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἕξει, εἰ ἓν ἔσται τὸ ἕν.

Here Parmenides is summarizing the results of the previous argument, and moreover stating the reason for those results. The reason is ἕν ἐστι τὸ ἕν.

Those who believe the hypothesis to be an existential claim betray their belief with their own words. Cornford, whilst commenting upon the significance of εἰ ἕν ἐστιν, says "We are to suppose that the One is just simply one and nothing else."[6] Even more telling is a comment which Cornford makes in regard to the second round. Concerning 142c3, he says "εἰ ἓν ἕν would be a more accurate expression than εἰ ἕν ἐστιν for what was our supposition in Hyp.I".[7] We find Wahl in a similar predicament. Initially, he says "Parmenides commence donc, comme il dit, par sa propre hypothese: ‹Si l'un est›".[8] But he then goes on to say

> Si l'un (εἰ ἕν ἐστιν), disons pour le clarte, si l'un est un (si l'on prend la copule comme affirmant le predicat d'unite, si l'on adopte donc l'idee de l'unite de L'etre, et l'on peut distinguer ainse la premiere hypothese de la seconde, qui poertera sur la realite de l'un).[9]

Ryle also shows himself to be undecided about this issue. He, though, is somewhat more candid with us. He says,

> . . . the actual formation of the hypothesis and the development of the argument in A1* leaves it in doubt whether the hypothesis is 'Unity exists' or 'Unity is single'.[10]

Although Ryle does go on to argue that the hypothesis is really 'Unity exists', he never quite forecloses on the possibility that the hypothesis is 'Unity is single'. Now, the lesson which we may learn from all this is that the question "What is the hypothesis of the first round?" presents us with a live issue.

While commentators have been aware of the possibility that 'The One is one' might be the hypothesis of the first round, they have not given serious consideration to whether 'The One is one' can be taken as the hypothesis of the second round. They are very firm in their conviction that the hypothesis of the second round is existential. The opening of the second round (in particular, 142b2-c7) seems to afford their view substantial evidence.

> ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; - Οὐκ οἷόν τε. ... νῦν δὲ οὐκ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἓν ἔστιν. (142b5-c3)

(In the above, I have omitted a sentence which intervenes between Ουκ οιον τε and νυν δε ουκ κτλ. This sentence is, I think, of signal importance for translating and interpreting νυν δε ουκ κτλ. In fact, I believe that the failure to understand the philosophical import of the sentence leads to an existential translation of ει εν εστιν. With regard to ἓν ἕν, commentators have taken one ἕν to be substantive and the other to be predicative so that they translate ἓν ἕν as either 'A One is one' (Cornford) or 'The One is one'. Having translated ἓν ἕν in this way, they understand Parmenides to be saying that "The One is one" is not going to be the hypothesis under consideration. On this account, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν is then given an existential translation.

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*That is, 137c-157b.

In light of the standard translations of 142bc and our findings in connection with the first round, we might be tempted to think that the first and second rounds have different hypotheses. There is, though, very strong evidence against this possibility. At 142b1-2, Plato has Parmenides say,

> βούλει οὖν ἐπι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν επανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῇ

The force of this remark must not be lost on us. Parmenides is not proposing to make a new beginning with a new hypothesis; rather, he is proposing a reconsideration of the hypothesis of the first round. And in view of this, we can give a rather distasteful flavour to the view that the hypothesis of the first round is different from the hypothesis of the second. If the rounds have different hypotheses, then Parmenides is not doing what he has said he would do; in which case, Parmenides is deceiving both himself and us about what he is really doing. At any rate, we are left with these options: The hypothesis of the first two rounds is either "The One is" or "The One is one".

Let us, for awhile, proceed on the assumption that the hypothesis of the second round is 'The One is'. Given this assumption, we may ask "What evidence is there for taking the hypothesis of the first round to be 'The One is'?". The evidence which has been cited in answer to our question is not to be found within the first round. It is found at 136ac. There are various approaches that may be taken towards this passage, as we will presently see.

> Οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθεσεως ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ πρός τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μή ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα·

This part of the passage, when taken together with 128ab (where Socrates suggests that Parmenides and Zeno come to the same conclusion via different routes) has been cited on behalf of the claim that whereas Zeno's hypothesis is εἰ πολλά ἐστι, Parmenides' hypothesis is εἰ ἕν ἐστι. We find Wahl saying "Parmenide commence dcnc comme il le dit, par sa propre hypothese: ⟨Si l'ún est⟩. Il prefere developper l'hypothese: ⟨Sil l'un est⟩ plutot que l'hypothese ⟨Si le multiple est⟩ que developpart Zenon".[11]

There is, though, another way of marshalling the evidence of 136ac such that a different kind of support is found for the belief that Parmenides is going to go to work on the hypothesis 'The One is'. Plato has Parmenides say,

> καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκάτερας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ

πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· (136b1-6)

Here we see a philosophical method emerging. And it looks as if the method is to be used in connection with questions about the existence or non-existence of some supposed entity. About this, Cornford says, "The procedure is to resemble Zeno's insofar as it takes an hypothesis such as 'that *x* exists' and deduces the consequences".[12] Ryle also thinks that the method is one which is to be brought to bear on questions of existence and non-existence.[13] And so, it looks as if the method favours the hypothesis 'The One is'.

Cornford and Ryle are, I think, quite right in taking the importance of 136ac to be the philosophical method which it describes. But I think that they are wrong in assuming that the method is restricted to questions of existence and non-existence. For Parmenides goes on to say

καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων... (136b6-c1)

Given ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο παθος πάσχοντος, it is quite clear that the method is not to be restricted to questions of existence and non-existence. And so, the fact that 'The One is one' is not an existential statement does not disqualify it as a candidate for the method. Hence 136ac does not decide the question "What is the hypothesis of the first two rounds?".

It is to be remembered that my first thesis is that the two hypotheses of the second part are 'The one is one' and 'The one is not'. Ryle could press an objection against this. His objection would be that this thesis is wrong insofar as it does not represent the second part as providing a 'two-way application of the Zenonian method'. I think that Ryle would argue for his point in the following way: Zeno's method requires its practitioners to consider the consequences of contradictory hypotheses; since Parmenides is using this method, we can expect the hypothesis of the first four rounds to be the contradictory of the hypothesis of the last four rounds; but the hypothesis of the last four rounds is 'The one is not'; therefore, we can take the hypothesis of the first four rounds to be 'The one is'. This is a very persuasive argument. Nevertheless, its presumptions may be challenged. The basic presumption is that the Zenonian method is controlling the dialectical process of the second part. But Crombe, quite rightly, points out that,

> . . . from Parmenides' advice to Socrates we ought to expect four extractions of consequences or deductions (how it affects (a) the one and (b) everything else if the hypothesis is (1) asserted and (2) denied). But in fact there are eight and not four, and each deduction in each pair contradicts its colleague. 14

This is a very important observation. And it tells against Ryle's view. The significance of the observation is just this: the Zenonian method does not characterize the most fundamental feature of the second part of the Parmenides. (As a reminder to the reader, may I say that the most fundamental feature of the second part is that Plato has Parmenides compile four pairs of contradictory rounds.) Another presumption of Ryle's argument (albeit an argument which I attribute to him) is that Parmenides would have us consider the consequences of contradictory propositions. In this regard as well, Crombie's intuitions are at variance with Ryle's. Crombie says,

> We will suppose then that Parmenides' affirmative hypothesis is "that the one is one". However when he comes to consider the contradictory of this hypothesis in 160b he says that they must consider what happens "if the one is not", where "is not" naturally means "does not exist" as contradictories is to presuppose that either the one is one or there is no such thing as the one.[15]

Taking a logical point of view, we should have to say that the claim "The One is one" and "The One is not" are not contradictory propositions. But such is not the issue. Rather, the issue turns on how Plato has Parmenides view the relationship between the two claims. Parmenides says,

> Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἓν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὂν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἓν ἐστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν. (141310-142a1)

This passage confirms Crombie's speculation. And there are other places to which we could turn for further confirmation.[16] At any rate, it would appear that Parmenides views the claims 'The One is one' and 'The One is not' as incompatible, insofar as he sees the former as including a presumption as to the existence of the One.

There is a general point which emerges from Crombie's insights. It is that the Zenonian method cannot be considered to be the methodological control upon the dialectical process of the second part. This is not to say that the Zenonian method is irrelevant to the second part. But it is to say that the method cannot be used to arbitrate questions concerning how we ought to interpret the second part. Our reply to Ryle's argument will be this. Since the Zenonian method does not dictate an answer to the question "What are the hypotheses?", we must look to the evidence within the second part in order to answer the question.

Let me summarize what I have been on about. It is to be remembered that we must choose either 'The one is one' or 'The one is' as the hypothesis of the first four rounds. Given these options, I have done two things. In the first place, I have discussed the evidence on behalf of the claim that the hypothesis of the first round is 'The one is one'. This evidence does, I think, speak for itself. There is, though, evidence (but evidence which does not come from the first round itself) that has led commentators to believe that the hypothesis is really 'The One is'. And so, in the second place, I have discussed the evidence which has been offered as support for the view that the hypothesis is 'The one is'; and I have tried to show that the evidence does not prove what it has been thought to prove. What we have done in connection with the first round, we must now do for the second round.

We may begin our consideration of the second round by looking at Cornford's translation of 142bc. It is,

> Start afresh, then, and consider. If a One is, it cannot be, and yet not have being. So there will be the being which the One has, and this is not the same as the One; otherwise that being would not be its being, nor would it, the One, have that being, but to say 'a one is' would be tantamount to saying 'a one (is) one'. But in fact the supposition whose consequences we are to consider is not 'if a one (is) one', but 'if a one is'. This implies that 'is' and 'one' stand for different things.[17]

It is important to note that Cornford provides the phrase εἰ ἓν ἕν with an understood εἶναι. And so, he translates εἰ ἓν ἕν as 'if a one is one'. In a footnote to his translation, Cornford says "In Greek the word 'is' (the 'copula') can be omitted, as here". While it is, of course, quite true that εἶναι can be deleted, the fact that it can be deleted is not yet sufficient reason for supposing that it has been. Perhaps, though, this contention is somewhat too severe. It would be better to say: unless there are special reasons for not accepting the suppressed presence of εἶναι, εἶναι can be understood as having been deleted. I say that there are special reasons for not translating εἰ ἓν ἕν with a suppressed εἶναι. I say that to translate as 'if a One is one' (or, as 'if the One is one') is to have misunderstood the main point of 142bc.

There is a philosophical argument which might well be given on behalf of the standard translations. The argument is this: If the hypothesis were 'The One is one', Parmenides could not infer that the One has being; for the claim 'The One is one' neither reveals nor presupposes an assumption as to the existence of the One; and so, the only available ground for inferring that the One has being is the hypothesis "The One is". I shall make two counter-attacks on this argument. First, as a philosophical argument relevant to our exegesis of the *Parmenides*, it is unsound. Second, even if the argument is sound, nevertheless it can be charged with obscuring assumptions which Parmenides accepts.

If we allow the claim 'The One is one' to become fair-gaime for any kind of philosophical criticism, then we do have to concede that it neither reveals nor presupposes an assumption as to the existence of the One. The most obvious criticism which we may make against the claim is that 'the One' is not an intelligible subject of discourse. But this criticism is no less applicable to 'The One is'; it undercuts 'The One is' as ground for inferring that the One has being as well. And, insofar as it forecloses on both 'The One is one' and 'The One is', the criticism is not one which is relevant to our exegesis. Relevant are those which foreclose on one of the options whilst leaving the other viable.

The criticism being laid against 'The One is one' is that it cannot underwrite the inference of 'The One has being', because it neither reveals nor presupposes an assumption as to the existence of the One. There is a way of blocking this criticism. The way proceeds by analogy. Our initial step is to concede that the claim does not involve an assumption concerning the existence of the One. Next, we take the claim 'The Metre (i.e., the Standard Metre) is a metre' as being analogous to 'The One is one'. By force of the analogy, we infer that the former claim involves no assumption concerning the existence of the Metre. But this result conflicts with a further premise. That premise is "To say of something that it is a metre is to say that it has a length". The conflict between the result of the analogy and the further premise is just this: While the claim 'The Metre is a metre' is supposed to involve no assumption concerning the existence of the Metre, the claim nevertheless reveals that the Metre has a length. (Risking tedium, I say that something which has a length will be either as long as, or longer than, or shorter than whatever else has a length. But how would any of this be possible, if the subject of the first instance did not exist?) The point of the analogy is, then, that just as the ascription of 'a metre' to the Metre requires the existence of the Metre, so the ascription of 'one' to the One requires the existence of the One.

It might seem that the blockage of the criticism is artificial. Nonetheless the analogy is relevant to our exegesis. Its relevance is due to a presumed distinction between 'being the One' and 'being one'. I assume that we are quite prepared to observe a distinction between 'being the Metre' and 'being a metre'; for something can be a metre without being the Metre. Are we also prepared to observe a distinction between 'being the One' and 'being one'? Perhaps not. For, if 'being one' were identical with 'being the One', the claim 'The One is one' would become an identity-claim, and as such it would require no presumption as to the existence of the One. Yet, if this were the case, there could be at most only one thing that is one. Parmenides, though, does observe a distinction between 'being the One' and 'being one' in both the second and third rounds. His motive for observing such a distinction is so that the things other than the One can be one 'in some sense'. In the third, he says,

> Οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τἆλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ. (–Πῇ δή; –) Ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη. (157c1-4)

An important consequence of this distinction is, of course, that the claim 'The One is one' includes a presumption as to the existence of the One.

We have been considering a philosophical argument that might be given against the possibility that the hypothesis of the second round is 'The One is one'. The argument has been stated in the following way. If the hypothesis were 'The One is one', Parmenides could not infer that the One has being; for the claim 'The One is one' neither reveals nor presupposes an assumption as to the existence of the One; and so, the only available ground for inferring that the One has being is the hypothesis "The One is". We have just seen that this argument is unsound. Let us now turn our attention to the textual evidence.

The opening of the second round contains a question which is in two ways interesting. At 142b3-5, Parmenides asks,

> Οὐκοῦν ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα· οὐχ οὕτω;

Notice that Parmenides says τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ. We may wonder whether περὶ αὐτοῦ has reference to τὸ ἕν. If it does, then τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ parallels περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ . . . τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν at 137b3. The significance of the parallel would be that just as περὶ τοῦ ἑνός can be understood as supplying the subject, τὸ ἕν, to εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν of 137b4, so περὶ αὐτοῦ may be understood as supplying the subject, τὸ ἕν, to ἓν εἰ ἐστιν of 142b3. The more interesting (or, perhaps the more puzzling) feature of 142b is the manner in which Parmenides states the hypothesis of the second round--namely ἕν εἰ ἐστιν.

Commentators have wondered not a little about the way in which Parmenides represents the hypothesis at 142b. Most of those who believe that the hypothesis of the first round is 'The One is one' think that Parmenides is about to argue from a new and different hypothesis. Some of those who believe the hypothesis of the first round to be existential think that the unusual placements of ἕν and ἔστιν are meant to indicate that the existential hypothesis has received new meaning. I wish to offer a quite different interpretation of ἕν εἰ ἔστιν. On my interpretation, ἕν εἰ ἔστιν will not be taken to be the hypothesis; rather we will see it as representing the hypothesis. Moreover, on my interpretation ἕν εἰ ἔστιν will be seen as a very ingenious way of respecting the final negative conclusions of the first round. My interpretation will suggest that there is an important connection between the conclusions of the first round and the beginning of the second. Once we see that connection, we will no longer need to speculate about the meaning of ἕν εἰ ἔστιν; the phrase, when understood in the light of the negative conclusions, takes on a very clear meaning.

Concerning the placement of ἔστιν, one thing is quite obvious. By representing the hypothesis as ἕν εἰ ἔστιν (as opposed to εἰ ἕν ἔστιν), Parmenides is focusing our attention on ἔστιν. It is not surprising that he should want to do this. Having just finished the first round, having just argued to the conclusion that the One does not exist, it is not surprising that he should want to make a pointed assertion concerning the existence of the One. But Parmenides is doing more than just this. The first round also denies that the One is one. And this is something else which Parmenides sets out to rectify. These negative conclusions are found at 14139-142a1.

> Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἕν. — Οὐ φαίνεται. — Οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἓν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὂν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν

The significance of this passage is two-fold. From a grammatical point of view, τὸ ἕν . . . οὔτε ἔστιν suggests that if Parmenides' only concern were to reassert the existence of the One, it would be enough for him to say εἰ ἔστιν at 142b3. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that the ἕν ἐστιν of τὸ ἓν οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστιν means '. . . is one . . .'. From a philosophical point of view, we see Parmenides making the existence of the One a necessary condition of the One's being one. Or, in other words, he holds that an assumption as to the existence of the One is presupposed by the claim 'The One is one'. This being so, Parmenides would believe himself to be in a position to restore existence to the One simply by returning the original hypothesis--viz., 'The One is one'. In what way, though, do these considerations have a bearing upon how we ought to understand ἕν εἰ ἐστιν ? Parmenides is not simply concerned with emphasizing that the One exists. He also wishes to emphasize that the One is one. So far, we have spoken of the unusual placement of ἐστιν. But no less unusual is the placement of ἕν; being so placed, εἰ serves to emphasize both ἕν and ἐστιν.

We can understand Parmenides' philosophical motives for wanting to emphasize both ἕν and ἐστιν. We understand that he wishes to say that the One both is and is one. What we need now is a translation which respects his motives. I offer this translation: 'If the one One is . . .'. I, of course, am supplying ἓν εἰ ἔστιν with an understood τὸ ἕν. More importantly, my translation presumes that Parmenides would have us shift ἓν from a predicative position to an attributive position. Such shifting is possible. Moreover, such shifting may be used to emphasize an existential presupposition. Consider the claim 'The chair is green'. 'Green' can be shifted from the predicative position to the attributive position, so that we get 'The green chair is'. It might be suggested that the sentences 'The One is one' and 'The one One is' represent different claims. But what must be at issue is whether Parmenides sees both as representing the two basic features of the One--namely, the One's unity and the One's existence.

I am quite prepared to concede that my translation reads oddly. Nonetheless, I believe that the notion of 'shifting from predicative to attributive position' provides us with the means for understanding what Parmenides has said. We will have occasion to appeal to this notion again. Such an appeal will be laid, whilst we consider the fifth round.

The above review provides me with the means for a second counter-attack on 'the philosophical argument'. The contention that the claim 'The One is one' neither reveals nor presupposes an assumption as to the existence of the One obscures a very important connection between the first and second rounds. Quite simply, this particular argument prevents us from appreciating the evidence. For Parmenides believes that his original hypothesis involves an assumption concerning the existence of the One.

Having removed a philosophical encumbrance upon our understanding, we may proceed to a translation of 142bc. I am about to offer a translation which does not have us supplying εἶναι to εἰ ἓν ἕν. The virtue of the translation is that it gives full scope to what Parmenides himself says about the hypothesis of the second round. Allow me to proceed towards this translation by commenting upon 142bc as it unfolds in the text.

> ἕν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; – Οὐχ οἷόν τε. (b5-7)

However we understand ἕν εἰ ἔστιν, the inference which it is supposed to underwrite is quite clear; that inference is 'The One cannot be, and yet not partake of being'. (We of course, realize that this inference is no less possible with 'The One is one' than it is with 'The One is'.) Parmenides goes on,

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταὐτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἑνί· (b7-8)

It would appear that this further inference is made possible by an assumption belonging to the theory of Forms. The assumption is: Something which partakes of the F, while it is F, is not the F. We, though, will not concern ourselves with the merits of the assumption. At any rate, Parmenides wishes to hold that the being of the One is not the same as the One. We come now to the heart of the matter.

> οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἕν, ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν... (b8-c1)

Parmenides is claiming that if the being of the One were the same as the One, then that being would not be the being of the One, nor would the One have being. This is a rather startling claim. Nonetheless, it is an understandable one in that it rests on the rather simple identity thesis that to be the same as something else is to be that something else. Hence, if the being of the One is the same as the One, then the being of the One is identical with--or rather just, is--the One. Under this condition, it would not be possible to say that there is such a thing as 'the being of the One'. The point which has emerged from b8-c1 is that in order for the One to be it must be different from its being. Parmenides continues and gives us a second reason why the One must be different from its being.

> ...ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἕν τε εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἕν. (c1-2)

On this account, if the being of the One were the same as the One, to say ἓν εἶναι would be to say ἓν ἕν. The converse of this is given at c4-5.

> Οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἕν;
> —Ἀνάγκη.

Hence, if the One and its being were not different things, the expressions ἕν and ἐστιν would mean the same thing, such that saying ἐστιν would be the same as saying ἕν. Herein lies our key for translation 142bc.

> If the one One is, the One cannot be, and yet not have being. Therefore, the being of the One is not the same as the One. Otherwise, that being would not be its being, nor would it, the One, have being; but to say 'is one' would be tantamount to saying 'one one'. But the hypothesis 'If the One one one' is not now the same as the one whose consequences we are to consider; that

> hypothesis being 'If the One is one'. This implies that 'is' and 'one' stand for different things.

Against this translation, it will be objected that it has Parmenides speaking nonsense. But there is no ground here for an objection. 'The One one one' is but an example of what would happen were 'is' to mean what 'one' means. Other examples are 'The desk one brown' and 'Simmias, who one from Thebes, one a friend of Socrates.' Those who supply ἓν ἕν with an understood εἶναι have failed to appreciate the concern which Parmenides gives to the point that 'is' and 'one' mean different things. Parmenides argues: If 'is' and 'one' did not mean different things, ὅμοιον ἂν λέγειν ἕν τε εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἕν. And from this he concludes, Οὐκοῦν (ὡς) ἄλλο τι σημαῖον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἕν. Since νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἕν. . . is nestled in the midst of this argument, it is not unreasonable to suppose that it is intended to have some relevance to the argument. Its relevance resides in the fact that it shows us what would happen to the hypothesis if 'is' were to mean the same as 'one'. But those who supply εἰ ἓν ἕν with an understood εἶναι make what Parmenides says at c2-3 irrelevant to his argument. Although it is true that εἰ ἓν εἶναι ἕν presupposes a difference in meaning between ἕν and εἶναι, for that reason alone εἰ ἓν εἶναι ἕν is not an example which reveals the need for ἕν and εἶναι to have different meanings.

It is to be remembered that the main, major, and perhaps sole reason for taking the hypothesis of the first round to be 'The One is' is that the hypothesis of the second round is (or rather, appears to be) 'The One is'. And the reason which has been given for taking the hypothesis of the second round to be 'The One is' is that since εἰ ἓν ἕν can be supplied with an understood εἶναι, it appears that Parmenides is disavowing 'The One is one' as the hypothesis when he says νῦν δέ οὐκ αὕτη ἐστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν... We, though, have just seen a special reason for not allowing the suppressed presence of εἶναι. It is: Parmenides' purpose is to reveal that ἓν εἶναι would mean ἓν ἕν, if εἶναι were to have the same meaning as ἕν.

Earlier, I raised the issue concerning whether Parmenides sees the sentences 'The One is one' and 'The one One is' as representing the same claim. At 142b3, b5, and c8, Parmenides states the hypothesis by saying ἕν εἰ ἐστιν. But at c2-3, he says,

> νῦν δέ οὐκ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἕν, τὶ χρή συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἕν ἐστιν·

We now have our answer to the question "What is the hypothesis of the second round?". And our answer is "The hypothesis is 'The One is one'".

There is, though, yet further evidence that may be given in support of our answer. At 142de, Parmenides offers a metaphysical analysis of the One. This analysis proceeds from a philosophical interpretation of the hypothesis 'The One is one'. Parmenides begins the analysis by asking the following question.

> εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἕν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου οὗ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τό μὲν ὅλον ἓν ὂν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι; (d1-5)

This interpretation presumes that ἐστιν and ἕν are concommitant predicates of that about which we are hypothesizing (ἐκείνου οὗ ὑπέθεμεθα). Hence, it would appear that Parmenides regards '. . . is one' as a compound predicate of a compound subject (the compound subject being τὸ ἓν ὄν). The third and fourth rounds remain for our consideration.

Parmenides begins the third round by asking, Λέγωμεν δή, ἕν εἰ ἔστι, τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι; Those who accept the view set out above ought to find it very difficult to believe that ἕν εἰ ἔστι could here mean anything other than what it means in the second round. Such a shift would require a precedent which is not in any way allowed for by our view. I mean, since there is no explicit declaration as to whether ἕν εἰ ἔστι of 157b is to have the same meaning as or a meaning different from ἕν εἰ ἔστιν of 142bc, the belief that it has a different meaning is plausible only if the second round is shown to have established a precedent for the continual acquisition of new hypotheses. We, though, do not believe that the second round establishes this precedent. Furthermore, we may go beyond this consideration by pointing to a declaration that does explicitly reveal Parmenides' intention to hold fast to the same hypothesis. At the opening of the fourth round, Parmenides says,

> ... ἐπισκοποῖμεν δε πάλιν ἕν ει ἔστιν, ἆρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ οὕτω μονον; -Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. -Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πεπονθέναι (159b2-5)

Here, Parmenides is reaffirming his intention ἐπιανέλθειν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς (see 142b1).

Even though the evidence that we have just considered is sufficient for our purposes, nevertheless we should proceed beyond it so that we may see how the hypothesis 'The One is one' directs the initial arguments of the third and fourth rounds. The initial argument of the third round is as follows:

> Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἕν ἐστι τἆλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν. – Ὀρθῶς. – Οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τἆλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ. – Πῇ δή; – Ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη. – Ὀρθῶς. – Μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾖ. – Φαμὲν γάρ. – Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὗ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου. (157b8-c8)

Implicit in this argument is a distinction between 'being ordinarily one' and 'being perfectly (παντελῶς) one'. The distinction is reminiscent of 129bd--where Socrates draws a distinction between 'that which just is one' and 'the things which are both one and many'. As for the significance of the distinction to this argument, it is that the distinction makes it possible to say of both the One and the Others. Assuming that the attribute of 'being perfectly one' is what makes the One what is, things other than One could become the same as the One, if they were to acquire the attribute of 'being perfectly one'. The distinction forestalls such a possibility. It allows the Others to be, in some sense, one. At any rate, by bringing this distinction to bear upon the hypothesis Parmenides can go on to speak of the Others as being one. This, then, is the extent to which the hypothesis 'The One is one' directs the initial argument of the third round.

In the fourth round, Parmenides reneges on the distinction of which we have just been speaking. Accordingly, the Others are said to be in no way one. This conflict between the third and the fourth rounds is not unlike one of the conflicts between Socrates' account of the theory of Forms and Parmenides' criticisms of the theory. As we have just seen, the third round shares with Socrates' account a very similar--if not, the same--distinction (namely, the distinction between being 'perfectly one' and 'ordinarily one'). The fourth round, on the other hand, makes use of an idea that is basic to one of the criticisms which Parmenides brings against the theory of Forms. Parmenides' criticism proceeds thusly:

> Do you hold, then, that the Forms as a whole, a single thing, is in each of the many, or how?
> Why should it not be in each, Parmenides?
> If so, a Form which is one and the same will be at the same time, as a whole, in a number of things which are separate, and consequently will be separate from itself.

In the fourth round, we read the following argument.

Οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταὐτῷ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα.- Οὐκ ἔοικεν.- Χωρὶς ἄρα; -Ναί.- Οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν.- Πῶς γαρ; - Οὔτ' ἄρα ὅλον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τε ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει. ... Οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἓν τἆλλά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἓν οὐδὲν. (159c3-d4)

This argument constitutes a denial of the distinction drawn in the third round. What is denied is the notion of 'being ordinarily one'. But the notion of being perfectly one is left intact (τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν).

The hypothesis, when interpreted in accordance with the notion of 'being perfectly one', is then taken to mean that only one thing can be one. Consequently, Parmenides urges the conclusion, Οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἓν τἆλλά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἓν οὐδέν (159d3-4).

There is a methodological observation which can be made here. In the third and fourth rounds, we clearly see the same hypothesis being submitted to contrary interpretations. This fact suggests that the adoption of conflicting interpretations will be a source of the conflicting results. Chapter four will provide us with the opportunity to pursue this suggestion. As for our present task, we have seen it through to completion. The hypothesis of the first four rounds is 'The One is one'.

(B)

This section is devoted to showing that the hypothesis of the last four rounds is 'The One is not'. In arguing for this view, I will also endeavor to show that we ought to distinguish between Parmenides' statement of the hypothesis and his philosophical interpretations of it. The utility served by this contention is that it explains how Parmenides can arrive at contrary conclusions whilst arguing from one hypothesis.

At the opening of the fifth round, Parmenides puts four questions to Aristoteles.

εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν ἆρ' οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ τοῦτο; - Σκεπτέον γάρ. - Τίς οὖν ἂν

> εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; ἆρά τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; — Διαφέρει μέντοι. — Διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τουναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; — Πᾶν τουναντίον. (160b5-c2)

Aristoteles' first response scores, what appears to be, a basic point; the point being that he and Parmenides are about to proceed from that hypothesis that the One is not. But Parmenides' further questioning raises problems that bear on the translation and exegesis of this opening passage. He asks, Τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; A question which we must ask is "Do εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν and εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν have the same meaning?" Assuming that they have the same meaning, difficulties arise in connection with the translation of εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν and εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν.[18] On the other hand, assuming that they have different meanings, we must resolve the difficulty constituted by the apparent shift from the pronounced hypothesis, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, to a different hypothesis.

There are a number of ways in which we could translate εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν. We will consider four possible readings. In the first place, we could take εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν to mean what εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν means; in which case, we translate the former as 'if the One is not'. Dies offers this translation; a translation which a number of commentators would endorse. Cornford, though, criticizes Dies for his reading. Believing there to be a difference in meaning between εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν and εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, Cornford says "Dies misses the point and renders both phrases by *si l'Un n'est pas*."[19] Unfortunately, Cornford does not explicitly state the point which Dies supposedly missed. Is the point a grammatical one? Has Dies failed to appreciate the fact that ἕν, when substantive and unaccompanied by τό, is to be translated as 'a One'? But surely Dies' knowledge could have not failed him in this regard. I strongly suspect that a philosophical consideration prevented Dies from applying the grammatical point just mentioned to εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν. The consideration may be posed as a question. Why should Plato have Parmenides shift from hypothesizing about the One (from εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν) to hypothesizing about a One (εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν)? This consideration places upon Cornford the onus of showing that there is a connection between 'The One is not' and 'A One is not'; a connection which makes it possible for Parmenides to come to conclusions about the One, even though he is proceeding from the hypothesis 'A One is not'. Were Cornford to reveal such a connection, he could then justly speak of 'the point which Dies has missed'. So far as I can tell, he does not discharge this responsibility.

Despite my criticism of Cornford, I wish to be lead by his intuition that there is a difference in meaning between εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν and εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν. The extent to which I agree with him is that I too believe that there is a difference in meaning. I part company with him when it comes to saying what that difference is. There are three ways in which we can give εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν a meaning different from εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν. It is possible to take the ἕν of the former substantively, as Cornford does, so that we read 'if a One is'. But we reject this reading on the ground that it is philosophically implausible.[20] Next, we might take the ἕν of εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν to be predicative; in which case we read 'The One is not one'. The chief difficulty with this reading is that it misrepresents the syntax of the phrase. I mean, it construes the μή as going with ἕν. But, if the μή were supposed to go with ἕν, then εἰ μὴ ἓν ἔστιν would be more likely. As it is, the μὴ goes with the ἔστιν. Beyond this linguistic observation, the text affords philosophical evidence. For Parmenides asks, Διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τουναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν

Assuming that ἕν is not being used substantively, the point which Parmenides is making is that one must say μὴ ἕν when one wishes to deny of something that it is one.

The final possibility, the possibility which gives us the reading that I favour, is that we read ἕν attributively. On first sight, this possibility appears to produce a rather silly reading. For if the ἕν of εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν is attributive to τὸ ἕν, we get 'if the one One is not'. Remember, though, that we are to understand the first occurence of 'one' as attributive, and its second occurence as substantive. Also remember that virtue does not always appear comely. The virtues of an attributive reading are, at least to my mind, quite substantial. Of first importance is the fact that it has τὸ ἕν as the subject of discourse. This fact allows us to circumvent the difficulties in regard to the translation and exegesis of the above passage. On the one hand, we do not need to understand Parmenides as meaning εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν when he says εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστι . On the other hand, we need not suppose that Parmenides shifts from one hypothesis to a different hypothesis. Equally important is the fact that the attributive reading preserves the two basic moments of the aim which Parmenides declares at the beginning of the round. It provides an hypothesis about the One which states that the One does not exist. There is, though, an even greater virtue of the attributive reading. The reading adds something to the hypothesis which, in turn, makes it possible for Parmenides to divide saying what the One is and saying that the One does not exist. Without such a division, the fifth round would not be as it is. I will say more about this in a moment. Finally, the attributive reading reveals that it is possible for Parmenides to recover the assumption that the One is one; an assumption which is quite necessary for some of the key arguments in the last four rounds.

We may presume that Parmenides understands himself to be saying what the One is when he says that the One is one. Now, the hypothesis--as we understand it--allows Parmenides to regain the moment of saying what the One is, even though the basic moment of the hypothesis is to say that the One is not. There is a more elegant way of stating the point. The hypothesis 'The one One is not' reveals the essence of what is assumed not to exist. A question which may be pressed against our view of the hypothesis is "How can the moments of 'revealing the essence' and 'claiming non-existence' be reconciled with the scope of stating the hypothesis?". We may answer this question through a consideration of an ordinary example of linguistic division. The statement "Grampa's desk is brown", although rather elementary, is nevertheless a statement that can be put to different uses. We may use it to claim that Grampa has a desk. Should this be conceded, the point of the claim becomes that of saying what the color of Grampa's desk is. This analysis may seem artificial. But the analysis does show that there are different avenues open for objecting to the statement. Imagine someone responding to the statement by saying "What you say is false". We should be left wondering whether it is false that Grampa has a desk or whether it is false that the color of his desk is brown. Suppose that the conversation in connection with the statement brings to light the fact that Grampa's desk was destroyed in a fire. Even so, it is still possible for us to speak of the color of Grampa's desk while conceding that the desk does not exist. We say "Grampa's brown desk no longer exists". By shifting the predicative expression 'brown' to the attributive position, we are able to divide saying what the color of his desk was from saying that it does not exist. Or, in other words, the concession that his desk does not exist does not always interfere with our saying other things about it. Non-existence need not always make us speechless.

In the fifth round, there is evidence which shows that Parmenides is greatly concerned with the moment of saying what the One is. Consider the following passage.

Τί δ' εἴ τις λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἆρα ἐφ' ἑκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν; – Πάνυ γε. – Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν

> εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει; —Ἴσμεν.— Πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἕν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲν <γὰρ> ἧττον γιγνώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. (160c2-d2)

The initial examples (εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν) appear to raise questions of non-existence. Nonetheless, the point which Parmenides infers from these examples bears upon saying what something is. He infers that we speak of things which are different when we hypothesize that Largeness is not, and that Smallness is not. A question which we may ask in connection with this point is "In what way could non-existent Largeness and non-existent Smallness be different?". Allow me to suggest that the non-existence of Largeness and Smallness does not affect the possibility of stating a definition of each, i.e., of saying what each is. The suggestion has an important consequence. In stating a definition of each, a difference in kind between Largeness and Smallness is revealed. Now, the suggestion and its consequence are, I think, relevant to an understanding of the above passage. As we have seen, the inference that non-existent Largeness and non-existent Smallness are different gives rise to the question "In what way are they different?". Parmenides, though, does provide an assumption which offers an answer. The assumption emerges from his discussion of the non-existent One. He says,

> Πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἕν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε

τὸ μὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲν <γὰρ> ἧττον γιγνώσκεται, τι το λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. (160c7-d2)

It is of signal importance to notice that Parmenides gives priority to 'speaking of something knowable'. (This priority is indicated by πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει.) Parmenides assumes that the moment of speaking of something knowable is prior to the moment of saying that the One is different from other things. (That the latter is secondary is indicated by ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων.) The significance of these observations is that the purported difference between the One and the Others is to be explicated in terms of the knowability of the One. Or in other words, the assumption that the One is knowable may be construed in such a way that we receive an answer to the question "In what way are the One and the Others different?". Furthermore, Parmenides explicitly assumes that the purported difference is unaffected by the existence or non-existence of the One. (His own words are, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι.)

We would do well to speculate about the meaning of γνωστόν. We have rendered γνωστόν as 'knowable'. But beyond rendering it as we have, we should realize that the word has a fairly important place in Greek philosophizing. The assumption that knowledge of a thing is knowledge of its essence is fairly ubiquitous to Greek philosophy. There is, though, a refinement upon the assumption; viz., that an essence is a proper knowable. We are familiar with the arguments that give the assumption and its refinement force. One such argument runs as follows: We know a thing by coming to know what it is; but a thing is what it is by virtue of having the essence that it does have; hence, knowledge of a thing is given by knowledge of its essence; and so, a thing's essence is the proper object of knowledge--the essence is the knowable.[21] The mainspring of the argument is the presumption that an essence constitutes what a thing is. Besides the consequences mentioned, the presumption leads to the further result that the ability to say and know what a thing is requires knowledge of the thing's essence. Now, these considerations permit the speculation that the knowable of which Parmenides is speaking when he says γνωστόν τι λέγει is the essence of the One. For the essence of the One makes it possible for us to know of what we speak. (Parmenides urges such knowledge upon us. He suggests ὅταν εἴπῃ ἕν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει.) Insofar as the essence of the One constitutes what the One is--whether the One exists or not--the essence also constitutes a difference in kind between what the One is and the things other than the One.

If we allow this speculation to stand, we may interpret the above passage as having a distinction between essence and existence contained within it. If that is so, then the passage is a direct challenge against the Parmenidean dictum οὐδέν... ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος. For the presumed distinction allows essence to be independent of existence. Moreover, the distinction is in conformity with our view that Parmenides divides saying what the One is and saying that the One is not.

I have more to say about 160b6-d2. In particular, I wish to contend that we should view the passage as being interpretive, as containing philosophical considerations which are meant to bear upon our understanding of the hypothesis. But since my argument for this contention focuses on a tension between the fifth and sixth rounds, I postpone the presentation of the argument. We will first consider the opening of the sixth round.

Parmenides begins the sixth round, saying

> Αὖθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν ὀψόμενοι εἰ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἅπερ καὶ νῦν ἢ ἕτερα. (163b7-8)

The starting point of which Parmenides is speaking must surely be the hypothesis which he has laid down in the fifth round. For Parmenides is not saying "Let us begin anew"; rather, he is saying "Let us go back again to our starting-point". This evidence is, I submit, sufficient for claiming that the fifth and sixth rounds have the same hypothesis.

In the fifth round, Parmenides has represented the hypothesis in three different ways. They are (i) εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, (ii) εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν, and (iii) ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. The last of these is used to represent the hypothesis in the sixth. There, Parmenides asks,

> Οὐκοῦν ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τί χρὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν; (163b8-c1)

This representation of the hypothesis emphasizes the saying of μὴ ἔστιν. Now, given the outcome of the sixth round, it is not at all surprising that Parmenides should want to emphasize the saying of μὴ ἔστιν. For the ultimate conclusion of the round is that the One is nothing whatsoever. Parmenides proceeds to this conclusion from a philosophical characterization of saying μὴ ἔστιν. He poses his characterization in the following way.

> τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν οταν λεγωμεν, ἆρα μή τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἦ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἄν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι;

In this regard, we may forward a philosophical observation. Whatever the hypothesis of the sixth round be, whether it be the same as or different from the hypothesis of the fifth, it is evident that Parmenides is philosophizing not about the whole hypothesis, but rather about only a part of it; viz., that part comprised by the two words μὴ ἔστιν. His interest in this part of the hypothesis is further evidenced by the fact that τὸ μὴ ὄν is the explicit subject of discourse in four different places. The One, on the other hand, is the explicit subject in only two places. And even so, where the One is the explicit subject, what is said about the One follows from considerations relevant to τὸ μὴ ὄν. These observations allow the conclusion that insofar as the hypothesis of the fifth round contains the words μὴ ἔστιν, that hypothesis is sufficient for the purposes of the sixth round.

At the beginning of this section, I announced the aim of showing that we ought to distinguish between Parmenides' statement of the hypothesis and his philosophical interpretations of it. I wish to pursue that aim presently. The passages which we have been considering (viz., 160bd and 163bc) are, I contend, interpretive passages. Each assumes a philosophical perspective on the different moments of the hypothesis. For the one passage urges philosophical considerations relevant to the moment of saying ἕν, while the other afords a consideration relevant to the moment of saying μὴ ἔστιν.

The dialectical tension which exists between the fifth and sixth rounds is a result of the different philosophical interpretations of the hypothesis. In the fifth round, it is argued that the One, even though it does not exist, nonetheless exists 'in some sense'. Now, Parmenides' explication of the way in which the One exists has its beginning in his interpretation of the hypothesis. By understanding the hypothesis to reveal something knowable, Parmenides then suggests that the subject of discourse is something which is different from other things. He further argues that the One is a 'this'. These considerations together with the assumption that we cannot speak truly of what is not lead to the conclusion that the One exists; otherwise, as Parmenides argues, it would not be true to say of the One that it is knowable, and different from other things, and a 'this'.[22] In the sixth round, on the other hand, it is argued that the One exists in no way whatsoever. The development of this argument begins from the philosophical 'observation' that the words μὴ ἔστιν mean the absence of being. And so, even though there is but one hypothesis, that hypothesis is the source of dialectical tension insofar as it is susceptible to different interpretations.

Finally, we come to the seventh and eighth rounds. We need not go into the details of these rounds. For, there is one piece of evidence which offers sufficient support for the answer herein defended. At the opening of the eighth round, Parmenides says,

> Ἔτι δὴ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι. (165e2-3)

In light of the evidence already considered, this further evidence confirms the view that the hypothesis of the last four rounds is "The One is not".

(C)

A very remarkable feature of the Parmenides is that contrary predicates (or rather, terms which appear to be contrary predicates) are alternately affirmed and denied of the One and the Others.[23] No doubt, it is this feature which leads Russell to say of the Parmenides that it is "perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made".[24] In this section, we will investigate the logic behind many of these conflicts. In particular, we will investigate the logical techniques which stem from, what I wish to call, the theory of opposites.[25] Our investigation will proceed from a detailed examination of a single argument. The scope of our investigation will then be widened to encompass a good number of other arguments.

The argument of which I speak is the first argument of the first round. It runs,

εἰ ἕν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἕν.

(137c4-5)

Prima facie, this argument appears to be unproblematic. But however the argument may appear to us, I suggest that there are serious problems implicit in Parmenides' understanding of it. We can acquire an awareness of these problems by contrasting the opening of the first round with the opening of the second round. The initial theses of the two rounds are ordered under the hypothesis in the following way.

R1

Hyp: If the One is one, then
N1: The One is not many (137c4), . . . and so
N2: The One neither has parts nor is a whole (137c5).

R2

Hyp: If the One is one, then
A1: The One has parts and is a whole (142c9), . . . and so
A2: The One is many (143a3).

The inference of (N1) is rather perfunctorily made. Indeed, it looks as if Parmenides would have us understand the inference as being a consequence of the hypothesis itself. The inference of (A1), on the other hand, is made with the help of some amount of explanation. Nevertheless, Parmenides suggests that even (A1) is a consequence of the hypothesis. He asks, σκόπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὂν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, οἷον μέρη ἔχειν;[26] Quite simply then, Parmenides would have us believe that (N1) and (A1) are both consequences of the hypothesis. Be that as it may, we may at least note that (N1) and (A1) are not contrary claims. Consider first (N1). The thesis seems to be true. (And it would be true, if 'the One' were a significant subject of discourse. But since this reservation is of little help towards explaining the argument, we will not pursue it.) At any rate, a straightforward and simple account of the apparent truth of (N1) can be given. The account is as follows: 'Many' is an expression which is said of plural subjects of discourse; 'the One' is a singular subject of discourse; hence, we cannot say of the One that it is many. Now, even though the claim that the One is not many might be true, the truth of that claim would not preclude the possibility that the One has parts and is a whole. An example would be relevant here. A car will have carbuerators, pistons, bumpers, wheels, etc.; but for all its parts, a car will nevertheless be one car--indeed, one whole car. The general point which we may draw from the example is that the possession of parts does not prevent anything from enjoying unity. Or, in more prosaic terms, something which has parts will nevertheless be one, for it is the one thing which has those parts. These considerations demonstrate that (N1) and (A1) are not contrary claims. Yet, in light of these considerations, it is somewhat surprising to find Parmenides arguing from the hypothesis and (N1) to a thesis which is contrary to (A1). And, it is no less surprising to find him arguing from the hypothesis and (A1) to a thesis which is contrary to (N1). We are inclined to ask "How is all this possible?". To be more precise about the predicament which Parmenides has presented to us, we ask: How is it possible, on the one hand, for (N1) and (A1), as consequences of the same hypothesis, and on the other hand for (N1) and (A1) to be assumptions which lead to consequences that are contrary to the consequences of the first instance? (That is to say, (N1) and (A1), as consequences of the hypothesis, are not inconsistent; but (N1) makes (N2) possible, (N2) being contrary to (A1); and (A1) makes (A2) possible, (A2) being contrary to (N1)). The only answer which we can give is "None of this is possible". This answer underlies the realization that Parmenides' arguments have gone wrong. Our once and future purpose remains that of seeing where and how they have gone wrong. Our investigations of the first argument of the first round will go some way towards fulfilling our purpose.

Even though the inference of thesis (N1) from the hypothesis might well seem to be an obvious deduction, we will see that Parmenides rejects the ground which gives the deduction plausibility. I can think of three possible explanations of the inference; one of which would be a grammatical explanation, another of which would be a metaphysical explanation, and the third of which would be a logical explanation. The grammatical explanation has already been given. But to reiterate it: since 'the One' is a singular subject of discourse, and since 'many' is said of plural subjects of discourse, the One cannot be said to be many. Of the three, this is the safest explanation. For it points to those facts of ordinary language in terms of which thesis (N1) becomes an 'apparent' truth. Unfortunately, though, it will not do as an explanation of how Parmenides understands the inference. In arguing for the thesis that the One neither has parts nor is a whole, he repudiates one feature of the grammatical explanation. The argument is,

> Τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἐστίν. — Ναί. — Τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὗ μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῇ ὅλον ἂν εἴη; — Πάνυ γε. — Ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὂν καὶ μέρη ἔχον. — Ἀνάγκη. — Ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἴη ἀλλ' οὐκ ἕν. (137c6-d1)

The key assumption of the argument is that something which has parts is many. This constitutes a repudiation of the fact that 'many' cannot be said of any singular subject of discourse. And so, the grammatical explanation is inconsistent with the assumption that Parmenides needs for the inference that the One neither has parts nor is a whole. In view of this, we may conclude that Parmenides would not agree to the grammatical explanation of the inference.

I have suggested a distinction between a metaphysical explanation of the inference and a logical explanation of it. The most important feature of this distinction is that it indicates that there are two remaining options for explaining the inference. The terms 'metaphysical' and 'logical' are names by which we may differentiate these options. These options are realized in the following question. Is the One not many because it is the One, or is the One not many because it is one? The first part of the question realizes the metaphysical option; viz., the One is not many because it is the One. The second part realizes the logical option; viz., the One is not many because it is one.

The metaphysical option would seem to be naturally suited to the view that the hypothesis is "The One is". For this option produces the argument "If the One is, it cannot be many"; which fits with reading εἰ ἕν ἐστιν as 'if the One is'. And yet, those commentators who believe that the hypothesis is "The One is" do not distinguish, nor would they wish to distinguish between the metaphysical and logical options. They are prepared to speak as if the hypothesis "The One is" represents both options. In this connection, I would like to remark on a statement that Cornford makes. Concerning the inference of thesis (N1), Cornford says "We are to suppose that the One is just simply one, and nothing else".[27] I wish to bring an objection against this. I do not see how the hypothesis "The One is" warrants the supposition that the One is one. To my mind, Cornford ought to have said "We are to suppose that the One is just simply the One and nothing else". At any rate, I wish to argue against the conflation of the metaphysical and logical options.

Let us take the claim "If the Colour Red is, it cannot be blue", as being analogous to "If the One is, it cannot be many". By extending this analogy in accordance with Cornford's statement, we may suppose that the Colour Red is just simply red and nothing else. (Of course, I will try to refute this extension of the analogy.) Next, we may remind ourselves that whatever is red is not blue. The universality of the preceding statement is important. If the Colour Red is red, then it--like any other red thing--is not blue because it is red. So, if the Colour Red is red, the fact that it is the Colour Red is not the appropriate reason for inferring that it is not blue; rather the appropriate reason is that it is red. But let us have another look at the hypothesis "The Colour Red is". From close inspection, we see that this hypothesis provides us with no means for supposing that the Colour Red is red. It contains no pronouncement as to what the colour of the Colour Red is (i.e., it does not say that the Colour Red is red--it says only that the Colour Red is). Our insistence on this point does lead to a problem. By what reason could we, having assumed that the Colour Red is, conclude that the Colour Red is not blue? The inference is possible. It is possible by means of the supposition that the Colour Red is just simply the Colour Red and nothing else--in which case, the Colour Red is not even red. A number of points can be made in defence of this supposition (and, of course, a number can be made against it), but two points in particular are relevant to this discussion. First, since something can be red without being the Colour Red, 'being red' will not be the same as 'being the Colour Red'; and so, one does not make an assumption as to the colour of the Colour Red when one assumes that the Colour Red is. Second, the supposition gives to the Colour Red the status of a universal. For, as we know, a universal is what an entity becomes when it no longer enjoys the benefits that accrue to ordinary things. Turning now to the other side of the analogy, our result there will be that the One is just simply the One and nothing else--in which case the One is not even one. And there will be two further analogous results. First, since something can be one without being the One, 'being one' will not be the same as 'being the One'; and, so one does not make an assumption as to whether the One is one when one assumes that the One is. Second, the presupposition that the One is just simply the One gives to the One the status of a universal, or as Plato might say 'a Form'.[28]

It is often claimed that the purpose of the first round is to deny to the One every possible predicate.[29] The metaphysical option gives us a new understanding of what this claim means. There is, though, a serious drawback to the option. It would lead to misrepresentation of some of the arguments. Let me demonstrate how such misrepresentation would occur. At 136cd, we have the following argument.

> . . . the One cannot have any parts or be a whole. For a part is a part of a whole; and a whole means that from which no part is missing. So, whether you speak of the One as 'a whole' or as 'having parts', in either case the One would consist of parts and in that way be many and not one.

If this argument were read in accordance with the metaphysical option, the latter part of it would run:

> . . . whether you speak of the One as 'a whole' or as 'having parts', in either case the One would consist of parts and in that way be many and not the One.

We may note that this interpretation of the argument involves a petitio. There is, though, a more significant observation to be made here. The former representation of the argument presupposes that there is a logical relation of contrariety between 'one' and 'many' (such that a thing cannot be said to be one, if it is said to be many). An important lesson which we may learn from this observation is that given the supposition 'The One is one', and given the logical relation between 'one' and 'many', there should be a logical difference between Parmenides' use of τὸ ἕν and his use of ἕν. The difference may be marked in the following way. With regard to τὸ ἕν, the expression is used substantively to identify an entity which we call 'the One'. With regard to ἕν, the expression is used predicatively to ascribe, what we might call, an attribute; and furthermore, an attribute which is contrary to the attribute 'being many'.[30]

By now, it should be quite obvious that those commentators who believe the hypothesis to be 'The One is' would not wish to distinguish between the metaphysical and logical options. Were they to observe the distinction, they could no longer claim that Parmenides supposes that the One is one when he states the hypothesis 'The One is'. But it is evident, and universally conceded, that Parmenides does suppose that the One is one. I have brought to our attention the differences between the claims 'The One is' and 'The One is one' for two reasons. First, those differences are of no little importance when it comes to giving an account of the Parmenides. Second, the differences are no less important when it comes to giving a translation of the dialogue. Of particular significance is the suggested difference between Parmenides' use of τὸ ἕν and his use of ἕν. We, though, have already reviewed some important passages where the observation of this difference is recommended.

Owen, while believing the hypothesis to be 'The One is', nonetheless appears to appreciate the exegetical difficulties presented by that hypothesis.[31] For he has offered a thesis which can be directed to the difficulties. Unfortunately, I do not fully understand Owen's statement of the thesis. But, what I do understand of it has a bearing on this discussion. Concerning the opening of the first round, Owen says,

> (1) 137c: The One is one and not many . . . From this it is deduced that the One cannot have parts or members or be a whole.
> Very likely (1) depends on a confusion between the identifying and predicative use of "S is P": One is not the same as Many and so is not many of anything. Let us call this the I/P confusion. It is surely one source of the so-called "self-predication assumption" which characterizes the theory of Forms both in earlier dialogues and particularly in Socrates' account of the theory in Parm. 128e-130a.[32]

I have a minor criticism to make of this statement. If the I/P confusion is relevant only to statements of the form "S is P", then the confusion is not relevant to the hypothesis "The One is", since this hypothesis is not of the form "S is P". This is, though, a minor criticism. The I/P confusion can be made relevant to the hypothesis "The One is". If Parmenides were to believe that when he says "The One is", he does not only identify something which we call 'the One' but also reveals what the nature of the One is (that nature being 'to be one'), he would thereby commit the I/P confusion. There are several arguments which can be cited in support of this contention. Two such arguments occur at 139bc. They are,

> (i) Were it (sc. the One) other than itself, it would be other than one and so would not be one. (ii) And if it were the same as another, it would be that other and not be itself; so that, in this case again, it would not be just what it is, one, but other than one.

Since Parmenides is here concerned about the identity of the One, he could have--if he had wanted to--argued in the following manner.

> Were the One other than itself, it would be other than the One and so would not be the One. And if it were the same as another, it would be that other and not itself; so that in this case again, it would not just be what it is, the One, but other than the One.

The important difference between what Parmenides does argue and what he could have argued is that in the former there is shifting between the reason that the One would not be itself and the reason that the One would not be one, while in the latter there is no such shifting. As for the significance of the shifting, a reasonable speculation would seem to be that Parmenides sees no logical difference between the One being the One and the One being one; in which case, he would be confused. But however reasonable this speculation may seem, I think that we should withhold the criticism.

Although Owen's thesis may aptly be titled 'The I/P confusion', Owen himself is not prepared to bring the criticism implicit in such a name down upon Plato's head. While it is true that the I/P confusion is present among the arguments of the second part, we may say that where it is present, Parmenides is exploiting it, rather than suffering from it. For there are a number of arguments in which Parmenides disentangles the confusion. Owen cites one such argument.[33] Another occurs at 157be, where Parmenides argues that the things other than the One are nevertheless one in some sense (such would not be possible, if to be one were to be the One). This latter mentioned argument is found in the third round. In the fourth round, Parmenides turns things about by exploiting the I/P confusion. There, he argues that the things other than the One cannot be one in any sense; the turn-around being made possible by the assumption that to be one is to be the One. Now, this evidence strongly suggests that the I/P confusion (or rather, the exploitation of it) might well be the source of various dialectical conflicts. On that possibility, we may anticipate that Owen's thesis will have some utility when we come to analyzing the arguments of the second part. There is one further point which I wish to make about Owen's thesis. It concedes that the hypothesis 'The One is' is not by itself sufficient to generate the supposition that the One is one. Insofar as the thesis lays a bridge between the two claims 'The One is' and 'The One is one', it leads into the logical option.

There remains the question "Is the I/P confusion present to 137c?". If we believe, as I do, that the hypothesis is "The One is one", we will feel no inclination to suppose that the confusion is present there. If the hypothesis were 'The One is", the I/P confusion would have to be appealed to in order to explain how Parmenides goes on to suppose that the One is one. To my mind, no such explanation is needed, because Parmenides begins with the supposition that the One is one.

I wish to argue that the inference of thesis (N1) depends upon, what I will call, the theory of opposites. This theory is a fairly ubiquitous feature of Greek philosophizing. Its initial development seems to begin with the Pythagorean table of opposites.[34] And particular applications of the theory can be found in the writings of the Eleatics, Atomists, and Sophists.[35] We, though, will be primarily concerned with the influence that the theory has upon Plato's work.

A basic precept of the theory of opposites is that opposites must come in pairs.[36] (It would appear that Aristotle is prepared to observe this precept, even when it comes to the doctrine of the mean.[37])

At any rate, in the Phaedo, we find the following pairs: 'equal/unequal', 'tall/short', 'hot/cold', 'odd/even'. And in the Republic, we find 'beautiful/ugly', 'just/unjust', 'double/half', 'large/small', 'heavy/light'. We will refer to these expressions by their ancient name; that name being πρός τι. But, the name has to be taken as a conventional name; conventional, because the aforementioned pairs represent 'a mixed bag'. Furthermore, the fact that they represent a mixed bag will require us to do some sorting. For, without such sorting, we will not be in a position to answer the question "Is the pair 'one/many' a πρός τι pairing?".

Greek philosophers, Plato among them, believe that πρός τι expressions exhibit a logical behaviour that is comparable to the logical behaviour of, what an Aristotelian might wish to call, species-terms which are under the same genus-term. (Allow me to give examples of what I mean. 'Round', 'square', 'triangular', etc., are all species-terms under the genus-term 'shape'. 'Blue', 'red', 'green', etc., are all species-terms under the genus-term 'color'.) Plato provides us with a revelation of this belief in the Phaedo. He has Socrates say,

> It seems to me not only that the form of tallness itself absolutely declines to be short as well as tall, but also that the tallness which is in us never admits smallness and declines to be surpassed. It does one of two things. Either it gives way and withdraws as its opposite shortness approaches, or it has already ceased to exist by the time the other arrives. (102de)

On the basis of this, we can take Socrates to be claiming that a person cannot, at the same time, have both tallness and shortness. In addition to this, since the tallness in a person is supposed to be that which makes it true to say of him that he is tall, and since the shortness in him is supposed to be that which makes it true to say of him that he is short, we can take Socrates to be claiming that we cannot, at the same time, say of a person that he is both tall and short. What are we to make of this? My speculation on this matter is that Socrates is imagining that 'tall' and 'short' have a logical behaviour vis-a-vis one another that is very similar to the logical behaviour which 'round' and 'square' have vis-a-vis one another.[38] Indeed, it looks as if he would be prepared to accept the following analogy. Just as the same thing cannot, at the same time, be or be said to be both round and square, so likewise the same thing cannot, at the same time, be or be said to be both tall and short. This analogy, though, is not very strict, as may be shown by generalization.

> (Lt_1) When two expressions (say, ϕ and ψ) are opposites, a subject of discourse cannot be or be said to be both ϕ and ψ.
> (Lt_2) When two expressions (say, ϕ and ψ) are species-terms under the same genus-term, a subject of discourse cannot be or be said to be both ϕ and ψ.

Two very important dissimilarities emerge from these generalizations. First, (Lt_1) characterizes a logical technique which operates only in connection with term pairings, whereas (Lt_2) may operate in connection with term sets, some of which are open-ended. (The number system is an open-ended set countenanced under (Lt_2). For we have: one is a number, two is a number, three is a number, etc.) Second, opposites, unlike species-terms, do not belong under the genus-term. For example, whereas 'length' is to be reckoned as the genus-term of 'one metre' and 'two metres', there is no genus-term for 'long' and 'short'. Despite these differences, there remains the fact that (Lt_1) and (Lt_2) are supposed to culminate in the same logical behaviour (viz. a subject of discourse cannot be or be said to be both ϕ and ψ). This fact is basic to our discussion of the theory of opposites.

We find arguments which make use of (Lt_1) in the writings of the Eleatics. There, those arguments are used against the possibility of 'what-is' being pluralistic. The Atomists, though, use similar arguments to disprove the reality of the senses, whilst leaving the plurality of 'what-is' unscathed. In light of all this, the position which Plato takes in the Phaedo can be seen as one which eases the intellectual tensions created by the philosophizing of the Eleatics and Atomists. For in the Phaedo, Plato would have tallness and shortness (and by parity of reasoning, other πρός τι pairings) take turns visiting themselves upon Simmias. This, I suppose, might be like having the length three feet and the length four feet take respective turns visiting themselves upon a growing boy. At any rate, in the Phaedo, Plato's attitude towards 'the opposites' is remarkably different from the attitudes of his precursors. The pre-Socratics hold: Since claims such as "Ordinary thing are both hot and cold" would be true of ordinary things if they did exist, such claims are reasons why they cannot exist. Plato, on the other hand, does not accept that such claims are or can be true of ordinary things. His attitude is that we must acquire a revised understanding of what we mean when we say of something that it is both hot and cold.[39] His proposed understanding seems to be that we do not mean what we say when we say this.

The fore-going interpretation of the Phaedo is overly simplified. And because of its simplicity, it is in all likelihood inaccurate, as I have warned in an aside (n. 38). Yet, I do not think that it is too far from the truth. My main reason for presenting the interpretation is that it outlines a rather remarkable contrast between the Phaedo and the Republic.

In the Republic, Plato uses arguments countenanced by (Lt_1) to support a quite different thesis. There, Plato still accepts (Lt_1); he still thinks that there is something wrong in saying of a subject of discourse that it is, for example, both tall and short. But he now allows that we can say of certain subjects that they are both tall and short.[40] The subjects of discourse of which we can say such things are the items of this ordinary world. And his new thesis is this: the fact that we can speak thus of ordinary things reveals that ordinary things are metaphysically and epistemologically defective.[41]

Allow me to summarize the preceding. (I) Where ϕ and ψ

are opposites, if we can say of some subject that it is both ϕ and ψ, then that subject either does not exist (Eleatics) or that subject is metaphysically defective (*Republic*). (II) Where ϕ and ψ are opposites, we cannot not say of a subject of discourse that it is both ϕ and ψ, because the condition upon which we could say both would be that the subject suffer from contrariety (*Phaedo*). In short, the theory of opposites requires us to set restrictions either upon what can be or upon what we can say. That is to say, the theory forces adjustments in either the ordinary world or ordinary language. We may now return to the *Parmenides*.

In the first part of the *Parmenides*, we find Socrates maintaining that 'one' and 'many' are opposites. He says,

> Even if all things (sc. ordinary things) come to partake of both, *contrary as they are*, and by having a share in both are at once like and unlike one another, what is there surprising in that? If one could point to things which are simply 'alike' or 'unlike' proving to be unlike or alike, that no doubt would be portent; but when things which have a share in both are shown to have both characters, I see nothing strange in that, Zeno; nor yet in a proof that all things that are one by having a share in unity and at the same time many by sharing in plurality. But if anyone can prove that what is simply Unity itself is many or that Plurality itself is one, then I shall begin to be surprised. (123e-130a)

What Socrates is saying here echoes the thesis of the *Republic*. Ordinary things are allowed to partake of contrary Forms; that, after all, is the reason for their metaphysical defectiveness. The Forms, on the other hand, are not allowed to enjoy the opposites. But the point which is most relevant to our discussion is that 'one' and 'many' are paired on par with the πρός τι pairing 'like/unlike'.

And so, by application of (Lt_1) we get the following full read-out of 137c4-5. If the One is one, the One cannot be many; since 'one' and 'many' are opposites. We have taken quite awhile to arrive at a rather simple point. I think, though, that our deliberations towards this point will prove useful both presently and later on.

The aforementioned read-out introduces a philosophical consideration by means of which the inference of thesis (N1) can be explained. The consideration is, of course, that 'one' and 'many' are opposites. It is important to realize that this kind of consideration is so familiar to Greek philosophizing that the Greeks would hardly feel the need to give voice to it. But for all that, the consideration is nonetheless susceptible to a philosophical dispute, and even refutation. We will turn our attention in this direction presently.

It is not difficult to understand why dialecticians find the theory of opposites useful. They believe that when one's dialectical opponent is brought to say that the subject of discourse is long and short, or beautiful and ugly, or in general forced to concede that both terms of a πρός τι pairing may be said of the subject, one has forced one's opponent to hold contrary claims.[42] This belief does, of course, depend upon (Lt_1). My objection to the theory is that it contains assumptions which cross-fire upon one another. That is to say, I believe the theory to be incoherent.

There are two cross-firing assumptions. The first is that one can say of some subjects of discourse both terms of a pairing. This assumption concedes what is a feature of ordinary language. We can say of a subject of discourse that it is hot and cold, large and small, etc. Consider the statement "Even though this truck is short for a truck, it is still too long for this garage". Here 'long' and 'short' are said of the same subject; but nevertheless the statement is not tinged with contrariety. And the dialectician would be hard-pressed to wring an absurdity out of it. What the dialectician does is to take advantage of a feature of ordinary language which allows us to economize what we say. A situation in which we could say the statement which we have just considered is also a situation in which we could simply say "The truck is too long". This latter example points out that we are allowed to economize and delete the qualification upon saying of the truck that it is too long; the qualification being that the truck is too long *for a certain garage*. The dialectician takes his start from statements which enjoy the benefits of economizing. And thereafter he systematically ignores the qualifications which could be brought to bear upon saying 'long' and 'short', 'beautiful' and 'ugly', etc., of the same subject of discourse.

Before I proceed to the second assumption, I would like to make the reminder that the Socratic dialogues deal extensively with πρός τι pairings. The following pairs are, to my mind, πρός τι pairings: 'pious, impious', 'courageous, cowardly', 'just, unjust', 'wise, foolish', 'temperate, intemperate'. I make this reminder in view of the fact that these terms share certain similarities with pairings such as 'long, short', 'hot, cold'. One similarity is that they all admit of comparitives and superlatives. That is to say, ordinary language provides us with the following expressions:

> pious, more pious, most pious/ hot, hotter, hottest.
> impious, more impious, most impious / cold, colder, coldest.

Another similarity is that all the terms we are here considering allow us to make statements of comparison. We can say "This desk is *as long as* that desk". Similarly, we can say "Simmias is as courageous as Cebes". But the most important similarity is that the πρός τι terms of the Socratic dialogues, no less than other πρός τι terms, admit of qualification. Examples of this are "He is pious for a merchant", and "It is courageous for an ordinary citizen to take up arms in defence of his country", and "He is just for a used car dealer". Just as saying of a truck that it is too long *for this garage* qualifies saying of it that it is too long, so likewise saying of a man that he is pious *for a merchant* qualifies saying of him that he is pious. We find in the Socratic dialogues an awareness of this third feature of the above expressions. Indeed, the awareness of the feature plays an important role in the arguments of these dialogues. For Socrates argues that πρός τι qualifications are irrelevant to saying what piety is, or to saying what justice is, etc. Socrates' arguments bring us to the second of cross-firing assumptions. The arguments presuppose the second assumption.

In the Socratic dialogues, in the *Phaedo*, in the *Republic*, and in the *Parmenides*, Plato has Socrates argue as if πρός τι terms ascribe, what we might call, attributes. Therein likes the second assumption. In this regard, we may reflect upon a passage from the *Meno*. Socrates says,

> Even if they (virtues) are many and various, yet at least they all have some common character which makes them virtues. That is what ought to be kept in view by anyone who answers the question, what is virtue? (72cd)

Socrates is suggesting that statements which enter qualifications upon saying of someone that he is virtuous are irrelevant to saying what virtue is. For he has rejected Meno's attempts to say what virtue is by saying what is virtuous for a man, and what is virtuous for a woman, and what is virtuous for a child, and so on. The important point in this is that Socrates believes that we can say what virtue is independent of saying what sorts of things can be virtuous. His belief presupposes that virtue is an attribute. But the logic of the word, when compared with genuine predicative expressions (i.e., expressions which do ascribe attributes), reveals that virtue is not an attribute.

It is time to make light of an important difference between πρός τι terms and predicative expressions. As we have seen, a basic feature of the former is that they admit of qualification. But predicative expressions never require nor even allow qualification. We may consider two examples which show that predicative expressions do not require qualification. We, for example, can come to know that 'this thing here' is one metre long without having to know that it is a coffee table. Similarly, we do not need to know that 'this thing here' is a moon rock to know that it weighs 352 grams. Consider, on the other hand, the claim "Simmias is virtuous". If this claim is made without reference to Simmias' manly comportment, or without reference to the ways in which he discharges his family responsibilities, or, should he be a public officer of the state, without reference to his manner of fulfilling his office, if in short the claim is baldly asserted without any intention of making reference to the ways Simmias lives his life, then the claim is not yet a candidate for truth or falsity. And what is more, it might even be meaningless. Consider also the claim "Simmias is courageous". It makes a difference whether we say this of 'Simmias, the ordinary citizen' or 'Simmias, the professional soldier'. Danger is not a frequent feature of ordinary life. Where the ordinary citizen contends with danger, we are inclined to call him courageous. But a professional soldier, in the same situation, might be doing no more than his duty. For this, we would be less inclined to call him courageous. These examples, I take it, reveal that whereas predicative expressions do not require qualification, πρός τι terms do. We may now consider the proposition that predicative expressions do not allow qualification. Our discussion will proceed from three examples.

(a) Cebes is tall for a Greek.
(b) Cebes is 180 centimetres tall.
(c) Cebes is 180 centimetres tall for a Greek.

Examples (a) and (b) present the contrast which we have been considering. Example (c) raises the issue of whether the contrast is merely an incidental feature of ordinary language. More precisely, the issue is this: Is it possible to qualify a predicative expression in the way suggested by (c)? In a sense, (c) is possible. For we can say and write the words contained in the example. And there are philosophical profligates who do defend the thesis "What we can say, we can mean". Be that as it may, whatever the meaning of (c), it would be absurd to think that (c) has reference to a way of measuring which is made possible by some peculiar trait of the Greek people. Quite simply, there are not various kinds of metre measures. There is not one kind of measure for sizing Greeks, nor another kind for sizing Russians, nor another for sizing Canadians. My point is that the metre system allows us to measure without regard to the kinds of things which may be measured. Any purported meaning of (c) which attempts to challenge this point is an absurd meaning. I, though, am convinced that the qualification entered in (c)--viz., 'for a Greek'--is meaningless. For the qualification can only endanger the means by which we can say how tall Cebes is. In general, then, qualifications upon predicative expressions are not allowable.

The facts necessary for showing the theory of opposites to be incoherent are now at our disposal. The theory inclines its adherents towards believing that it operates over pairs of contrary predicates; which is also to say that the theory is thought to operate over term pairings, members of which ascribe contrary attributes. This claim is evidenced by the fact that the pre-Socratics take themselves to reveal contradictions within ordinary reality when arguing from πρός τι pairings. Moreover, the Socratic dialogues provide evidence which shows that Socrates takes the πρός τι terms 'virtue', 'piety', 'courage', etc. to be predicative. But, on the other hand, there is the fact that πρός τι terms are not predicative expressions, the fact that they do not ascribe attributes; otherwise they would not admit of qualification. Greek philosophers do partially acknowledge this fact, insofar as they argue from claims which have both members of a πρός τι pairing said of the same subject of discourse. To the extent that the theory permits, for example, both 'great' and 'small' to be said of the same subject, the theory observes a feature of ordinary language. But the belief that πρός τι terms are predicative engenders a misunderstanding of ordinary language, and an incoherency in the theory. The misunderstanding and the incoherency arise from the fact that πρός τι terms are not predicative and the presupposition that the terms are predicative.

We may turn our present discussion towards the Parmenides. If the first argument of the first round depends on the theory of opposites, then the argument falls with the theory. Now, given the evidence of the first part of the dialogue (viz. 128e-130a), it is reasonable to suppose that the pairing 'one/many' is being treated as a πρός τι pairing. Hence, our argument against the theory of opposites affords us a general reason for discounting the first argument of the first round. There is, though, a special reason which also may be given for discounting the first argument. I will state the special reason later on. Presently, we may move on, and widen the scope of our inquiry.

I have spoken of πρός τι as a conventional name; conventional, because it applies to a mixed bag of different kinds of terms.[43] I wish to offer a sorting of the bag. I will divide πρός τι terms into three groups.[44] The first group is to be called 'the C-group'; so named, because the terms within this group admit of comparitives. The second group is to be called 'the R-group'; for it comprises relative terms. And the third group is to be called 'the P-group'; for the pairings within the group consist of polar opposites.

Most of the aforementioned examples belong to the C-group. There are, though, two subdivisions within this group. Some C-group pairings align themselves with genera-terms; some do not. Examples of pairings which align with genera-terms are 'hot/cold', 'tall/short', 'light/heavy'. Alignments are possible in the following ways:

(A1) S_1 is as C as S_2; hence S_1 and S_2 are the same G. (Eg., this table is as long as that table; hence they are the same length.)

Notice that this alignment is possible for both members of a C-group pairing; eg., this table is as short as that table, hence they are the same length.

(A2) S_1 is C-er than S_2; hence they are different G's. (Eg., this cup is heavier than that cup; hence they are different weights.)

Those C-group pairings which do not align with genera-terms generally go by the name 'moral and aesthetic predicates'. As examples, we may cite 'good/bad', 'beautiful/ugly', 'just/unjust', 'courageous/cowardly', etc. Consider the claim "Helen is as beautiful as Aphrodite". And ponder these questions. Would the truth of this claim make possible an inference comparable to "These sticks are the same length, since they are as long as one another"? Can we align '. . . as beautiful as . . .' with an expression of the form '. . . the same G'? Various philosophers have suggested that such an alignment is possible. They have taken beauty to be the genus of things which are beautiful, goodness to be the genus of things which are good, justice to be the genus of things which are just, etc. We, though, are quite familiar with the philosophical problems which attend this general position.[45] And existence of those problems is sufficient to warrant our division of C-group pairings. Nonetheless, even though we mark a difference between the moral and aesthetic terms and the other C-group pairings, there remain two important similarities. First, all C-group terms admit of comparitives and superlatives; they admit of more and less, and of most and least. Second, all such terms also admit of qualification.

The second class of πρός τι pairings will have the name 'R-group'. The basic feature of the terms belonging to this group is that the terms reveal that there is a relationship between two subjects of discourse without revealing what the relationship is. Consider the following statements.

(i) This car is the same as that car.
(ii) This desk is like that desk.
(iii) This stick is equal to that stick.

The truth of the first statement depends upon a fact such as the two cars being of the same model. There are, though, other ways in which cars may be the same. In addition to making statement (i), it is possible for someone to go on to say "For neither of them works"; and in going on to say this, he has revealed facts in terms of which statement (i) would be true. In any case, the point is that statement (i) does not make light of any facts by virtue of which it would be true to claim (i). And since such relevant facts underlie what the relationship is, statement (i) can do no more than indicate that there is a relationship. The same point can be made about (ii) and (iii). There are many ways in which desks may be like one another. Statement (ii), though, does not reveal any facts relevant to saying in what way the two desks are alike. As for the two sticks, it is possible for them to be equal in length or equal in weight or both. But no facts relevant to these different ways of being equal are disclosed by statement (iii).

It is interesting, perhaps even philosophically significant, that while the early and middle dialogues deal extensively with pairings from the C-group, the second part of the *Parmenides* is directly concerned with the R-group pairings 'same/different', 'like/unlike', 'equal/unequal'. At any rate, a passage from the second indicates rather explicitly Parmenides' intention to treat 'same' and 'different' as if they ascribe contrary attributes.

> αὐτό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἆρ οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις; -Πῶς δ᾽οὔ; - Ἦ οὖν ἐθέλησει ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἕτερω ἐν ταὐτῷ ποτε εἶναι; -Οὐκ ἐθελήσει.-Εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἕτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον χρόνον οὐδένα·
> (146d5-9)

Our response to this manner of philosophizing is that it is incoherent. More importantly, we have the means to diagnose what has gone wrong. Sameness and difference (if we may speak this way) are not ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις. Hence, the suggestion that they cannot be in the same thing at the same time fails. Similarly suspect are the arguments which would have the One and the Others either both the same as and different from one another or neither the same as or different from one another. But, the view which we have developed in this section affords us only a partial 'handle' on the arguments from Sameness, Difference, Likeness, etc. Section (D) imports further philosophical equipment for analyzing these arguments.

The final class of πρός τι pairings will take the name 'P-group'. Within this class are the expressions 'finite/infinite', 'in motion/at rest', and 'temporal/atemporal'. These pairings can be philosophically troublesome; and this is something which the *Parmenides* does exploit at times. The most significant feature of these pairings is that (Lt_1) seems to become a valid logical technique when used in connection with the pairings. For each of the pairings contain 'polar opposites' between which there is no middle ground. Hence, the possibility of qualification does not arise in connection with them. Furthermore, one term of each pairing may be aligned with a genus-term, while the other term may be used to deny the applicability of that genus term. ('Finite' may be aligned with the genus-term 'number'; but as for 'infinite', to say of something that it is infinite is to deny that it has a number. 'In motion' may be aligned with 'velocity'; as for 'at rest', the terms may be used to say of something that it has no velocity. 'Temporal' may be aligned with 'time'; as for 'atemporal', to say of something that it is atemporal is to deny that it has a time.) These facts indicate a difference between C-group terms and P-group terms. Both terms of a C-group pairing align with the same genus-term. For example, something which is 20 degrees Centigrade in temperature may be said to be both hot and cold. But something which is ten in number cannot be said to be both finite and infinite. Thus, insofar as polar opposites do not admit of qualification, and insofar as such opposites do not align with the same genus-term, it appears that (Lt$_1$) is a valid logical technique when used in connection with them.

We may now consider what conditions are presupposed by the use of these pairings. Our purpose is that of settling a framework in terms of which we may analyze those conflicts which arise in connection with P-group pairings. We can fairly say that 'finite' means 'having some number'. As for 'infinite', we might say that it means the opposite of 'finite'. But if we were to say just this, and no more, we would be inviting difficulties. If infinite were to mean no more than 'having no number', unicorns and centaurs would be infinite. There are three conditions which are applicable to the use of 'infinite'. That which is said to be 'infinite' must be something (i) which we can begin to count, and (ii) which we can continue to count, and (iii) which we cannot finish counting. Thus, the possibility of counting is a condition relevant to using both 'finite' and 'infinite'. At any rate, we see that 'having no number' is ambiguous between 'not being countable (at all)' and 'being infinite'. We find a similar ambiguity in connection with Parmenides' use of ἄπειρον. In the first round, Parmenides argues,

> Οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη. —Ὀρθῶς. —Καὶ μὴν τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχή πέρας ἑκάστου. —Πῶς δ' οὔ; —Ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἕν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει. (137d4-8)

In saying of the One that it is ἄπειρον, Parmenides here means that it is neither limited nor unlimited. This claim is analogous to "Unicorns are neither finite nor infinite". But in the second round, ἄπειρον, acquires a different meaning. Parmenides asks, Οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἓν ὂν εἴη ; We may schematize these facts.


Having no number
Not being countable
Infinite
Having a number
Finite
Being countable (in a sense)


Ἄπειρον
Having no parts
Unlimited
πέρας
Limited
Having parts

Earlier I said that πρός τι pairings from the P-group can prove to be philosophically troublesome. The schemata bear my point out. Of particular relevance to the Parmenides is the fact that the second schema shows that the opposition between ἄπειρον and πέρας can be exploited in different directions.

Similar schemata can be developed for 'in motion/at rest' and 'temporal/atemporal'. This, though, will be done within our commentary.

There remains one question to be answered within the space of this section. It is: Is 'one' a πρός τι expression?[46] My answer is 'No'. 'One' has a genus-term; viz., 'number'. Furthermore, it belongs to a set of species-terms that are under the head of 'number'. It belongs with 'two', 'three', 'four', etc. Hence, 'one' is an expression over which (Lt_2), and not (Lt_1) operates; which means that there is a logical disparity between 'one' and 'many'. For 'many' is a C-group term. 'Many' admits of a comparitive and a superlative (viz., more and most). It also admits of qualification (viz., '. . . too many for . . .'). In fact, 'many' belongs to the C-group pairing 'few/many'. In which case, (Lt_1) becomes the operative technique to be used in connection with many. Earlier, I spoke of a special reason for discounting the first argument of the first round. That reason is now available. Even if the theory of opposites were generally valid, its basic technique is nevertheless inapplicable to the pairing 'one/many'. This conclusion underlines a point which emerged at the beginning of this section. The apparent truth of the first argument of the first round is owed to a grammatical, and not a logical, relation between 'one' and 'many'.

I might just add here that the Ancients did come to treat 'one' as if it were a πρός τι expression. They came to philosophize with expressions such as 'as one as', 'more one than', and 'most one'.[47] This manner of philosophizing is closely connected with one of their major philosophical endeavors--that of saying what substance is.[48] We will have occasion to briefly consider this endeavor in the following section, where we will ask "Is 'one' a formal concept expression?".

(D)

In this section, I discuss Ryle's thesis on the *Parmenides*. His thesis does, I believe, contain an important insight; an insight, which is relevant to many of the arguments in the second part.

Ryle holds that the purpose of the *Parmenides* is to show that contradictions and absurdities result when the distinction between formal concepts and material concepts is violated.[49] We may distinguish two features of the thesis. First, it offers to explain the conflicts of the dialogue in terms of the failure to observe an important distinction. Second, it purports that the purpose of the dialogue is to demonstrate the necessity of such a distinction. Now, I will speak of the former as 'the basic feature of the thesis'. At any rate, the whole thesis may be confronted with the following question: How does the *Parmenides* accomplish the demonstration of the necessity for a distinction between formal concepts and material concepts? Ryle's answer is,

> When we treat a formal concept as if it were a non-formal or proper concept, we are committing a breach of 'logical syntax'. But what shows us that we are doing this? *The deductive derivations of absurdities and contradictions shows it, and nothing else can*. Russell's proof that, in his code symbolism, ϕ cannot be a value of x in the propositional function ϕx is only another exercise in the same genre as Plato's proof that Unity cannot go into the gap in the sentence-frame '. . . exists' or '. . . does not exist'.[50]

This appeal to Russell is understandable. For Russell would have us understand that the contradictions generated by the function $\phi(\phi x)$ underline the need for a distinction which forecloses on the function. By imputing a similar purpose to Plato, Ryle may see the *Parmenides* as demonstrating the need for a distinction between formal and material concepts. But we may challenge this view of the dialogue. And we may do so by also appealing to Russell.[51] A philosopher who lacks a healthy sense for reality will, by virtue of his failing, misunderstand the nature of paradoxes and dilemmas. For paradoxes and dilemmas will make him suspicious, not of his philosophizing, but rather of reality. Indeed, the history of philosophy is full of countless theorizers who have offered deductive derivations of absurdities and contradictions to show that reality is unreal. And so, the fact that the Parmenides contains derivations of absurdities and contradictions cannot be counted as a sufficient reason for concluding that the purpose of the dialogue is to reveal a distinction which forecloses on the absurdities and contradictions. This criticism, though, is one which has been previously made, and there is no need to dwell on it. Rather, we should learn what we can from the basic feature of Ryle's thesis.

I would like to cite two objections that have been brought against Ryle's thesis. Runciman has argued,

> Ryle's whole interpretation implicitly attributes to Plato a knowledge of the distinction between semantics and ontology which Plato never possessed. Now this distinction is obviously relevant to a critical examination of Plato's views, and it is a distinction of which Aristotle was certainly aware. But there is abundant evidence in Plato's dialogues that he himself was not--that is to say, that he was incapable of distinguishing a purely logical or syntactical question as such.[52]

Quite simply, the objection is that Ryle's thesis is too sophisticated. Be that as it may, it is important to realize that Runciman has conceded that the distinction is 'obviously relevant to a critical examination of Plato's views'. For my part, I am prepared to make this same concession. More importantly, I wish to incorporate the basic feature of

Ryle's thesis into our critical examination. Owen puts the second objection.

> . . . he does not, of course, offer to show that Plato's antinomies follow from their first premisses as directly as those which Russell collected to argue the need for a theory of types. On Ryle's own survey of the Parmenides there seem to be many other premisses and assumptions intervening in the plot. The reader is left to wonder whether these interventions are systematic or perhaps just random--as they might be expected to be, for example, on Robinson's thesis that Plato "is genuinely failing to notice the extra premisses as such". But the answer, I think, is that they are systematic.[53]

Runciman objects that Ryle's thesis does too much. Owen objects that it does too little. But neither is inclined to reject its basic feature. Neither would suggest that the dialogue does not violate a valid distinction between formal concepts and material concepts. Of course, this is not to say that they have criticized Ryle unfairly. The difficulties of which they speak are genuine. Nonetheless, we may insist that those difficulties bear upon only that feature of the thesis which purports to state the purpose of the Parmenides. Their criticisms do not affect the utility of its other feature. In this section, I hope to show to which arguments of the dialogue, and in what ways, the basic feature of Ryle's thesis is applicable.

Before taking on the task of presenting and assessing evidence which is relevant to my present purpose, I would like to make a few comments about the distinction between formal concepts and material concepts. I do not think that we should view the distinction as something which reveals a fundamental difference between two kinds of concepts. For I do not think that we can give a singular definition of material concepts. I would urge that we see the expression 'material concepts' as a foil to 'formal concepts'. In my opinion, the utility of the distinction resides in the fact that it isolates a select group of expressions as formal concept expressions. When it comes to identifying expressions as material concepts, we should not take ourselves to have revealed anything insightful about the expressions so identified. Rather, we should take ourselves to be saying no more than that they are not formal concept expressions. At any rate, while I think there to be a utility in speaking of material concepts, I do not think that such claims will have much significance. Concerning formal concept expressions, let us briefly consider two questions: first, what is a formal concept?; second, how may we identify a formal concept expression? If the first question is intended as an invitation to define formal concepts, then we should, I think, forego answering it. For I am convinced that Ryle's intuitions concerning formal concept expressions are dead-right. The most basic of his intuitions is this: By their paradoxes, you shall know them.

I consider the following expressions to be formal concept expressions: 'is', 'same', 'different', 'like', 'unlike', 'equal', and 'unequal'. In each case, it is possible to generate various paradoxes by taking the expression to be substantive, or predicative, or a genus-term, etc. The treatment which ἔστιν receives in the opening of the second round is an excellent case in point. There, Parmenides speaks of 'the being of the One', and also of Being simpliciter and the One simpliciter. The phrase 'the one of the One' suggests that 'being' is to be understood as a genus-term, analogous to terms such as 'color', 'size', and 'shape'. (The similarity underlying the analogy is given by phrases such as 'the color of the One', 'the size of the One', and 'the shape of the One'.) Parmenides then goes on to speak of ἔστιν as if it were a substantive term. He asks,

> Οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἕν; (142c4)

Further evidence indicates that ἔστιν is supposed to stand for Being simpliciter. Now, the opening of the second round is a curious and paradoxical passage. And I am suggesting that we may better understand its arguments and conclusion by variously modelling . I will follow through on this suggestion shortly. Let us, though, first consider some simpler paradoxes. Towards showing that the One and the Others are alike, Parmenides argues,

> Ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τἆλλά που ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη. - Τί μήν; - Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττον; Τί γὰρ ἄν; - Εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὁμοίως. (147c2-6)

And he redoubles this argument with the conclusion that,

> Οὐκοῦν ᾗ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τἆλλα τῷ ἑνί. (147c6-8)

Parmenides is here treating ἕτερος as if it were a predicative expression, and as such capable of being entered into the following argument pattern: If S_1 is P, and S_2 is P, then S_1 and S_2 have the same G. One can hardly imagine a paradox more curious than "The One and the Others are alike insofar as they are different". But, in fact there is one.

Parmenides also argues,

> Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον. – Ναί. – Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταὐτῷ. – Καὶ τοῦτο. – Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο γ' ἐφάνη, ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις ταὐτόν. – Ἐφάνη γάρ. – Τοὐναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων. – Πάνυ γε. – Ἧι γε μὴν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον ἐφάνη. – Ναί. – Ἧι ἄρα ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τοὐναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. (148a6-b5)

So as to leave us without any doubts as to his meaning, Parmenides summarizes the conclusions of the above arguments.

> Ὅμοιον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἕν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ᾗ μὲν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον, ᾗ δε ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον. (148c1-2)

At any rate, the key assumption within the latter argument is that Sameness is an attribute (for which 'same' would be the corresponding predicative expression) which is contrary to the attribute Difference. The ensuing paradox is sufficient reason for condemning the argument and its assumptions.

Even though the above arguments demonstrate the applicability of the basic feature of Ryle's theis to the dialogue, I wish to propose an amendment to the thesis. The amendment is proposed in light of the fact that the thesis, as it now stands, does not account for all the conflicts to which it is relevant. The thesis, as it now stands, reads: The Parmenides treats formal concept expressions as if they were material concept expressions. But, in fact, there are arguments which treat formal concept expressions as formal concepts. In other words, in the course of the dialogue, formal concept expressions are shifted between formal concept roles and material concept roles. Hence, the amendment is that the Parmenides treats formal concept expressions as if they could be both formal concept and material concept expressions. The amendment will allow us to characterize certain conflicts which arise between the affirmative and negative round, and also other conflicts which occur within the affirmative rounds. We will find arguments whose conclusions depend upon treating formal concepts as material concepts conflicting with other arguments whose conclusions depend upon treating formal concepts as formal concepts. An excellent example of the shifting of formal concepts between roles is found at 139d.

> Οὐδὲ μὴν ταὐτόν γε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται.- Πῶς δ' οὔ; - Οὐχ ἧπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὴ δήπου καὶ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ. - Τί δή; -Ὅτι οὐκ, ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν γένηταί τῴ τι, ἓν γίγνεται. -Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; - Τοῖς πολλοῖς ταὐτὸν γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι άλλ' οὐχ ἕν.

Here, on the one hand, Οὐχ ἧπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὴ δήπου καὶ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ casts αὐτός into a material concept role; for it presumes that Sameness is a genus. On the other hand, though Ὅτι οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν γένηται τῴ τι, ἓν γίγνεται shifts αὐτός back into a formal concept role, where it functions to make possible comparisons. In this case, the comparison is between 'the many' and something which is becoming many. Notice that Parmenides is arguing that something which becomes the same as the Many must become many. By parity of reasoning, it is possible to argue that something which becomes the same as the One must become one. Of course, Parmenides does not offer this argument. Rather, he goes on to argue that Sameness is different from the One. There are a good number of arguments in which formal concept expressions are shifted between formal roles and material roles. And in the course of our commentary, we will have occasion to review them. Presently, I would like to state a philosophical consideration which shows the necessity for the shifting of formal concept expressions when formal concepts are presumed to be material concepts.

Let us accept simplistic characterizations of formal and material concepts. Let us, on the one hand, say of formal concepts that they are modes of combination. On the other, we say of material concepts that they are the elements within the combinations made possible by formal concepts. We will apply these characterizations to an example no less simple than they are. The example is "The apple is red". The elements combined within the example are a substance-term (viz., 'the apple') and a color-term (viz., 'red'). As for the copula, since it is a mode of combination, it makes it possible for us to go beyond speaking of some substance, and also beyond speaking of some color, towards saying what the color of this substance is. Now, if the mode of combination is taken to be an element of the combination (i.e., if the formal concept is taken to be a material concept), the mode must then have two roles; otherwise there will be no combination. Unless the mode is both an element of that which is bound and a mode of binding, the elements will not be in combination. With regard to our example, the utterance "The apple is red" would be, not a statement, but merely a series of expressions, each of which is identifying a different element, if 'is' were only an element of the utterance. Quite simply, then, a shifting between roles is required. We now have both a textual evidence and a philosophical consideration to give in support of the amendment to Ryle's thesis.

The amended thesis will permit us to analyze conflicts which arise between the affirmative and negative rounds, and furthermore to analyze conflicts which arise within the affirmative rounds. In this connection, we may here consider arguments from the first and second rounds. In the first round, we find the following argument.

> Ἕτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἑνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρου, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί. (139c3-5)

In this argument, ἕτερος is being cast as a material concept; for the argument presumes 'Difference' to be a concept which makes possible the sorting of things. It presumes that we may sort a set of items into groups, one of which consists of things which are different, the other of which consists of things which are not different. Turning to the argument in the second round which gives the opposite conclusion, we find ἕτερος in a formal concept role.

> Οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἕν ἐστιν, ἄπανθ᾽ ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἕν; —Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; —Ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων. (146d3-5)

Here, ἕτερος is used to reveal that there is a contrast between the One and the Others. The contrast is made possible by the assumptions that the One is ἕν, and that the Others are μὴ ἕν. Indeed, the employment of these assumptions makes it possible to state a way in which the One and the Other are different. In any case, the argument observes the formal nature of ἕτερος.

Let us now consider a conflict which occurs within the affirmative second round. In the second, the contrary conclusions "The One is different from the Others" and "The One is the same as the Others" are argued for. We have just seen the argument for the former conclusion; we have seen that it casts ἕτερος as a formal concept expression. As for the latter conclusion, we will see that its argument uses ἕτερος as if the expression were a material concept expression.

> Ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τἆλλά που ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη. ... Οὐκοῦν ᾗ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τἆλλα τῷ ἑνί. (147c2-8)

This argument changes horses in mid-stream. It begins with a claim that does not offend the formal nature of ἕτερος. But a shift in the treatment of ἕτερος allows Parmenides to assume that Difference is a way of being the same. There are fairly clear indications that the presumption behind the argument is that Difference is an attribute. For πέπονθεν and πεπονθότα are verbal cognates of πάθος. From a linguistic point of view, we may say that ἕτερος is being modelled as a predicative expression. For the suggestion, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τἆλλα τῷ ἑνί, is generally applicable to predicative terms such as 'red', 'two metres', etc. I mean, things which are red are the same (in color), and things which are two metres are the same (in length). And so, on either ground, we may say that Parmenides is treating ἕτερος as if it were a material concept. There is, though, yet another way in which to view the above argument. In section (C), we placed 'different' among those πρός τι expressions which reveal that there is a relation between subjects of discourse without revealing what the relation is. The claim which begins the above argument satisfies this characterization of 'different'. But Parmenides then goes on to argue as if he had disclosed assumptions that would allow him to compare the One with the Others. Thus, again we see ἕτερος being shifted between roles.

Earlier, I promised an analysis of the opening of the second round. I wish to follow through on that promise here. Even though a discussion of the passage is not needed to accomplish the purpose of this section (for we have seen the truth and utility of Ryle's amended thesis), nevertheless the passage deserves discussion here and now. It deserves discussion because of its importance. The dialectical development of the dialogue, the development of large-scale conflicts, is largely due to the philosophizing found within this passage. Our analysis of the passage will prepare a way towards understanding these conflicts.

There are three arguements within the passage which I wish us to consider. Each argument, in its own way, demonstrates the liberty Parmenides exercises in connection with the word ἔστιν. The first argument is,

> ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; -Οὐκ οἷόν τε.- Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταὐτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἑνί· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἕν, ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἕν τε εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἕν. (146b5-c2)

Consider the suggestion that if the being of the One were the same as the One, then that being would not be the being of the One. In some philosophical quarters, this suggestion would be received as offensive. And the response to it would be "If the One and the being of the One were different, the One would not be what it is".[54] We, though, need not enter this dispute. Rather, we will consider a modelling of οὐσία which will allow us to understand the suggestion. By taking οὐσία to be a genus-term, we will have a rationale for the conclusions here urged by Parmenides; viz., that the one would not have Being, and that the being of the One would not be the being of the One. Modelling ἔστιν as a genus-term, we understand it to be analogous to terms such as 'shape', 'length', and 'color'. Furthermore, we understand the following argument to be analogous to the one which Parmenides has stated.

> If this table-top were the same as its shape (let us assume that the table-top is square), then the shape square, would not be the shape of the table-top; nor would the table-top have a shape.

This argument invites us to consider the identification of an object with a shape. That is to say, we are asked to suppose the table-top to be identical with the shape square. Allowing the supposition, we may conclude that the table-top has been done away. For the table-top is something which has the shape square. Hence, in that we have identified the possessor of the shape with the shape, we have done away with the possessor of the shape. Or in other words, the shape square cannot be the shape of the table-top, if there is no table-top for which it is the shape. Now, the analogy permits us to offer the following rationale for the conclusion that the being of the One would not be the being of the One. If the One were identical with its being, the One could not be the possessor of its being; hence, we could not speak of the being of the One, since there would be not the One to which that being would belong. This rationale also explains why the One would not have Being. For the One would not have its being, rather it would be its being.

As I have already pointed out, Parmenides shifts from speaking of 'the being of the One' to speaking of 'Being simpliciter'. The shift is necessary for the conclusion of the second argument; the conclusion being that the One is a whole which has the parts Unity (τὸ ἕν) and Existence (τὸ ὄν). The argument is,

> σκόπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον
> ὂν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, οἷον μέρη ἔχειν; - Πως; - Ὧδε· εἰ
> τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός,
> ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἕν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ
> ἐκείνου οὗ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἆρα οὐκ
> ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἓν ὂν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι
> μόρια τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι; - Ἀνάγκη. (142c8-d5)

It is important to notice that Being is characterized, not as a part of the One, but rather as a part of a whole of which the One is also a member. The significance of this is that the One and Being are to be seen as comparable elements within a whole. This view of the subject of discourse contrasts with seeing the One as a whole to which Being belongs as a part; in which case the One and Being would not be comparable elements. Although the contrast may seem to be of little consequence (for in either view, Being is taken to be a part of a whole, with the consequence that the whole is pluralized), the difference can be realized through seeing that the former view (which has the One and Being as comparable elements) leads into a paradox which is not possible under the latter view.

The paradox arises from the following assumption: ἔστι δὲ δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἕν. The assumption makes it possible for us to ask the question "If the One and Being are different things, different elements, by reason of what will the One exist?". If, as Ryle suggests, being unitary is different from being an existent, then the element which is unitary will not be an existent, and will not exist. Indeed, the non-existence of what is unitary is necessary for maintaining that what is unitary and what is existent are different things. Hence, the compound (the One, Being) turns out to be a compound of an existent element and a non-existent element. Such a compound would, I think, be entitled to the description "both is and is not". The conclusion which we have just arrived at is, in itself, paradoxical. But to be more precise, the paradox resides in the fact that the characterization which introduces the supposed elements of a supposed combination is such that one element of the combination turns out to be non-existent.

I have suggested that the paradox does not arise where the One is taken to be a whole of which Being is a part. Allow me to offer a demonstration of this. Consider, again, the two claims,

(i) τὸ ἓν ὄν is a whole of which the One and Being are parts.

(ii) τὸ ἕν is a whole of which Being is a part.

These claims may be symbolized in the following way,

(iii) W(τὸ ἓν ὄν): P(the One), P(Being)

(iv) W(τὸ ἕν): P(Being).

(It should be obvious how we are to read (iii) and (iv). Even so, lest there be a misunderstanding, I'll explain the code. 'W' indicates that the following expression will have reference to a whole. Accordingly, 'P' indicates that the following expression will have reference to a part of the whole already designated.) Now, let us assume that a part will bestow its nature upon the whole of which it is a part. The assumption allows us to say of the One, whether we describe it in accordance with (iii) or (iv), that it exists. But, on the other hand, the assumption does not permit us to say that some other part of a whole exists. For the part, Being, is assumed to bestow its nature, not on a co-part, but rather on the whole of which it is a part. In view of this consideration, we see that the One, as described by (iv), avoids the paradox by not having the One as a co-part along with Being. So described, the One has no part which lacks being.

The assumption which makes possible the preceding argument may be credited to Parmenides. In the opening of the second round, Parmenides first of all insists that the One cannot be and yet not have

Being. He then offers to prove that the One has Being as a part. By putting these two contentions together, we may presume that Parmenides believes that existence is bestowed upon the One by virtue of having Being as a part. With regard to the symbolizations entered above, I would like to make one further point. I have spoken of a shift between talking about 'the being of the One' and talking about 'Being simpliciter'. Insofar as (iii) characterizes Being as a co-partner of the One, that description permits the shift.

The paradox presents Parmenides with a special problem. He has offered to show that the subject of discourse is a whole composed of the parts, the One and Being. But the paradox threatens the former part with non-existence. And so, we may wonder whether Parmenides has a way of avoiding the paradox. It seems to me that he does have a way of avoiding it. I think that he avoids it by means of an infinite regress. This infinite regress is found in the third argument, where Parmenides draws the conclusion that the One is an infinite manifold. But I wish to suggest that the basis for the regress is established in the second argument.

Let us reconsider the saying τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός. It is important to notice that ἔστιν and ἕν are paralleled as expressions 'said of' some subject of discourse. It is also important to notice that each of the expressions is said of a subject of discourse which is a compound subject. (For ἔστιν is not said of just τὸ ἕν, rather it is said of τὸ ἓν ὄν; and ἕν is not said of just τὸ ὄν, but of τὸ ὂν ἕν.) Since we take Parmenides to be arguing from the hypothesis εἰ ἓν ἔστι τὸ ἕν, we may ask "What bearing do our present findings have upon the hypothesis?".* We have already characterized . . . ἓν ἔστιν as a compound predicate. Our findings would seem to indicate that the expressions form a compound predicate which is to be said of a compound subject of discourse. There is further evidence to this effect. Parmenides takes himself to be hypothesizing not just about the One, but rather about the One which is. For remember that the negative conclusions urged at the end of the first round demand that the existence of the One be a necessary condition for claiming that the One is one. Also, Parmenides claims that ἔστιν and ἕν stand for different things; in which case, if ἔστιν is said of just τὸ ἕν (and not of τὸ ἓν ὄν), then ἔστιν is being said of something which is τὸ μὴ ὄν. For, ἔστιν --if it stands for Being--must be said of Being. This evidence points to the lesson that Parmenides thinks it possible to say ἔστιν of τὸ ἕν, only if τὸ ἕν and τὸ ὄν are in combination. A general assumption is in the offing. It is as follows. An expression may be said of a subject of discourse, only if the expression has reference to what is 'in' the subject. The application of this assumption has the result that ἔστιν can be said of τὸ ἕν only if τὸ ὄν is a part of (and, hence in) τὸ ἕν. There is another way in which this result may be stated. If ἕν and ἔστιν are expressions which stand for τὸ ἕν and τὸ ὄν respectively, and if, therefore, τὸ ἕν and τὸ ὄν are different elements, then any subject of discourse of which it is possible to say both ἕν and ἔστιν must be a compound of which τὸ ἕν and τὸ ὄν are parts.

The above review demonstrates that Parmenides' characterization of the subject of discourse is a result of philosophical assumptions which he has brought to bear upon the hypotheses. But, as we have already seen, to characterize the subject of discourse as a whole of which the One and Being are parts is to invite a paradox. How, then, is the paradox to be avoided? Here is how Parmenides does it.

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*We may ask this, others may not.

τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἆρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου; – Οὐκ ἂν εἴη. – Πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερων τό τε ἓν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὖ μορίον τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἀεί, ... ὥστε ἀνάγκη δύ' ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἓν εἶναι. – Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. – Οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἓν ὂν εἴη; – Ἔοικεν. (142d9-143a2)

Parmenides avoids the paradox by assuming that each part of the whole must be as the whole is; that is to say, each part must be a compound of which the One and Being are parts. Now, the necessity of their being so is forced by the consideration: otherwise the part, the One, would be apart from Being, and hence not be. Of course, the same necessity must be visited upon each part of each part, and so on.* In this way, Parmenides arrives at the conclusion that the whole, must be unlimited in multitude. We, though see that this conclusion has been forced by infelicitous assumptions about Being. Allow me to use Parmenides' own words to remind us of two such assumptions.

ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἕν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου οὗ ὑπέθεμεθα, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἓν ὂν εἶναι αὐτό (142d2-5)

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*Similar paradox, for the part, Being.

The reader will have noticed that I do not include 'one' among the formal concept expressions. My reason for excluding it from that group is quite simple. 'One' is a species-term belonging under the genus-term 'number'; as such 'one' is a colleague of 'two', 'three', 'four', etc. I realize that this prosaic view conflicts with some rather more sophisticated views. In light of this, I wish to discuss briefly a more sophisticated view.

Aristotle's arguments concerning 'the concept of unity' place the expression 'one' under two different roles. In the first role, 'one' is relevant to the task of saying whether something is a substance. In the second, the expression--but more basically, the concept underlying the expression--is thought to be fundamental to the development of both the number system and measurement systems. There is, I think, a tension existing between these two roles. Moreover, I think that such tension should lead us to suspect the significance of one of these roles; namely, the first.

Concerning the second role, Aristotle says,

> . . . measure is that by which quantity is known; and quantity _qua_ quantity is known either by a 'one' or by a number, and all number is known by a 'one'. Therefore all quantity _qua_ quantity is known by the one, and that by which quantities are primarily known is the one itself; and so the one is the starting point of number _qua_ number. And hence in the other classes too 'measure' means that by which each is first known, and the measure of each is a unit--in length, in breadth, in depth, in weight, in speed.[55]

Whatever the particular merits of this account, Aristotle is surely right about one thing. The number system is fundamentally basic to the various measurement-systems.

Let us now consider Aristotle's characterization of the other role which he bestows on 'one'.

> . . . 'one has several meanings; the things that are directly and of their own nature, and not accidentally one may be summarized under four heads, though the word is used in more senses. (1) There is the continuous, either in general, or especially that which is continuous by nature and not by contact nor by being tied together; and of these, that has more unity and is prior whose movement is more indivisible and simpler. (2) That which is a whole and has a certain shape and form is one in a still higher degree. . . . Some things, then, are one in this way, qua continuous or whole, and the other things that are one are those whose definition is one; i.e. those the thought of which is indivisible; and it is indivisible if the thing is indivisible in kind or in number. (3) In number, then, the individual is indivisible, and (4) in kind, that which in intelligibility and in knowledge is indivisible, so that that which causes substances to be one must be one in the primary sense. (my italics).[56]

I have underlined in the above phrases which allow a comparitive use of 'one'. I mean, if something which is a whole is one in a higher degree and has more unity than something which is not a whole, then we may speak of the former as being more one than the latter. And given the supposed senses under (3) and (4), the following example is possible. A man is more one than a bundle of sticks, since a man is indivisible with respect to number and intelligibility, whereas a bundle of sticks is not.

I think it fairly obvious that senses (3) and (4), and perhaps also (2), are to be understood as relevant to the question "What is a substance?". But what is more, Aristotle suggests that (4) provides 'what it is to be one in the primary sense'. Against this view, I should like to suggest that there is a confusion between 'the various conditions of applicability for the expression one' and 'the meaning of the expression one'. For such a confusion permits an argument which approximates the results of Aristotle's view. The argument is as follows. Since the meaning of 'one' depends upon the condition of its applicability, and since there are various and different condition relevant to the use of 'one', therefore the expression must have as many meanings as there are conditions relevant to its use.

My view is that the meaning of 'one' is solely and exclusively secured by the role which it plays in counting. Whether we are counting bundles or men, the effect is the same. Given a set of bundles, or a set of men, we may count either; beginning by saying of one of them 'one', of another 'two', of yet another 'three', and so on. As I have said before, it is a simple view.

What I have said so far does not indicate why some philosophers feel inclined to view 'one' as a formal concept expression. But, such a view is a consequence of what we have been considering. Like Aristotle, many philosophers believe unity to be a ubiquitous feature of 'things that are'. On the basis of this belief, Aristotle further suggests,

> That in a sense unity means the same as being is clear from the fact that its meanings correspond to the categories one to one, and it is not comprised within any category (e.g., it is comprised neither in 'what a thing is' nor in quality, but is related to them just as being is); that in 'one man' nothing more is predicated than in 'man' (just as being is nothing apart from substance or quality or quantity); and that to be one is just to be a particular thing.[57]

The analogy between being and unity has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, the analogy is taken to constitute a reason for characterizing 'one' as a formal concept expression. But, if this analogy is allowed various disparities occur between 'one' and other number-expressions.

With respect to other number-expressions, there is no parallel to the claim that 'one man' predicates nothing more than is predicated by 'man'. For it would be false to say, for example, that nothing more is predicated by 'two men' than is predicated by 'men'. In the latter we say what, and in the former we say how many what. And furthermore, if there were no difference between saying 'two men' and 'men', then there would be no difference between saying 'two men' and 'ten men'. If, on the other hand, there is a difference between saying 'two men' and 'men', why should there not be a difference between saying 'one man' and 'man'? In order for Aristotle to forestall the question which I just now raised, he would have to enter an assumption purporting that the meaning of 'one' is different in kind from the meanings of other number-expressions. But such an assumption would presume a disparity between 'one' and the number expressions.

Since Aristotle's philosophizing makes a comparitive notion of 'one' (i.e., '. . . more one than . . .') appear conceptually attractive, we may wonder whether his notion may be generalized and applied to other number expressions. Consider, then, this example: Three men are more three than three bundles. What sense are we to make of this? It purports that there is a difference between three men and three bundles. But that difference cannot be a difference in number. Can we refer to the supposed difference to the individual items spoken of in the example? No; to do so would be to revert to the notion of '. . . more one than . . .', when what we want is an explication of '. . . more three than . . .'. And so, it again appears that there is a disparity between 'one' and other number-expressions.

I think that the disparities which we have uncovered are evidence of a tension between the two roles that Aristotle would have 'one' play. By reason of this, I also think that we should suspect the significance of the role which presumes 'one' to be somehow basic to saying what substance is.

(E)

The preceding sections have presented theses which pertain to the interpretation and analysis of individual arguments in the second part of the Parmenides. In this section, I introduce a thesis which may be used to illuminate the structure of the second part.

The conflicts between the affirmative rounds (where the One and the Others are allowed to enjoy many 'attributes') and the negative rounds (where the One and the Others are forbidden any 'attributes') are structured by, what I will call, the Separation Assumption. As we shall see, this assumption is a two-edged sword, either side of which can cut against the One. On the one side, it cuts thusly: If the One exists, then it is not truly one but rather many. Its other cut against the One is: If the One is separate (i.e., truly one), then it does not exist. A further refinement on the latter is "And if the One does not exist, it cannot be one". And so in either case, the Separation Assumption threatens the unity of the One. But the One is not the only victim of the Separation Assumption. For it is given the occasion to threaten the plurality of the Others.

In offering a thesis which purports to illuminate the structure of the conflicts, I take myself to be proposing a thesis which is relevant to the following general conflicts.

I. (A) The One has no attributes whatsoever. (It is neither one nor many; neither limited nor unlimited; etc. Round 1.)

(B) The One has many attributes. (It is both one and many; both limited and unlimited; etc. Round 2.)

II. (A) The Others have many attributes. (They are both one and many; both limited and unlimited; etc. Round 3.)

(B) The Others have no attributes whatsoever. (They are neither one nor many; neither limited nor unlimited; etc. Round 4.)

III. (A) The One (which is not) has many attributes. (It is both one and many; both like and unlike etc. Round 5.)

(B) The One (which is not) has no attributes whatsoever. (It is neither one nor many; neither like nor unlike; etc. Round 6.)

IV. (A) The Others appear to have many attributes. (They appear to be both one and many; both like and unlike; etc. Round 7.[58]

(B) The Others appear to have no attributes. (They appear to be neither one nor many; neither like nor unlike; etc. Round 8.)

What I am calling the Separation Assumption has its name on loan from the theory of Forms. The Separation Assumption of the middle dialogues lays the following requirements upon the Forms.

(i) A Form must be intelligible

(ii) A Form must be changeless

(iii) A Form cannot be qualified by contrary predicates.[59]

We may concede that should an entity meet these requirements, then that thing would acquire for itself a status that sets it quite apart from the ordinary items of this world. But however that may be, it should be quite clear that these requirements have an epistemological orientation. For in the middle dialogues, Plato would have these same requirements as conditions for being an object of knowledge.[60] I suggest that there is another requirement, one which is logical in nature, that may be laid upon the Forms.

We may note that (i)-(iii) allow a Form to have attributes. What a form cannot have is contrary attributes, which would interfere with the Forms intelligibility and changelessness, and furthermore be the basis for the ascription of contrary predicates to the Forms. Similarly, a Form is allowed to be qualified by predicates, so long as it is not qualified by contrary predicates. All this seems fair enough. Nonetheless, the possibility of a Form having various attributes is sufficient to get the theory into some minor logical difficulties. One such minor difficulty arises from the following considerations. Let us suppose that there is a Form of justice, and a Form of goodness. Let us further suppose that Justice is good. The theory of Forms offers to explain how this is possible. By its account, we may say of Justice that it is good, because Justice partakes what it is, it would seem that Justice runs the risk of losing an important feature of 'what it is to be a Form'. For, if Goodness supplies Justice with what it is (i.e., with its essence), then Justice cannot be truly said to belong among the things which are αὐτὰ καθ᾽αὕτα.[61] There is, in this minor difficulty, one point which requires special consideration. It is that predication requires participation. This could well be a slogan for us: Predication requires participation. Our slogan is a useful chant. Even the problem of self-predication marches under its banner. Given the assumptions of the theory of Forms, to predicate, for example, 'large' of 'the Large' is to presuppose a Form other than, as the logicians would have it, 'the Large$_1$' such that the Large$_1$ partakes of another Form. Or, in other words, predication requires participation. A common feature of these two problems is that each would have that which is predicated different from the subject of discourse.[62] This point suggests a way out; a way, which appeals to a logical requirement.

By making the Forms non-participants both of themselves and of one another, they will no longer suffer these problems of predication. But the move would require a separation assumption that is stronger than the Separation Assumption of the middle dialogues. The assumption of the middle dialogue forbids the forms from having contrary predicates. The stronger assumption, which we are here envisaging, would forbid the Forms from having any predicates at all. This new Separation Assumption would even prevent the Large from being large, and the One from being one.

The new Separation Assumption begins to make its appearance in the first round.

> Ἕτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἑνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρω τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί.—Ὀρθῶς—Τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· ἢ οἴει;—Οὐ δῆτα.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὂν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον. (139c3-d1)

It might be thought that c3-4 (Ἕτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἕν) leaves the one as a candidate for self-predication. That is not the case. In this passage, there is a conflation of the identifying and predicative uses of ἕν. Furthermore, the conflation is brought down on the side of identifying the One. Cornford's translation of the passage makes the conflation perspicuous.

> Nor can it be other than another, so long as it is one. To be other than something properly belongs, not to 'one' but only to an 'other than another'. Consequently, *it will not be other in virtue of its being one, and so not in virtue of being itself, and so not as itself*; and if as itself it is not in any sense, it cannot be other than anything. (my italics)

Take note of the fact that there is a translation here from 'the One not being other in virtue of its being one' to 'the One not being other in virtue of being itself (i.e., in virtue of being the One)'. I suggest that a conflation of the identifying and predicative uses of ἕν underpins this transition. There is, though, additional evidence on this point. At 140a, Parmenides says,

> Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τις πεπόνθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἕν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον.

We may contrast what is said here with, what Vlastos would call, the Non-Identity Assumption.[63] In order to get the regress of the Third Man going, one must assume that when one says "The Large is Large" one has predicated of the large something which is different from the large. But the above rebutts the applicability of such an assumption to the One. The One cannot suffer anything which is separate from the One. For if the attribute 'being one' were allowed to be separate from the One, the One would not be, as Cornford says, a bare One.[64] Rather the One would be a complex; it would be a whole having the attribute 'being one' as a part. This possibility does not arise here because of a conflation of the identifying and predicative uses of ἕν. Thus, the problem of self-predication is forestalled within 139b-140a. And what is more, the conflation makes the One truly separate; it makes the One something to which no attributes belong.

The new Separation Assumption can be used to lay down a direct path to denying of the One that it exists. The first step along the path is made possible by analogy. That step is: existence, no less than sameness and difference and no less than likeness and unlikeness, is something which is different from the One. The next step is one which we are quite familiar with. It is: If the one exists, it will be more than one. This can be taken on analogy with "If the One is the same, it will have the attribute of sameness, and thereby be more than one". Or, in other words, just as Parmenides says "The nature of unity is one thing, the nature of sameness another", so he could say "The nature of unity is one thing, the nature of existence another". The final step along this path is: If the One is, the one will suffer something different from 'being one', and so will be more than one. But that, as we are told in the first round, is impossible. Hence, the One does not exist. This, then, is one of the cuts that the Separation Assumption can make against the One.

Some commentators have had a vision of this direct path towards denying existence to the One. Cornford says about 141e (where Parmenides denies that the One exists),

> The conclusion itself--that the One can have no sort of being--is sound, and could be deduced directly from the definition in the first paragraph of the Hypothesis. If we conceive the One as one and nothing else whatever, it cannot have any second character that could be meant by the word 'is' in any of its senses.[65]

And in a footnote to this remark, Cornford adds,

> This is remarked by Proclus (vi, 251), who adds that Plato could hardly have opened his argument by deducing that the One has no sort of being immediately from the supposition εἰ ἕν ἔστιν, which it would have appeared to contradict (and does in fact contradict).[66]

Proclus and Cornford, it would appear, share a rather curious attitude towards the hypothesis and the conclusion that the One does not exist. On the one hand, they see the conclusion as following directly from what is said about the One at 137cd. Yet, on the other hand, the conclusion contradicts their understanding of the hypothesis. At any rate, I think that Proclus and Cornford are being overly optimistic in thinking that the denial of existence arises directly out of the opening of the first round. For the denial is possible only after the Separation Assumption is exercised on the hypothesis. And, by my reading of the text, the Separation Assumption is not introduced into the argumentation until 139de. Prior to this passage, there is no ground for assuming that the One and Being are different natures. Nevertheless, they see that the denial of existence requires that the One be a nature which has no attributes, and furthermore that existence be one of the attributes which the One will not have. They have, then, appreciated the effect that the Separation Assumption has upon the One.

In view of the fact that the Separation Assumption can be used to lay down a direct path towards denying that the One exists, it is somewhat surprising to find Parmenides using an indirect path. Insofar as the assumption permits Parmenides to distinguish the nature of the One from the nature of the Same, it would also permit him to distinguish the nature of the One from the nature of Being. And he could thereby draw the conclusion that the One does not exist. But, in the first round, Parmenides does not place upon Being a nature. Be this as it may, the indirect path also depends upon the Separation Assumption. The reason which Parmenides gives for denying existence to the One is that since the One is not in time, it does not exist.[67] This reason, though, depends upon the theses that the One is neither younger nor older than itself or another, and that the One is not the same age as itself or another. But the mainsprings of these theses are that in order for the One to be older or younger than itself or another, it must have the attribute 'being different'; and that in order for the One to be the same age as itself or another, it must have the attribute 'being the same'.[68] Here I am following Cornford.

> Whatever exists in time must be a different age at every moment from its age at any earlier moment; and the lengthening interval between its younger self and its older self must always be the same interval between its older self and its younger self. But we have seen that no propositions involving the terms 'same' and 'different' can be true of the One we have defined.[69]

Quite simply then, Parmenides assumes that 'being younger' and 'being older' depend upon 'difference', while 'being the same age' is assumed to depend upon 'sameness'. This shows that the indirect path towards the denial of existence follows out of the Separation Assumption of 139de.

The Separation Assumption has two cuts to make against the One. We have just seen the first. Before we proceed to the second, we may consider a refinement upon the first.

Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα τὸ ἓν οὐσίας μετέχει. - Οὐκ ἔοικεν. - Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἕν. - Οὐ φαίνεται. - Οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἓν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὄν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· (141e9-11)

This shows that Parmenides is prepared to separate the One from 'being one'. Notice, though, that the wedge which Parmenides is using to accomplish their separation is different from the one which I have used on a number of occasions. I have urged a distinction between a Form and its accompanying attribute. In the above, the complicity of Being, prevents the One from being one. Nonetheless, it is the separability of the One which is controlling the outcome of the first round.

We have seen that the Separation Assumption provides simplicity. But in the case of the One, the cost of the simplicity is non-existence. There is, though, a converse application of the assumption, which requires that the One be complex, if it is to exist. And this is the assumption's second cut against the One. Allow me to further explain myself. If the One is separate, it cannot partake of any nature other than itself. In this way, the One would enjoy simplicity, and be the 'bare' One. And, on the assumption that Existence is a nature, the One becomes non-existent. Conversely, though, if the One does exist, and thus does partake of existence, it becomes complex. Or, to speak as Parmenides does, the One becomes many.

Οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν τὸ ἕν, διὸ ἔστιν; - Ναί - Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἓν ὄν πολλὰ ἐφάνη. (143a4-6)

Hence, the Separation Assumption by means of its converse applications, is largely responsible for both the poverty which the One suffers in the first round, and its over-burdening plentitude in the second round. Similar perspectives may be taken with regard to the other six rounds. And so, the Separation Assumption has a general role to play in the generation of the dialectical conflicts.

Although I would give the Separation Assumption a special role, I am not suggesting that it is of singular importance. The applicability of the assumption turns on the various philosophical interpretations set upon the hypotheses. We will consider the foundations of those interpretations later. Presently, we will give brief consideration to how the Separation Assumption enters into the other six rounds.

The third round is a companion to the second round. For the third attempts to show that the Others enjoy all the 'contrary attributes' which are given to the One in the second round. The fourth round is a companion to the first. For in the fourth the Others are shown to be as barren as the One of the first round. Our question is this: How does the separability of the One make these parallels possible? With regard to the fourth round, it is quite obvious that the separate One is supposed to prevent the Others from having any attributes. The argument which starts us towards this conclusion is as follows.

> Ἆρ οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι; - Τί δή; - Ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, ὃ ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τοῦ ἑνός, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων· ... χωρὶς ἄρα; - Ναί. - Οὐδὲ μὴν μόρια γε ἔχειν φαμέν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν. - Πως γάρ; - Οὔτ' ἄρα ὅλον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τε ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει.
>
> (159b6-c7)

This argument begins a round whose purpose is to show that the Others do not have any attributes. But the argument is about the One. And it is an argument in which are contained assumptions about the separability of the One. In our commentary, we will see how the barren One keeps the Others impoverished.

There is a very interesting contrast between the third and fourth rounds. In the fourth, Parmenides claims that,

> Οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μορίον τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα. (159d1-2)

But in the third round, he claims that

> Οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τἆλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ... Ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη. (157c1-4)

Parmenides then goes on to reveal that the Others are parts of a whole by virtue of possessing (μετέχοντα) unity. This revelation is reminiscent of a claim made within the second round. There, Parmenides says,

> Τὸ ἓν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσιάς πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος ἐστιν. (144e3-5)

Thus, it would seem that the One's ability to be parsed out by Being makes it possible for both the One and the Others to have parts and be many.

We may summarize these findings with respect to the first four rounds. (1) If the One is separate, it does not exist; and furthermore, both the One and the Others turn out to be nothing whatsoever. (2) If the One exists, Being parcels it throughout 'reality', so that both the One and the Others become indefinitely numerous. We may now briefly consider the last four rounds.

Rounds five and seven are companions to one another. Each attempts to show that its subject of discourse may have the contrary predicates said of it. Rounds six and eight, on the other hand, move in the opposite direction. Each attempts to show that its subject of discourse has no attributes at all. The basic assumption of all these rounds is that the One does not exist.

The sixth round produces an expected result. If the One does not exist, it cannot be anything at all. In the eighth, the argument towards the conclusion that the Others are nothing at all proceeds from the assumption that the Others are not one.[70] Parmenides then goes on to argue that the Others cannot be many because none of them can be one thing. The assumption underlying this further assumption must be that the possibility of 'being one' is foreclosed by the non-existence of the One. A more elegant way of putting the point is this: When the One is separated from 'what-is', its nature (viz. 'to be one') cannot be enjoyed by other things.

The fifth and seventh rounds begin from quite similar assumptions. In the first case, Parmenides assumes that we are saying something meaningful when we say "The One does not exist". From this he infers that we mean to be speaking of something, and furthermore of something knowable, when we say that the One does not exist.[71] In the second case, Parmenides says,

> Ἄλλα μέν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο. (164b6-7)

These two assumptions may be closely aligned with, what I will call, Linguistic Pluralism. One feature of Linguistic Pluralism is this: If an expression is meaningful, then that expression must mean something (i.e., some entity).[72] For example, if the expression 'the One' is meaningful, that expression must have reference to something.[73] There is another feature to Linguistic Pluralism. It is: In order for different expressions to have different meanings, the expressions must have reference to different things. The first feature is quite obviously operating in the seventh round; where Parmenides says "If the Others did not exist, we could not speak of the Others".[74]

The first feature is operating in the fifth round as well. There Parmenides asks,

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει; (160c5-6)

This question appears to invite the following objection: All along, Parmenides, you have been insisting that in order for the One to be anything at all, it must have being; but now you are saying that the One is something different and something knowable, even though you have assumed that the One does not exist; therefore, you are violating the dictums of the Separation Assumption. While it is true that Parmenides seems not to be affronted by self-contradiction, this conflict appears to be more basic than the others. For it appears that Parmenides is here departing from the assumption whose different sides structure the opposite ways of the dialogue. Parmenides, though, does recover himself. By assuming that the One which is not is different from other things,[75] he proceeds to the following result.

> Καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἑκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τουτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ ἂν τι ἦν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἄν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων. (160e2-7)

Parmenides then makes his way to the conclusion, καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ [τὸ ἓν] μετέχειν πῃ. This conclusion brings the fifth round into conformity with the dictums of the Separation Assumption. For the Separation Assumption would have existence as both a necessary and sufficient condition of a subject that is a compound possessing attributes. 'The One which is not' of the fifth round conforms to this requirement. Even though the existence of τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕν is circumscribed, nonetheless Parmenides does grant it existence.[76]

(F)

The preceding section introduced a topic which deserves further comment. That topic is Linguistic Pluralism. Linguistic Pluralism is a philosophical foundation for the Separation Assumption. Indeed, it is a foundation for both sides of the assumption. On the one hand, it provides a philosophical characterization of conceptual and ontological simplicity. On the other, it is also responsible for the existential failure that the separables suffer under condition of such simplicity.

The most forth-right statement of Linguistic Pluralism occurs within the second round.

> ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς; -Ἔγωγε.- Τί οὖν; το αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ; -Ἔγωγε.- Πότερον οὖν ἐάν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὗπέρ ἐστι τοὔνομα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα φθεγξῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταὐτὸν καὶ λέγειν ἀεί; (147d1-6)

Parmenides applies this general statement to the case of ἕτερον. Concerning ἕτερον, he says,

> Ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, δὶς τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν ᾗσπερ ἦν τοὔνομα (147e3-6)

The pluralistic consequences of this position are obvious. Since each word is supposed to have meaning by virtue of referring to some singular nature of which the word is a name, and since ἕτερον, αὐτός, ὅμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἔστιν, etc., are different words, there will be a singular and separable nature corresponding to each word. On this account, then, language mirrors an ontological populace. In any case, of signal importance is the claim that each word is the name of some one nature. This provides a philosophical basis for the ontological and conceptual simplicity of the separables. For, the simplicity of each separable guarantees that each word will have a single and constant meaning. And each separable, being just what it is, may be taken singularly into mind (αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸ λάβωμεν -143a7).

This, though, is but one side of the story. If ἕτερον, αὐτός, and ἔστιν are each a nature, the separables in general will suffer existential and identity failings. They will neither exist, nor be the same as themselves, nor be different from one another, if ἔστιν, αὐτός, ἕτερον are each a name of a simple nature. The following argument demonstrates the point.

> ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἓν οὐσίας μετέσχεν. -Ἀνάγκη.- Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν τὸ ἓν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. - Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. -Ὥστε οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον. (143b1-7)

Thus, if the One, or any other separable, is to be different from another, it must partake of difference. But such participation would prevent it from enjoying simplicity. Similarly, in order for a separable to exist, or to be the same as itself, it would have to partake of Being or Sameness. But that would visit complexity upon the separable. Consequently, simplicity may be enjoyed only on the conditions of non-existence and non-identity. Linguistic Pluralism, then, has consequences similar to those realized under the Separation Assumption.

Linguistic Pluralism plays a significant role in two rounds of the Parmenides; in the second and in the fifth. In the former, Parmenides uses Linguistic Pluralism to interpret the hypothesis. By so interpreting the hypothesis, he takes himself to be in a position to argue that the One has parts, and what is more, an infinite number of parts. And in the latter, the assumption "To say something meaningful is to mean some thing" is basic to the round.

Linguistic Pluralism comes to the second round in the following form: ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἕν. Accordingly, Parmenides takes the is of 'The One is one' to have reference to Being. He, then, infers that since the One exists, it must be composed of the parts Unity and Being. As we have seen, this inference leads into an infinite regress that provides the One with an infinite plentitude of parts. In this connection, though, Parmenides doubles his effort, and provides another proof to the same effect. Proceeding from the assumption that the One (since it is, and is different from Being) has the parts τὸ ἕν, ἡ οὐσία, and τὸ ἕτερον, he argues to the conclusion that the One is ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.

In the fifth round, as we have also seen, Parmenides employs two assumptions which belong under Linguistic Pluralism. He assumes that a meaningful expression will have reference to something, and that different meaningful expressions have reference to different things. To these two assumptions, he adds a third; which is that we cannot speak truly of what is not. Having described the One as 'something' and a 'this', Parmenides argues

> εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἓν μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. (161e4-6)

Through these assumptions, the hypothesis "The One is not" is lead to the conclusion that the One exists in some way.

Notes to Chapter Two

1. Crombie has already offered this view concerning the hypotheses. See _EPD2_, p. 337. But he does not draw on a substantial body of evidence which conclusively demonstrates the truth of his view. In this, though, he does not stand alone. None of the views, heretofore received, have been framed with regard to, or appreciation of, the majority of the evidence. The view which is presently accepted is that the hypotheses are "The One is" and "The One is not". Ryle and Owen offer this view. See Ryle's "Plato's _Parmenides_", _Studies in Plato's Metaphysics_ (hereafter _SPM_), p. 114; and Owen's "Notes on Ryle's Plato", _Ryle_, p. 342. Although Ryle formulates the first hypothesis as "Unity exists", I presume that he would accept "The One exists" as an equivalent formulation. Owen accepts "The One exists", but he also expresses an indifferent preference between it and "One exists". Cornford and Robinson, though, hold that the hypotheses are "There is a One" and "There is not a One". And Cornford offers the alternative formulations "A One is" and "A One is not". See _Plato and Parmenides_ (hereafter _P & P_), n. 3 p. 108, n. 2 p. 116, and p. 136; and _Plato's Earlier Dialectic_, pp. 241-242. Besides these views, some commentators have urged the view that there are eight hypotheses. And some have even suggested that there are nine. These other views are briefly considered herein; and in light of rather straight-forward evidence, they are rejected.

2. _P & P_, n. 3, p. 108.

3. Ibid., n. 3, p. 108.

4. Ibid., p. 116.

5. Plato, pp. 361-363. But Taylor says "It has been asked what the "it" presupposed as the subject of the thesis "it is one" is. The answer . . . is "anything whatever which is conceived to be a mere undifferentiated unity admitting no plurality whatsoever" (my italics)". On this account, Parmenides may be understood to be hypothesizing, not about the One, but rather about whatever is one. Yet, it seems evident to me that it is Parmenides' intention to discuss a hypothesis about the One.

6. P & P, p. 116.

7. Ibid., n. 1, p. 136. Cornford also says "It is clear that each Hypothesis begins with a definition, sometimes disguised as a series of inferences. Thus, instead of saying, 'Let us suppose that "the One" means, for our present purpose, absolute unity which excludes any sort of plurality', Parmenides will say 'If the One is one, it will not be many; and so it will have no parts and will not be a whole'. That is really the definition". (my italics). See p. 114.

8. Etude, p. 113.

9. Ibid., p. 114.

10. SPM, p. 114.

11. Etude, p. 113.

12. P & P, p. 105.

13. SPM, p. 114.

14. EPD2, pp. 336-337. See also P & P, p. 107. Cornford also notes the

discrepancy between the method and the process. Nevertheless, he is prepared to arbitrate questions concerning the process on the basis of the method.

15. Ibid., p. 337.

16. The moral of the fifth movement, at least on my interpretation, would seem to be that the non-existent One exists in some way by virtue of being one. For by being one, it is knowable, different from the Others, and a 'this'. In the sixth movement, on the other hand, Parmenides again contends that the One cannot be anything whatsoever, and therefore not even one, if it does not exist. More generally, it would appear that Parmenides holds to an abiding premise concerning, what Allen would call, the co-existensiveness of unity and existence. (See "Unity and Infinity: Parmenides 142b-145a", Review of Metaphysics, 27, pp. 697-725.) For the second and fifth movements confirm the premise that whatever is one is, and whatever is is one. And the first and sixth, on the other hand, offer the converse; i.e., whatever is not is not one, and whatever is not one is not.

17. P&P, p. 136.

(B)

18. The assumption that εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν means εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν parallels the assumption that εἰ ἓν ἔστιν means εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἕν. But the former gives rise to problems concerning the translation of εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν. Parmenides characterizes εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν and εἰ

μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν as πᾶν τουνάντιον. Assuming, then, that ἓν is substantive (meaning 'the One'), we must ask "What does μὴ ἓν mean?". It could mean 'the non-One', or 'what is not the One', or 'what is not one'. Common to each of these possibilities is the presumption that μὴ ἓν is the subject of discourse of which it is said "It does not exist". But this presumption, when referred to the philosophical evidence, proves to be false. In this regard, consider the following questions. Is πᾶν τουνάντιον meant to characterize subjects of discourse which are contrary (subjects such as 'the One' and 'the non-One'), or is the phrase meant to characterize claims which are contrary? A review of the passage 160b5-c2 reveals that πᾶν τουνάντιον is intended to characterize contrary hypotheses; which is to say, contrary claims. But the claims "The One is not" and "The non-One is not" are not contrary. For, in the first place, they may be assigned the same truth-value; and in the second, contrary claims must have the same subject of discourse. Furthermore, these considerations count against any substantive translation of μὴ ἓν. How, then, are we to translate εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν ? I suggest "The not-one One is not". See p.31 for my rendering of εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν.

19. P&P, n. 1, p. 219.

20. It is implausible, because Parmenides is hypothesizing about the One, and not about a One.

21. Cf., Republic, 475e-479e.

22. 160e.

(C)

23. The second part of the dialogue offers to prove theses of the form "S" is neither ϕ nor ψ" and "S is both ϕ and ψ"; ϕ and ψ being understood to be contraries. In particular, Parmenides affirms and denies of the One and the Others both members from the following pairings: (one/many), (limited/unlimited), (straight/round), (in another/in itself), (in motion/at rest), (same/different), (like/unlike), (equal/unequal). At 146d, Parmenides suggests that Sameness and Difference are ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις. At 148a, he says that Likeness is ἐναντίον to Unlikeness. At 149e-150a, Greatness and Smallness are said to be ἐναντίω ἀλλήλοιν. At 159e-160a, Parmenides argues that if the Others are both like and unlike, they will have two contrary attributes. Finally, at the end of the third round, having taken himself to have shown that the Others are both one and many, both limited and unlimited, and both like and unlike, Parmenides says that there will be no difficulty proving that the Others suffer πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη see 159ab.

24. The Principles of Mathematics.

25. An Aristotelian account of the theory of opposites is given in G.E.R. Lloyd's Polarity and Analogy, pp. 87-171.

26. 142c8.

27. P & P, p. 116. See also Owen's "Notes on Ryle's Plato" Ryle, p. 349.

28. The characterization of 'a Form' which the second result offers is, to say the least, debatable. For the characterization suggests that

the Forms are ἀλόγα. Prior to Ryle's work on the Theaetetus (reported by Cross in SPM, p. 14), commentators did generally hold views entailing the above characterization; see SPM, pp. 16-19. But since Ryle's work, commentators have taken a different kind of view of the theory of Forms. (Cross's "Logos and Forms in Plato" gives the earliest expression of such a view.) In any case, recent interpretations of the theory tend to respect the criticisms which Ryle raises against the view that the Forms are simple ἀλογα. Allen's recent Plato's Earlier Theory of Forms clearly belongs to the new school.

29. See P & P, pp. 129-130; Etude, pp. 114-115.

30. This recommendation, even though it issues from philosophical consideration, nonetheless can be systematically observed throughout the text.

31. Ryle, pp. 342-343, and p. 349. As we will see, Owen's 'I/P confusion' provides a bridge between 'The One is' and 'The One is one'.

32. Ibid., p. 349.

33. p. 357.

34. See Lloyd's, Polarity and Analogy, pp. 15-19.

35. Consider Zeno's two arguments against plurality. Consider also fragments 1 and 4 of Anaxagoras (Kirk and Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 368). Democritius is reported as arguing "By convention are sweet and bitter, hot and cold, by convention is colour; in truth are atoms and the void . . . . In reality we

apprehend nothing exactly, but only as it changes according to the condition of our body and of the things that impinge on or offer resistance to it." (from The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 422).

36. See Polarity and Analogy, p. 106.

37. Aristotle's doctrine of the mean might seem to conflict with the theory of opposites. He says "There are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz., the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states are contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the intermediate to the extremes". But the mean is not an independent contrary. Rather, it is dependent on the extremes; ". . . as the equal is greater relatively to the less, less relatively to the greater, so the middle states are excessive relatively to the deficiencies, deficient relatively to the excesses, both in passions and in actions." (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, chpt. 8) To a certain extent, Aristotle's doctrine is a variation upon the basic theory.

38. This is a very simplistic speculation. For it ignores the evidence on the other side of the question. Socrates also says, "If . . . when you say that Simmias is taller than Socrates, but shorter than Phaedo, you are then saying that both these things, both tallness and shortness exist in Simmias?" (102a). Now, this appears to be knock-down evidence against my speculation. There is, though, further evidence in support of my speculation.

Socrates has drawn a three-fold distinction between sensible objects, the tallness in us, and the tallness itself. With respect to the latter two, Socrates maintains that they neither admit nor can be overcome by the short. In light of this, the following problem is raised:

> . . . didn't we agree to exactly the reverse of what we are now saying--that the greater does come into being from the smaller, and the smaller from the greater, and in a word that this is generation where the opposites are concerned--that they are generated from their opposites? But not it seems to me that we are saying that this could never happen.

To this question, Socrates replies:

> But you don't realize the difference between what we are talking about now and what we were then. Then it was said that an opposite thing is generated from the opposite thing, but now that the opposite itself could never be opposite to itself--either that which exists in us or that which exists in nature. Then we were talking about the things which possess the opposites, calling them by the same name as the opposites themselves have, but now we are talking about those opposites themselves which, by their presence, give their names to the things called after them, and we say that they themselves would never submit to becoming one another.

On the basis of this, we may ask "How can Simmias be the locus of change between tallness and shortness, if he presently possesses both tallness and shortness?". More generally, if Socrates allows that sensible objects can possess the opposites (at the same time), his theory of generation is put in jeopardy. There is, then, a tension between his theory of generation and the apparent concession that sensible objects can possess the opposites. Now, as for my part, I see myself as working one side of this undecided issue. And I see the standard interpretation of 102a-106e as working the other side of this undecided issue.

39. See 102bc, where Socrates asks ". . . you agree that "Simmias surpassing Socrates" is not really what the words might suggest?". This suggests that it is Plato's hope to revise our understanding of 'what we mean when we say . . .".

40. Republic, 479a.

41. Ibid., 479ce.

42. Euthydemus, Protagoras.

43. The generally accepted test for πρός τι terms was that of incompleteness. See Owen's "A Proof in the 'Peri Ideon'", SPM, p. 302. Hence, the notion that πρός τι terms are incomplete predicates. But this test obscures important differences between, for example, 'beautiful' and 'equal'.

44. My discussion of πρός τι terms owes a great deal to Professor R. Bosley's U-word thesis. And I would like to think that my discussion affords particular development a more wide-ranging philosophical theory.

45. Plato provides us with a very large stock of arguments which detail difficulties concerning whether something is beautiful, good, just, etc. He makes an interesting request in the Euthyphro: . . . δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν... ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνη ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι. Depending on the genera, we have paradeigmatic instances of species. The Department of Weights and Measures does store paradeigmatic samples of the colour canary, the color chartreuse, etc. The Metre (in Paris) is the paradigm for metre-lengths. On the other hand, though, one does not store temperatures; one stores

thermometres. But 'temperature' is nonetheless a genus.

46. Cf., "A Proof in the 'Peri Ideon'", SPM, p. 305. If 'one' is an incomplete predicate, so is every other number. Ryle also thinks that 'one' has a status above and beyond 'being a number'. See SPM, p. 132.

47. For example, 1016aff and 1052aff in Aristotle's Metaphysics.

48. See Metaphysics, 1015b 15 ff.

(D)

49. SPM, pp. 115-116.

50. Ibid., p. 132.

51. "On Denoting".

52. SPM, p. 171.

53. Ryle, p. 345.

54. Aristotle, for example, says "that which 'is' primarily is the 'what'"; 1028a.

55. Metaphysics, 1052b.

56. Ibid., 1052a.

57. Ibid., 1054a.

58. In rounds seven and eight, Parmenides replaces the verbs 'have' and 'are' with 'appear to have' and 'appear to be'. We may speculate concerning the considerations behind this shift. Is the hypothesis behind it? Does the hypothesis "The One does not exist" and its purported consequece (viz., since the One does not exist, the Others can neither possess Unity nor be one) require that there be a shift from what-is to what-appears to be?

59. See Vlastos' article "The Third Man Argument in Plato's Parmenides", SPM, p. 246.

60. Ibid., notes 1, 2, and 3 on p. 246. In most of these cited passages, Plato is, among other things, addressing himself to epistemological concerns.

61. See n. 28 above.

62. Consider Vlastos' non-identity requirement; op. cit., pp. 251-254.

63. Op. cit., p. 237.

64. P & P, p. 122.

65. Ibid., p. 129.

66. Ibid., n. 1, p. 129.

67. 141de.

68. 140e-141a.

69. P & P, p. 128.

70. 165e.

71. 160cd. See my comments given above, pp. 33-36.

72. See 147d-148a.

73. See 161a.

74. 164bc.

75. The assumption is announced at 160de, after which follows the argument assigning various attributes to the non-existent One.

76. See 162b.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

This chapter contains two sections. In the first, I outline a methodological format to be used in the following chapter. In the second, I reconsider an earlier question in light of, what I shall call, recalcitrant evidence.

(A)

Those commentators who have undertaken to give analyses of the arguments have, for the most part, accepted a format which mirrors the structure of the second part of the Parmenides. We are familiar with this structure. It gives to the dialogue two hypotheses. Each hypothesis underwrites four rounds; two rounds of which concern the One, and two rounds of which concern the Others. There are serious difficulties which attend this structure. And the chief difficulties are (1) that under either hypothesis, the rounds which concern the One are in direct conflict with one another; and (2) that under either hypothesis the rounds which concern the Others are in direct conflict with one another. Generally speaking, then, the structure of the Parmenides makes it look as if the one and the same hypothesis stands as a common source for contrary results. This point gives rise to an obvious question. How can contrary results possibly follow from one hypothesis? But this question cannot be given a coherent answer. Even so, the question is interesting in one regard. It belies an interest in the relationship between the hypotheses and the conclusions which Parmenides purports to draw from them. The format which I propose to use will make no concession to such an interest.

In my opinion, Ryle's view of the Parmenides is the only view which seriously attempts to come to grips with the structural difficulties of the dialogue. For Ryle holds that the hypotheses suffer from such a basic philosophical corruption that they can be held responsible for the absurdities and contradictions of the second part of the dialogue. Owen, though, has an objection to lay against Ryle's view. He says,

> . . . he (Ryle) speaks more than once of both the hypothesis "Unity exists" and its contradictory as entailing the families of contradictions that they severally breed. As an analogy he cites Russell's use of the so-called vicious Circle paradoxes to show that "Ø(Øx)" is ill-formed. But he does not, of course, offer to show that Plato's antinomies follow from their first premises as directly as those which Russell collected to argue the need for a theory of types. On Ryle's own survey of the Parmenides there seem to be many other premises and assumptions intervening in the plot. The reader is left to wonder whether these interventions are systematic or perhaps just random--as they might be expected to be, for example, on Robinson's thesis that Plato "is genuinely failing to notice the extra premises as such". But the answer, I think, is that they are systematic.[1]

While I quite naturally agree with the principle of Ryle's thesis (the principle being that a philosophically corrupt hypothesis will license contradictory conclusions), I think that the corruption lies, not with the hypothesis, but rather with the various interpretations which Parmenides exercises on the hypothesis. (To use Owen's word, the interpretations represent 'interventions' in the plot.) And in any case, there happen to be conclusions which are not directly related to the hypotheses. I agree with Owen's objection.

Many commentators have offered interpretations which avoid the structural difficulties of the second part. For a widely accepted view is that there are as many hypotheses as there are rounds. Such a view has an obvious benefit. If, in fact, there is a different hypothesis for each round, there is no need to consider the question "How can contrary results follow from one and the same hypothesis?". The view has another benefit. It allows a more serious import to be given to the interest of showing how the conclusions of a particular round are related to the (supposed) hypothesis of that round. There is implicit in this interest a notion of which I would have us disabuse ourselves. The notion is that the conclusions of a given round can be derived directly from the (supposed) hypothesis of the round. The notion finds expression in Wahl. He says,

> De ce fait que l'un n'est pas plusieurs, de cette première négation vont dériver une foule d'autres negations qui seront tout ce que nous pouvons dire sur l'Un.[2]

This notion does, perhaps, enjoy some plausibility with regard to the negative rounds. But it is embarrassingly implausible when applied to the affirmative rounds; where Parmenides offers to show, among other things, that the subject of discourse is both limited and unlimited, both in motion and at rest, and residing in different places. The only respectable opinion that is possible in connection with these claims is that no hypothesis, either alone or together with a consistent set of assumptions, would warrant such self-contradictory claims.

A variation upon the approach which I have just now criticized is based on the view that the hypotheses, while being two, acquire different meanings from round to round. But the affirmative rounds are no less embarrassing to this view. No hypothesis, however generously we understand its meaning, can warrant the inference of obviously self-contradictory theses--which is what we find in the affirmative rounds.

These criticisms bespeak the need for a different approach to the structure of the dialogue; an approach which will place little, if any, emphasis upon the hypotheses, and instead attempt to reveal the dialectical interventions that are responsible for the multitude of philosophical conflicts. Our commentary will be based on such an approach. It will attempt to articulate, in the first place, the assumptions which make possible the result of a given round. Furthermore, it will attempt to articulate how such assumptions relate to the conflicts which arise both between the affirmative and negative rounds and within the affirmative rounds. Or in other words, our commentary will look to the assumptions which have been aligned under the hypotheses, rather than to the hypotheses themselves, to find the sources of the conflicts.

Owen has already adopted the approach which I am here recommending. In his paper "Notes on Ryle's Plato", Owen offers ". . . to mark out, and locate conflicts between the (or a representative majority of the) cardinal theses on which Plato's antinomies turn".[3] Needless to say my view has been influenced not a little by Owen's work.

As we all know, the second part of the Parmenides is one of the most difficult of philosophical tracts to read. An obvious reason for this is that the second part has an over abundance of enigmatic arguments. But a no less important contributing factor is the fact that the arguments producing the contradictions and conflicts are insulated from one another in long chains of argumentation. The format to be used in our commentary will remove that insulation. Since almost every argument within a given round is replied to by an argument to the contrary in a counter-round, it is possible to place each argument alongside a counter-argument, and to consider each argument in the light of its counter-argument. This, in effect, will be our format. With regard to the first and second rounds, for example, our commentary will be given in ten stages; each stage offering analyses of the arguments which generate the following conflicts.

	Negative Theses		Affirmative Theses
(N1)	The One is not many.[4]	(A1)	The One is both one and many.
(N2)	The One neither has parts nor is a whole.	(A2)	The One both has parts and is a whole.
(N3)	The One is neither limited nor unlimited.	(A3)	The One is both limited and unlimited.
(N4)	The One is neither round nor straight.	(A4)	The One will be either round or straight.[5]
(N5)	The One is neither in itself nor in another.	(A5)	The One is both in itself and in another.
(N6)	The One is neither in motion nor at rest.	(A6)	The One is both in motion and at rest.
(N7)	The One is neither the same as another nor the same as	(A7)	The One is both the same as itself and the same as the

	itself; nor yet is it different from itself or different from another.		Other; and both different from itself and different from the Others.
(N8)	The One is neither like nor unlike itself, and neither like nor unlike another.	(A8)	The One is both like and unlike itself, and both like and unlike the Others.
(N9)	The One is neither equal nor unequal to itself or to another.	(A9)	The One is both equal and unequal to itself and to the Others.
(N10)	The One is neither younger nor older than, nor the same age as itself or another.	(A10)	The One is younger and older than, and the same age as itself and the Others.

Let me point out that there are two passages in the second part which are not accommodated by the format. They are 148e-149d and 155e-157b. The first of these poses no serious problem for interpretation, since it may be subsumed under (A4). (Accordingly, a counter-argument can be generated from (N4).)

The other passage, 155e-157b, has been seen by some commentators as an independent round. On this view, there are nine, rather than eight, rounds. The evidence supporting this view is given by Parmenides' proposal, Ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν (155e4). But, when we consider what Parmenides says in connection with this proposal, we realize that this passage proceeds from a platform that presupposes the results of both the first and second rounds. Parmenides asks,

> τὸ ἓν ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἕν τε ὂν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἕν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μή μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας;
>
> (155e4-8)

The phrase οἷον διεληλύθαμεν necessitates the realization that this passage is supposed to combine the results of the first and second rounds. For the second round, while it warrants the description of the One as being 'both one and many', does not warrant the description that it is neither one nor many. Such a description can be derived only from the first round, wherein the initial thesis of the round is 'The One is many', and there is as a final conclusion 'The One is not one'. There is ancillary evidence supporting this view. In two other places, Parmenides subsumes contradictory results within one claim. At 160b, he says

> Οὕτω δή ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἕν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως

And at 166c, he says

> ἓν εἴτ᾽ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι ...

In the first place, Parmenides is combining the results, albeit conflicting results, of the first four rounds. In the second he is combining the results of all eight rounds. And so, each offers a model for taking 155e to be a statement which is intended to combine the results of the first two rounds. There is, though, an important difference between 155e on the one hand, and on the other 160b and 166c. Parmenides uses the former as a basis for further argumentation. The latter are not so used.

In our commentary, we will see that the various characterizations given of the One in this passage fit either with the One as it is described in the first round or with the One as it is described in the second round. We will pay particular attention to Parmenides' explication of the notion of 'instant', Consider the following.

> ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι. ... μεταβάλλον δ' ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινοῖτ' ἂν τότε, οὐδ' ἂν σταίη. (156d6-7)

The apparent lesson offered by this claim is: At the instant of change from being at rest to being in motion (or from being in motion to being at rest), the One is neither at rest nor in motion. It is possible to generalize on this lesson, so that it is applicable to all the negative theses found within the first round. For, 'the instant' provides the condition in which the negative theses may be true of the One. In particular, at the instant when the One is changing from being limited to being unlimited, it is neither limited nor unlimited. Or, at the instant when the One is changing from being in motion to being at rest, the One is neither in motion nor at rest; and so on. In any case, I do not view 155e-157b as an anomalous passage. I see its opening statement of claim as being strictly analogous to 160d and 166c. And as I have already noted, the only difference between the former and the latter two is that the latter are not used as a basis for further argumentation. That failing with regard to the latter is one of the few small mercies afforded us by the second part of the Parmenides.

Besides the two passages already mentioned, there is another section of the second part which will receive special treatment. In general, the format will enable us to follow both the development of each round and the development of the conflicts between the rounds. But, in the case of the fifth and sixth rounds, we will not be able to follow both. We must choose between doing one or the other. I have decided that it would be better to follow the development of each round. My reasons for this decision are given in Chapter Four.

(B)

Our interpretation of 155e-157b casts various reflections upon other parts of the text. We have already considered some of these reflections. Presently, I would like us to consider 155e-157b vis-á-vis two passages which bear upon the method that Parmenides purports to be using. We have, on other occasions, inspected each passage. Here, we will assume a final perspective on each.

The first passage states the method which Parmenides purportedly uses in the second part. We need not reconsider the whole of the passage, but only that part of it which offers an example of the method.

> Οἷον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ πρός τε αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μή ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα·
>
> (136a4-b1)

This description of the method indicates that the exercise of the method will entail four movements. But, as a matter of fact, the second part of the Parmenides contains, not four, but rather eight rounds. Furthermore, the description, in no way, indicates how the method might be related to 155e-157b. This recalcitrant evidence has serious implications for those interpretations which decide interpretive questions on the basis of, what has been called, the Zenonian method.

The first point of evidence could be circumscribed, if it were possible to show that four of the eight rounds are methodologically defective. Indeed, if this were the case, we could count four of the rounds as showing how the method is to be used, and the others as showing how the method is not to be used. This brings us to the second passage, wherein Parmenides rejects the results of the first round.

> Οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις
> ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα. - Οὐ φαίνεται. -
> Οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται
> οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται.
> - Οὐκ ἔοικεν. - Ἦ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἓν ταῦτα οὕτως
> ἔχειν; - Οὔκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. (142a3-8)

The disclaimer that such cannot be the case with the One affords some evidence for seeing the first round as a false start, and as an invalid application of the Zenonian method. But, is it possible to take the disclaimer so seriously?

It is worth noting that most commentators do not take the disclaimer seriously.[6] In any case, the disclaimer enjoys a rather unique status. It represents the only time Parmenides explicitly rejects a set of conclusions. This fact is important. Since there is only one round containing an explicit avowal of disclaimer, we lack evidence for deciding which of the other seven rounds are worthy of the Zenonian method, and which are not. Moreover, we may appeal to the recalcitrant evidence to show that Parmenides does not really reject the results of the first round. For he reveals an acceptance (or, at least, a re-acceptance) of those results, when he says, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι (ἕν), μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας (155e7-8). Thus, the recalcitrant evidence forces us to the conclusion that Parmenides does not reject any of the rounds for failing to comply with the Zenonian method.

I would like us to reconsider the question raised in section (A) of chapter two; the question, of course, being "What are the hypotheses?". Ryle offers the following answer.

> Now though the actual formulation of the hypothesis and the development of the argument in operation A1* leaves it in doubt whether the hypothesis is 'Unity exists' or 'Unity is single', the formulation of the hypothesis and the argument of N1 make it perfectly clear that here the hypothesis is 'Unity does not exist'.
>
> It is fairly clear too, though less so, that the hypothesis of N2 is 'Unity does not exist'. But from this it follows that the hypothesis of operations A1 and A2 must be 'Unity exists', else the promised two-way application of the Zenonian method would be broken. Moreover, *this alone is consistent with Parmenides' sketch of the task of the dialectical method in the passages from 135a to 136b*. (my italics)[7]

We see Ryle adjudicating interpretative questions on the basis of the Zenonian method. And clearly, he is presuming that the dialectical process of the second must be interpreted in such a way that it is shown to be consistent with the Zenonian method. But I have been arguing, and the recalcitrant evidence shows, the contrary. To put my point simply, the method fails to characterize the dialectical process of the second part. And as we have already seen, its failure is twofold. It characterizes a process to which there are, not eight, but only four rounds. Furthermore, it does not characterize argumentation which proceeds from the conjunction of contradictory claims, such as is found at 155e-157b.

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*Ryle intends A1 to refer to the first and second round, A2 to refer to the third and fourth, N1 to refer to the fifth and sixth, and N2 to refer to the seventh and eighth.

The view which I am offering concerning the relation between the Zenonian method and the second part is open to question. In particular, it is open to questions which focus upon the apparent disparity between what Parmenides says that he will do and what he does do. But, my view is _not_ that there is a disparity between the method and the dialectical process. Rather my view is that interpretative questions concerning the process are not to be adjudicated on the basis of what Parmenides _sketches_ as his method. Finally, my view leaves it open to us, in seeking consistency between the method and the process, to allow that interpretive questions concerning the method be adjudicated in light of the dialectical process.

Notes to Chapter Three

1. *Ryle*, p. 345.
2. *Étude*, p. 107.
3. *Ryle*, p. 348.
4. At the outset of the first round, Parmenides offers to prove only that the One is not many. But at the end of the round, he argues that the One is not one. These two conclusions permit the construction of the thesis "The One is neither one nor many". At 155e ff., Parmenides introduces this thesis. Now, there the thesis is accompanied by a claim which is of signal importance to the concluding remarks of the first round. The claim is "The One does not exist". Thus, it appears quite evident that "The One is neither one nor many" is to be counted as a thesis of the first round.
5. This thesis presents a rather interesting anomaly. It is the only one of the form "S is either φ *or* ψ". No doubt, even Parmenides feels the constraint of the logic belonging to 'straight' and 'round'. Of all the ἐνάντια, 'straight' and 'round' are the only two genuinely predicative expressions.
6. The discounting of the disclaimer is almost universal. Lynch sees a possibility under which it might be taken at its word. (See, *An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato Through the "Parmenides"*, p. 80) Forrester takes it seriously. But he also circumscribes its effect by arguing that it is intended only as a rejection of the conclusions given after 141a. (See, "Plato's Parmenides: The Structure of the First Hypothesis", *Jour. of Hist. of Phil.*, X, pp. 1-14.)
7. *SPM*, p. 114.

CHAPTER IV

This chapter contains my commentary on the second part of the *Parmenides*. The commentary will proceed in accordance with the format laid down in the previous chapter. And the analyses of the individual arguments will, for the most part, employ the critical apparatus established in the second chapter.

I will be using an index. So, allow me to explain the code. The letter 'R' will be used in the designations of the rounds; the letter 'N' will be used to designate negative theses; and the letter 'A' to designate affirmative theses. Each round will be numbered in accordance with its place in the text. Hence, 'R1' refers to the first round, 'R2' to the second round, and so on. Each thesis will be numbered in accordance with its place in the round from which it comes. And so, for example, 'N1' is to be understood as meaning 'the first negative thesis'. By conjoining the round designations and the thesis designations, we achieve a means of making specific reference to each thesis. 'R1(N1)' designates the first thesis of the first round; 'R2(A1)' designates the first thesis of the second round; 'R3(A4)' designates the fourth thesis of the third round; and similarly for all other cases. (Notice that 'N' and 'A' serve to remind us of the nature of each round--i.e., of whether the round is composed of negative or affirmative theses.) Finally, since there are a number of assumptions which are common to various rounds, the letter 'C' will be used to designate common assumptions.

They too will be numbered.

The First Round *vs*. The Second Round

137cd *vs*. 142b-143a

The opening of the first round contains two theses. They are "The One is not many" and "The One neither has parts nor is a whole". Against each of these, there is a counter-thesis in the second round. For the second maintains that the One is many, and that it has parts and is a whole. Consider, then, how each thesis is related to the hypothesis.

R1

Hyp: If the One is one, then
N1: The One is not many (c4), . . . and so
N2: The One neither has parts nor is a whole (c5).

R2

Hyp: If the One is one, then
A1: The One has parts and is a whole (d8), . . . and so
A2: The One is many (a3).[1]

We may note that (N1) and (A1), when (N1) is afforded a normal understanding, are not contrary claims. Rather, (N2) gives us the contrary of (A1), and (A2) the contrary of (N1). These facts might lead us to believe (i) that there is one assumption which permits the transition from (N1) to (N2), and another which permits the transition from (A1) to (A2), and furthermore (ii) that the two assumptions, insofar as they lead to contrary claims, are themselves contrary, and hence (iii) that the two assumptions constitute the conflict. But such is not the case. One and the same assumption is used, first, to infer (N2) from (N1), and then in the second round it is also used to infer (A2) from (A1). That assumption is,

(C1) To be many is to have parts and be a whole.

Assuming (N1), (A1), and (C1), we may construct the following arguments.

For R1: Since the One is not many, and since to be many is to have parts and be a whole, the One neither has parts nor is a whole.

For R2: Since the One has parts and is a whole, and since to be many is to have parts and be a whole, the One is many.

The first of these arguments is a simpler version of what we find in the first round.

> Τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἐστίν. – Ναί. – Τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὗ ἂν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῇ ὅλον ἂν εἴη; – Πάνυ γε. – Αμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὂν καὶ μέρη ἔχον. – Ἀνάγκη. – Ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως τὸ ἓν πολλὰ ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕν. – Αληθῆ. (137c6-d1)

In the second round, the One is characterized thusly: τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἓν ὂν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι (d4-5). On the basis of this, Parmenides offers the conclusion, Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, δὴ τὸ ἓν ὂν πολλὰ ἐφάνη (143a5-6). This evidence indicates that the conflict must be constituted by assumptions which intervene between the hypothesis and the initial theses.

I submit that the conflict results from Parmenides having different understandings of the hypothesis. In the first round, Parmenides understands the hypothesis as having the force of saying what the one is. But in the second, he assumes that the hypothesis involves both saying 'what the One is' and saying 'that the One is'. Now, I am not suggesting that there is a philosophical tension between the moment of saying what the One is and the moment of saying that the One is. Rather, my view is that the attribution of these moments to the hypothesis gives Parmenides the grounds on which to lay different understandings of the hypotheses. In this regard, his concern with the moment of saying 'that the One is' is of particular importance. In the second round, Parmenides assumes that the truth of saying (and even the sense of saying) that the One is depends upon the participation of the One in Being. There is a common assumption which brings forth the consequences of the participation. It is,

> (C2) Anything is related to anything in one of the following ways: (a) by identity, (b) by difference, or (c) as part to whole or whole to part.[2]

If the One is to partake of Being, its relation to Being will be under (c). For, if the One and Being are identical, then either the nature of Being is absorbed into the identity of the One, and consequently Being becomes the One and ceases being itself, or the nature of the One is absorbed into the identity of Being. Parmenides chooses to argue from the first option.

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταὐτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἑνί· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἕν, ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν... (142b7-c1)

A further consequence of the identity of the One and Being would be that it would make no sense to say that the One is. Parmenides makes the point this way,

...ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἕν τε εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἕν.

If the One and Being are related by difference, the nature of Being will not be available to the One; the One will not be. That leaves us with the relations of 'as part to whole' or 'as whole to part'. Parmenides assumes that the One partakes of Being by having Being as a part. Then, by application of (C1), the One becomes many.

Upon review, we see where the conflict is. The absence from the first round of the assumption that to be is to partake of Being and the presence of that assumption in the second constitutes the conflict. This point is, I believe, fundamental to understanding the tension between the opening of the first round and the opening of the second.

Previous to this chapter, I have had a lot to say about the openings of the first two rounds. Section (C) of chapter two contains a discussion of 137cd. And section (D) contains a discussion of 142b-143a. It would be redundant for me to reiterate all that I have said there. Instead, I will summarize the previous discussions; summarizing them in light of the fundamental point.

In the first round, Parmenides is primarily concerned with the moment of saying 'one' of the One. The employment of a special (even philosophical) sense of 'many', and a presumed contrast between 'one' and 'many' underwrites this concern. I mean, by assuming that there is a logical relation between 'one' and 'many', and by bestowing upon 'many' the sense which is suggested by (C1), Parmenides can claim that the One is one in a special sense. We may presume that the special sense of 'one' is supposed to be revelatory of what the One is, or if you wish, revelatory of ἡ φύσις of the One. This understanding of the hypothesis has a direct bearing on the arguments which purport to show that the One is neither the same nor different.[3] For those arguments are offered as showing that the One as one can enjoy but its own nature.[4] On the other hand, the first round evidences no concern for the moment of saying 'is' when one says "The One is one".

In the second round, Parmenides is primarily concerned with the moment of saying 'is'. There, he argues that saying 'is' of the One requires, first, that Being and the One be different things, and second that the One partake of Being. Our discussion of Linguistic Pluralism has exposed the foundations of this argument. The foundations are, (i) 'Is' is a name, and (ii) a name of something unique, in which case it is a name of something which is different from the One. The consideration which frames these foundations is, of course, the notion that 'is' and 'one' would have the same meaning, if they did not stand for different things. We, though, realize that such philosophizing as this violates the formal/material concepts distinction. The beginning of the violation seems naively misguided. And we might be inclined to say "What is needed is a distinction between words and names. For 'is' is a word, but not a name". But this is an uninteresting approach to Parmenides' philosophizing; and in any case, it begs the issue. Should we stand on our suggestion, a clever dialectician will be moved to ask "Surely you concede that 'is' and 'one' have different meanings?". Since our answer to his question must be "Yes", the dialectician can proceed to the further question "By virtue of what do 'is' and 'one' have different meanings?". In doing so, he is posing a genuine, and not at all uninteresting, philosophical problem.[5] Parmenides has given an answer, albeit a false one, to this problem.

(Parmenides' answer, though, is problematic in ways known to Plato. For it invites the issue "How can the One have Being, if the One and Being are different things?". Given the opening of the second round, it would appear that Parmenides' response to the issue is to assume that the One has Being as a part. This position is reminiscent of the sail-analogy of the first. And, of course, the objections there stated will apply. Another possible response to the issue would be to treat Being as a universal. In which case, the things which have Being would have it by having the same attribute. This possibility is analogous to the status which the Colour Red has. Just as the things which are red are so by having the same colour, so likewise the things which are would be so by having the same attribute. But the Third Man stands in the way of this possibility. Needless to say, the main objection will be against the assumption that Being is.)

Although I have represented thesis R2(A2) as being "The One is many", I think it possible to impute the thesis "The One is both one and many" to the second round. Three pieces of evidence are relevant to this suggestion; two of which are textual, and one of which is contextual. Even though Parmenides argues that the One has parts and is many, nonetheless he still wishes to hold that the One is one whole. He says

Καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστί, ὃ ἂν ἓν ᾖ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει.

And also, there is the description of the One found at 155e τὸ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἕν τε ὂν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλά.

I have interpreted this description as being a summary of the conclusions from both the first and second rounds. Of significance for our present enquiry is the contrast between ἕν τε ὂν καὶ πολλά (which must have reference to the second round) and μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλά (which would have reference to the initial thesis of the first round and one of the final conclusions of the same round). Finally, the thesis that the One is both one and many conforms to the pattern for the theses of the second round; that pattern being to affirm the contraries of the One.

137d vs. 143a-145a

The conflicting theses are "The One is neither limited nor unlimited" and "The One is both limited and unlimited". The proof for the latter is the longest proof in the dialogue. And depending on one's affection for the dialogue, it is either the most dazzling, or the most tedious, proof. But it is also unnecessary. There are assumptions in 142b-143a, the direct use of which allow the construction of the thesis "The One is both limited and unlimited". And so, my view of the proof is that while it adds interest to the story-line, it is not essential to the development of the plot.

Parmenides presents R1(N3) in this way: Ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἕν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν (137d6). This claim is ambiguous; an ambiguity for which ἄπειρον is responsible. Ἄπειρον is applicable to (i) something which while having parts has no end of those parts or (ii) something which has no parts at all. Since the argument for (N3) proceeds from (N2)--viz., the One neither has parts nor is a whole--it is obvious that the latter sense is meant. The latter sense entails that the One is neither limited nor unlimited. This point may be demonstrated by use of an P-group-schema.

I. Ἄπειρας : Without Limits ——— Having no parts
II. Ἄπειρας : Unlimited
Having parts
Πέρας : Limited

Where the first sense of ἄπειρας is applicable, the condition of its applicability (the condition being that the subject of discourse have no parts) is sufficient ground for denying that the subject is either limited or unlimited. In light of this, consider how Parmenides begins the argument for (N3).

> Οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· (137d4-5)

Throughout the second round, and indeed throughout the affirmative rounds, Parmenides exercises a Zenonian technique.[8] The technique bears upon the construction of the affirmative theses. Conflicting options are made to appear plausible in their own right. For example, Parmenides argues that the One is at rest (145e); he then argues that the One is in motion (146a). The next step is to treat such options as logical conjuncts, and a thesis such as "The One is both at rest and in motion" is formed. This technique is used to construct R2(A3).

In view of the fact that the proof for (A3) is rather long, I would like us to first consider a more direct route to the thesis.[9] The virtue of the more direct route is that it keeps things in focus. At any rate, the claim that the One is limited may be aligned with the following

> Πότερον οὖν ἑκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσεροῦμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε μόριον προσρητέον; — Τοῦ ὅλου. — Καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστί, ὃ ἂν ἓν ᾖ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει. (142d6-9)

Since R2(A1) purports that the One has parts and is a whole, and since the above passage presumes a whole to be one, the inference that a whole is limited seems not unreasonable. Parmenides, relying on such an inference, offers the conclusion that the One is limited. He says

> Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ μόρια μόρια πεπερασμένον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἕν· ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια(;) (144e8-9)

As for the claim that the One is unlimited, Parmenides has the wherewithal for it at 142e.

> Πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερων τό τε ἓν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὖ μοριόν τὸ μορίον, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἀεί, ὅτιπερ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτω τὼ μορίω ἀεὶ ἴσχει· τό τε γὰρ ἕν τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἕν.

On the basis of this account, he has Aristoteles approve the conclusion suggested by the following question. Οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἓν ὂν εἴη; Which is to say that, the One is unlimited. And so, with the simple addition of the assumption that whatever is a whole is limited, Parmenides can proceed to the construction of thesis R2(A3).

Parmenides is quite aware of the fact that he is doing a double-shift on thesis (A3). He announces the longest proof this way: Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι. In view of the announcement, we can, I think, be fairly confident about our present perspective on the conflict between R1(N3) and R2(A3).

Let us now consider the sources of conflict between (N3) and (A3). Parmenides' different understandings of the hypothesis still constitute the sources of conflict. On the one hand, his first understanding of the hypothesis, whereby the employment of special senses of 'one' and 'many' make possible the inference that the One has no parts, and hence that the One is without limits, is the basis of (N3). On the other hand, his second understanding of the hypothesis underlies (A1), and (A1) is the basis for (A3). Of particular importance is an assumption which the arguments for (A1) and (A3) share. The transition from the hypothesis to (A1) is made possible by the assumption that Being and the One are different elements. That same assumption is operating in the argument for the claim that the One is indefinite. While presenting the argument, Parmenides is moved to ask,

> τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό
> τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἆρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἦ τὸ ἓν τοῦ
> εἶναι μορίου ἦ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου; (142d9-e2)

The phrase, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν clearly identifies Being and the One as elements.

Besides the conflict between (N3) and (A3), there is the conflict which is internal to (A3); viz., that of saying that the One is both limited and unlimited. Summaries of the respective arguments will help us bring the conflict into focus.

> The argument for the claim "The One is Limited": Since the One and Being are parts of the One, and since parts must be parts of a whole, and since a whole must be limited, the One is limited.
>
> The argument for the claim "The One is Unlimited": Since the One and Being are parts of the One, and since each of these parts has the One and Being as parts, which parts in turn each have the One and Being as parts, and so on *ad infinitum*, therefore the One is unlimited.

It might be thought that these arguments are intended to reveal a 'limited' whole which has an unlimited number of parts.[11] But could we, for example, fit such a description to the number system? Could we say that the number system is a limited whole having an unlimited number of parts? I submit that we cannot without doing violence to what we normally mean by 'whole'. Parts, which are parts of a whole, can be completely ennumerated. Indeed, it is this possibility which allows us to suppose that a whole is limited. But this is not to say that parts must be parts of a whole. In this regard, consider numbers. They belong to an open-ended set, the parts of which are innumerable. Now, the latter summary above bespeaks a set not unlike the number-system. In any case, we see that the internal contradiction of R2(A3) depends upon the application of a false assumption. That assumption makes it possible to argue for the claim "The One is limited". Notice, though, that the assumption is absent from the argument to the contrary.

Hence, the contradition is constituted by the presence in the one case, and the absence in the other, of the assumption that parts must be parts of a whole. Finally, let me just say that I see no way of easing this conflict. In my opinion, the options subsumed within the thesis are exclusive. If parts must be parts of a whole (which is to say, parts of something complete), then the One cannot be infinitely complex. Alternatively, if the One is infinitely complex, it cannot be a whole.

The preceding analysis of the conflict between R1(N3) and R2(A3) serves a two-fold purpose. In the first place, it reveals the relevant sources of conflict. And in the second, it affords us an understanding which will be of use to us in analyzing the longest proof. The second way of showing that the One is an infinite plurality contains five stages. The first stage plays a variation upon the violation of the formal/material concepts distinction. This is followed by 'the generation' of numbers. The third stage parcels Being throughout reality. Next, the One is parcelled out. In the final stage, the co-existence of Being and the One is affirmed, and Being is seen as the distributor of the One. We will follow this ordering.

Within the first stage, Parmenides raises a question to which a direct answer is not given.

αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, ὃ δὴ φαμεν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ
τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου
οὗ φαμεν μετέχειν, ἆρά γε ἓν μόνον φανήσεται
ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο; (142a6-9)

The question presupposes the Separation Assumption; for the separability of the One would be a condition of conceiving it just by itself. Moreover, when we view the question in light of the Separation Assumption, we see the import of the options presented in the question. Presumably, when the One is conceived just by itself, it appears to be one. Aristoteles bespeaks this option in answering the question. He says, Ἕν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε. But Parmenides then proceeds with a refutation of this answer.

> ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτὸ, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἓν οὐσίας μετέσχεν. –Ἀνάγκη.– Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσίας, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν τὸ ἓν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσίᾳ εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. – Πανυ μὲν οὖν. – Ὥστε οὐ ταὐτον ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον
> . (143b1-7)

This argument bears upon Parmenides' initial question in the following way. A condition of the One's separability is that it be different from other things, and in particular different from Being. In light of this condition, Parmenides suggests that the One is different from Being, not by virtue of being the One, but rather by virtue of being different. If this suggestion is allowed to stand, difference will be an attribute that the One must have independently of its relation to Being. In which case, even when the One is conceived just by itself, the condition of holding the conception is such that difference will be a pluralizing attribute of the One conceived just by itself. Or, in other words, if the One must be both itself and different (i.e., different by virtue of having the attribute 'difference') in order to be conceived just by itself, then the One just by itself is more than itself. Hence, even when the One is conceived by itself, it is many. Parmenides, though, does not draw this inference. Nonetheless, it is available to him. As for our analysis, we may say that the argument depends upon a formal/material concepts conflation. And in this regard, we should pay particular attention to this claim: Since Being is different, and since the One is different, it is not the case either that the One is different from Being by virtue of being one, or that Being is other than the One by virtue of being Being, but rather these two different things are other than one another by virtue of Difference and Otherness. (see 143b3-6). Intuitively, we see straight-away that this claim begins from two misguided assumptions; viz., that Being is different, and that the One is different. More exactly, these assumptions are misguided in that they purport Difference to be something which the One and Being can have independently of their relation to one another. For 'different' is a relational term, and it cannot be given to a subject singularly. Perhaps, though, Parmenides would concede this objection. And he might reply: Difference relates things by making them different. (For he does say, τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.) While this reply does concede the relational nature of difference, nonetheless it still treats a formal concept as if it were a material concept. Later on, Parmenides accepts one of the consequences of so treating difference. That consequence is,

> Ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τἆλλά που

> ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη. – Τί μήν; – Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε ἧττον; – Τί γὰρ ἄν; – Εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὁμοίως.
>
> (147c2-6)

Quite simply then, as a material concept Difference would make things both the same and different. Such nonsense should remind us of a previous discussion. We should remind ourselves that things are different by virtue of being different in kind, or by having different features, or by having a difference in place, etc. In short, Difference does not provide a way of being different.

The second stage of the proof is sometimes credited with generating the number system. Such is, I believe, an extravagant view. And so, I will challenge it. I will argue that Parmenides is not generating the numbers system. Rather he is conflating (or, if you wish, confusing) the means by which we count and things counted. Parmenides needs this conflation in order to give an ontological status to numbers; in order to claim that numbers are things which are.

Parmenides begins from an assumption that quite clearly treats the One, Being, and Difference as elements.

> ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἓν εἴτε τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἆρ οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθά τινε ὧ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω;

He proceeds to construct sets out of these elements. He specifically mentions the sets, (being, one), (being, different), and (different, one).

In regard to these sets, he insists on two points. First, he insists that each member of a set is one; and second, that the members of each set are two. Having found employment for the first two numbers, Parmenides continues.

> Εἰ δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι, συντεθέντος ἑνὸς ὁποιουοῦν ᾑτινιοῦν συζυγίᾳ οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ πάντα; - Ναί. - Τρία δὲ οὐ περιττὰ καὶ δύο ἄρτια; - Πῶς δ'οὔ; - Τί δέ; δυοῖν ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δίς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δὶς ἓν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρὶς ἕν; - Ἀνάγκη; - Δυοῖν δὲ ὄντοιν καὶ δὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δὶς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ τρία τρὶς εἶναι; . . . Ἄρτια τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττὰ περιττάκις καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις. (143d5-144a2)

What this account sor far proves is that it is possible to generate an indefinite number of sets, to each of which a number may be assigned. But this is not to generate numbers. Rather, the account generates sets, the parts of which can be counted; it generates sets to which a number can be assigned by virtue of the sum of the parts. Parmenides, though, wishes to conclude,

> Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἴει τινὰ ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; - Οὐδαμῶς γε. - Εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἕν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι. (144a2-4)

This conclusion over-reaches its basis. The argument requires a stipulation; the stipulation that each number is to be identified with some particular set. And so, for example, it might be stipulated that the number one is to be identified with the set (one), and that the number two is to be identified with the set (one, being), and so on. By this means, the argument might have some chance of reaching the desired conclusion. But even then, there would be serious difficulties.

Allow me to explain the necessity for the stipulation that each number is to be identified with some particular set. The purpose of the argument is to prove that numbers exist. Towards this end, the argument confers ontological status on the elements, one, being, and different, and also upon the sets which may be constructed out of the elements. Now, it is important to realize that neither the elements nor the sets are numbers. For if each set were a number, there would be, for example, three things each of which could be the number two. I mean this: If each of the sets (being, one), (being, different), and (different, one) were a number, we would have three number twos. In light of this consideration, we may justly ask "How can these sets confer existence on numbers?". But, of course, they cannot. Now, if a philosopher were to stipulate that the set (one) is the number one, and that the set (one, being) is the number two, and so on, we could ask whether his stipulations are heuristic or abstruse. And in asking these things, we concede a certain amount of plausibility to his endeavor. Nonetheless, the main point is that Parmenides' argument over-reaches itself.

There is another criticism which we may bring against the argument. It is as follows. Even though the argument purports to prove that numbers exist, nonetheless it presupposes the availability of numbers. Consider this suggestion.

> Ὧ δ' ἂν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἆρα οἷόν τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτὼ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή; – Οὐκ οἷόν τε. – Ὣ δ' ἂν δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐκ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἓν εἶναι; (143d1-3)

In making this suggestion, Parmenides is, I submit, already counting. But counting presupposes the availability of numbers.

We now come to the parcelling of Being. Two assumptions are operative in this stage. The first is that what is must have being. The other is that what has being has it as a part. A consequence of the latter is that there are as many parts of being as there are things which are. The first assumption is revealed in the following way.

> Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πολλὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὄντων· ἢ οὐκ ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται; – Καὶ πάνυ γε. – Οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἂν αὐτῆς; – Ναί.

Notice that the suggestion τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἂν αὐτῆς leads into the second assumption. The second assumption is represented thusly.

> Ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν ὄντων του ἀποστατοῖ (144b1-4)

This does not make it totally clear that numbers have parts of Being.

But whilst summing up, Parmenides says about Being, Πλεῖστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς. In view of this, Parmenides' point must be that each number has a part of being. Finally, Parmenides concludes: Since numbers are unlimited, the parts of Being must also be unlimited; hence, Being is unlimited. In connection with this argument, we need only remind ourselves that its two assumptions spring directly out of Parmenides' understanding of the hypothesis.

The fourth stage is quite similar to the third. It begins from the assumption that what is must be one. Under this assumption, we find the claim that each part of Being must be one part. The next assumption is that what is one must have Unity. (This, we may note, is analogous to "What is must have Being".) The third assumption is that what has Unity must have a part of Unity. Parmenides is quite explicit in his pronouncement of the third assumption. He says

> Ἆρα οὖν ἓν ὂν πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἐστί; τοῦτο ἄρθει.— Ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον.— Μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον ἄλλως γάρ που οὐδαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασι τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας μέρεσιν παρέσται ἢ μεμερισμένον. (144c8-d4)

Our familiarity with the third stage provides us with the expectation that the fourth stage will have as its conclusion the following. Since the parts of Being are unlimited, and since the parts of Unity are as many as the parts of Being, the parts of Unity are also unlimited. Parmenides, though, momentarily forestalls this expectation.

> Καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη.—Ἀνάγκη.— Οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν

λέγοντες ὡς πλεῖστα μέρη ἡ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἴη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω τοῦ ἑνὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ' ἴσα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ ἑνί. (d4-el)

This turn in the argument is reminiscent of one horn of a Zenonian dilemma. Zeno argues,

> εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη τοσαῦτα εἶναι ὅσα ἐστὶ καὶ οὔτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐλάττονα. εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα ἐστιν ὅσα ἐστὶ, πεπερασμένα ἂν εἴη. (Fr. 3)

But Parmenides does not press this advantage to the contrary. He recovers his main purpose in the fifth stage, wherein he argues:

> οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἐξισοῦσθον δύο ὄντε ἀεὶ παρὰ πάντα. —Παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται.— Τὸ ἓν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθός ἐστιν. — Φαίνεται.— Οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὂν ἓν πολλά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενεμημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. (144e1-7)

It would seem reasonable to suppose that the assumption "Since the parts of Being are unlimited, and since the parts of Unity are as many as the parts of Being, the parts of Unity are also unlimited" is directing this final stage.

137de *vs*. 145ab

The theses which we shall here take under discussion are,

R1(N4): The One is neither straight nor round.

R2(A4): The One is either straight or round.

R2(A4) is an anomolous thesis. Whereas almost all of the affirmative theses take the form 'The S is both ϕ and ψ', (A4) reads "The One is *either* round *or* straight. The anomoly is not without significance. Given its construction, (A4) does not give rise to an internal conflict. More importantly, it shows that even Parmenides feels constrained to respect the logic of genuine contraries.

There are two assumptions which are shared by 137de and 145ab. They are:

(C3): Whatever is a whole has a middle.

(C4): Whatever has a middle is either round or straight.

These assumptions are introduced into the first round in the following way.

> Στρογγύλον γέ που ἐστι τοῦτο οὗ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσον ἴσον ἀπέχῃ. - Ναί. - Καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε, οὗ ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν ἐπίπροσθεν ᾖ.
>
> (137e1-4)

From the previous argument, we may add the premise that τὰ ἔσχατα are parts. In which case,

> Οὐκοῦν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἂν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι. (e4-6)

Whence follows the conclusion

> Οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές ἐστιν, ἐπείπερ οὔδε μέρη ἔχει. (36-7)

The argument for (A4) proceeds from a claim derived from (A3). On the basis of (A3)--viz., that the One is both limited and unlimited--Parmenides suggests that since the One is limited it has extremities. He then introduces an assumption for which I have argued, and which underlies the internal contradiction of (A3). We read,

> Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπείπερ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; —Ἀνάγκη.— Τί δέ; εἰ ὅλον, οὐ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; κἂν του ἓν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὅλον εἶναι; (145a4-8)

To assume that a whole must have a beginning and an end is to concede that the parts of a whole will be ennumerable. And as I have pointed out, this assumption makes (A3) into a genuinely contradictory thesis. In any case, Parmenides proceeds to characterize the One as having a beginning, middle, and end. From these considerations, he moves to the desired conclusion.

> Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἴη. —Οὐ γάρ.— Καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὂν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου, ἤ τινος μεικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν
>
> (b1-5)

Our review of the above passage indicates that the present conflict results from directing contrary assumptions at a set of common assumptions. Thesis R1(N2), the One neither has parts nor is a whole, together with (C3) and (C4) yields "The One is neither straight nor round". Turning to the second round, we find R2(A1), the One has parts and is a whole, together with (C3) and (C4), yielding "The One is either straight or round". This observation may be connected with a more general view of the initial results of the dialectical process. So far, the particular tensions between the first and second round may all be related to the basic sources of conflict; which is to say Parmenides' different understandings of the hypothesis. The sources, together with a number of common assumptions, are responsible for the initial conflicts. This general view is applicable to two more conflicts. Thereafter, the contradictions arise independently of the different understandings of the hypothesis.

138ab vs. 145be

The conflicting theses are,

R1(N5): The One is neither in another nor in itself.

R2(A5): The One is both in itself and in another.

Heretofore, the common assumptions have been more or less innocuous. Now, the most important feature of the arguments relevant to the present conflict is that the arguments treat the expression 'in another' and 'in itself' as location-predicates. I mean, the arguments presuppose that these expressions enable one to say where something is. Such a presupposition is not at all innocuous. Rather it is dangerously false. Concerning 'in itself', we will see an argument from the first round educing an excellent reason for disallowing 'in itself' as a location-predicate. That reason not withstanding, the claim that the One is not in itself is nonetheless used in concluding that the One is nowhere. Concerning 'in another', its viability as a location-predicate depends upon, what I shall call, the bucket theory of place.

Thesis (N5) is aligned with a more general thesis. Parmenides says,

> Καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἴη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη. (138a2-3)

The fact that (N5) is aligned with the further thesis "The One is nowhere" demonstrates that Parmenides is taking 'in another' and 'in itself' to be location-predicates.

The phrase τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν indicates that Parmenides is going to pick up on what he has already said about the One. This he does.

> Ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὂν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἅπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἑνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντες ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ ἅπτεσθαι. (138a3-7)

The claim "Since the One is without parts and does not partake of round, it is impossible for it to be in contact at many points all round" may be referred to theses R1(N2) and R1(N4). There is, though, a much more important claim made within the above passage; a claim which presupposes the bucket theory of place. Simply stated, the theory is this: To have a place is to be contained and encompassed by something else. The theory is presupposed by the above, insofar as Parmenides takes the argument to be apropos of showing that the One is nowhere (which is to say, has no place). Now, the bucket theory is relevant to all four arguments under 138ab and 145be. This is somewhat surprising, in that a claim such as "The One is in itself" (when the claim is intended to state the place of the One) would seem to be incompatible with the requirement that what has a place be contained by something else. Nevertheless, the theory is relevant to all four arguments. So, in anticipation of observing its relevance to all the arguments, we may confer on the basic premise of the theory the status of being a common assumption.

(C5) To have a place is to be contained and encompassed by something other than that which has the place.

Let us consider the argument stated above. With regard to it, we may raise the question "How does lack of parts prevent the One from having any contacts?". Suppose we imagine the One to be an indivisible rubber ball. Its indivisibility would leave it without parts. And its rubberiness would allow it to bounce from point to point. The case is fanciful. Nonetheless, it brings to the fore the issue of what Parmenides means by 'parts'. If by 'parts' Parmenides were to mean no more than whatever may be acquired by division, then his argument would be invalid. But, when Parmenides speaks of parts, he does not take himself to be speaking of just 'bits' and 'pieces'. He also counts ἐσχάτα, extremities, as parts. For Parmenides, an extremity is a part over and above whatever may be acquired by division. For example, then, a yard-stick, besides having thirty-six parts will have a part which is an ἀρχή, and a part which is a τελευτή; besides these, there will also be a part which is a μέσον. Given this understanding of 'parts', the argument follows. In order for two things to be in contact, their extremities must be in contact. But since the One is assumed to have no extremities, it will not have the wherewithal to make contact with another thing. These considerations provide a rationale for the conclusion that the One cannot be in another.

The second argument under 138ab, the argument which is given in connection with the claim that the One is not in itself, affords an excellent reason for excluding 'in itself' as a location-predicate of the bucket theory. Parmenides argues

> Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν κἂν ἑαυτῷ εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη· ἔν τῳ γάρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον. – Ἀδύνατον γάρ. – Οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταὐτὸν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν οὐκ εἴη ἔτι ἓν ἀλλὰ δύο. (138a7-b5)

The basic consideration underlying this argument is, ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον. Now, when the claim "The One is in itself" is viewed in light of the basic considerations, we see that it fails to reveal that there is a container encompassing the One. Or, in other words, the expression 'in itself' cannot be a location-predicate of the theory. A further consequence is that the expression is irrelevant to saying where something is. Parmenides, though, seems to have missed this lesson. For he proceeds to the conclusion, Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἕν, μήτε ἐν αὑτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν5-6). The conclusion suggests that something can be somewhere by being in itself. For if the claim "The One is not in itself" may be used towards concluding that the One is nowhere, then presumably the claim "The One is in itself" may be used towards concluding that the One is somewhere.

From what I have said, it would appear that Parmenides has misunderstood his own argument. But in fact, he has included in his argument an assumption which blocks my criticism that 'in itself' cannot be a location-predicate. That assumption is expressed in the following.

> οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταὐτὸν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἓν ἀλλὰ δύο. (b3-5)

The possibility of a subject of discourse 'being more than one' is the condition upon which 'in itself' may be taken to be a location-predicate. The One, of course, fails to meet this condition, since it is just one. We will find the assumption being used in the second round. Hence, we may designate it as a common assumption.

(C6) Whatever has a place by being 'in itself' will be more than one.

We should realize that (C6) is a breeding ground for a paradox. Indeed, what is said concerning (C6) in the first round anticipates the internal tension of R2(A5). Consider the claim "The same thing cannot as a whole both encompass and be encompassed". The claim creates a philosophical tension vis-á-vis "The One is in itself". We are left wondering how the One manages its double-identity. Let us, then, turn to the second round.

The first argument of 145be is intended to prove that the One is in itself. The central part of the argument reads,

> 1. Ει ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάντα τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, περιεχέται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη (145c4-7)

We may concede that the parts of the One are in the One. We may also allow the inference that the parts are encompassed by the One. But we should want to foreclose on the claim that the One is its parts; for it is the basic assumption of the argument. It makes it possible for Parmenides to argue that since the One encompasses its parts, and since the One is its parts, then the One encompasses itself; and hence, is in itself. (Parmenides rather pointedly says, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἕν.) In any case, the basic assumption is supposed to bestow upon the One the double identity of being both container and contained.

The second argument of 145be disputes the purported identity of the One and its parts. The internal conflict of 145be may be set out in the following way. On the one hand, if the One is its parts, then the One will be in the same place as its parts are. But on the other hand, if the One is in the same place as all its parts, it will be in the same place as any one of its parts; but to have a place is to be encompassed therein; and it is absurd that the One, which is a whole, should be in one of its parts. (This line of argumentation can be brought to an appropriate finale. Continuing to the end: If the One and its parts are not in the same place; they are in different places; but things which are in different places are different; hence the One is not its parts.) The argument which Parmenides uses to develop the internal tension is,

> εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἑνί· ἔν τινι γὰρ ἑνὶ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι του δύναιτο ἔν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἁπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἔνι, πῶς ἔτι ἔν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται; - Οὐδαμῶς.- Οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἴη, τὸ πλέον ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἴη, ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον. (145d1-6)

We may view the exploitation of the internal tension as a means of clearing the way for the claim that the One is in something else. The argument for that claim is,

> Μὴ ὂν δ' ἐν πλέοσιν μηδ' ἐν ἑνὶ μηδ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι; –Ἀνάγκη.– Οὐκοῦν μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὂν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον δὲ ὂν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι; – Πάνυ γε.– Ἧι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστιν· (d6-e3)

This argument again reveals Parmenides' intention to treat 'in another' and 'in itself' as location-predicates. For it presumes that 'in another' and 'in itself' are exclusive options under the notion of 'being somewhere', such that if neither option is applicable to the subject of discourse, it may be infered that the subject is nowhere. The reverse of this is to block the inference that the subject is nowhere, and thereby force a decision between the subject being in another or being in itself. Now, Parmenides has taken the reverse route. And since the exploitation of the internal tension leaves him with the conclusion that the One is not in itself, he may infer that the One is in another.

Let us review the arguments of 138ab and 145be. On the one hand, the bucket theory of place together with the assumptions under the thesis that the One has no parts account for the conclusions of 138ab. And on the other hand, the bucket theory together with the assumptions under the thesis that the One has parts account for the conclusions of 145be. But to this general view we must add the special observation that the expression 'in itself' is a predicate of the theory only by virtue of (C6). Without (C6), the expression 'in itself' could not be a predicate of the theory. But, the assumption, in turn, is responsible for the internal tension of 145be.

138b-139b *vs*. 145e-146a

The conflicting theses are,

R1(N6): The One is neither in motion nor at rest.

R2(A6): The One is both at rest and in motion.

These theses are closely related to the preceding theses concerning whether the One has a place. In fact, a P-group analysis schema reveals 'having a place' as a condition of being either at rest or in motion.

The analysis schema for the pairing 'at rest/in motion' is as follows.



This schema reveals that there are two conditions for being at rest. One condition is that the subject of discourse have no velocity; the other is that the subject have a place. My desk and the University's Administration Building satisfy both conditions. Each is at rest. But subjects of discourse such as 'the number nine', 'Justice', and 'Beauty' do not satisfy both conditions. We may, if we wish, say of the number nine that it does not have a velocity. This statement, though, would not warrant the inference "So, the number nine is at rest". Having a place is a necessary condition of being at rest. The number nine does not satisfy this condition, and so it is neither at rest nor in motion.

Parmenides has already argued, in the first round, that the One is nowhere. Given our analysis schema, Parmenides is justified in further claiming that the One is neither in motion nor at rest. Nevertheless, Parmenides introduces considerations which complicate our simple view. In connection with the claim that the One is not in motion, three kinds of motion are considered. Parmenides says,

> Ὅτι κινούμενον γε ἢ φερο ιο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν· αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις· (138b8-c1)

The first kind of motion (φέροιτο) is later sub-divided into circular motion and linear motion. As for ἀλλοίωσις, we would be inclined to say that it is not motion. But in any case, Parmenides' contention that the One does not sufer ἀλλοίωσις may be refered to his arguments under 139be. (There, he argues that the One is not the same as, or different from, itself or another. If such were the case, neither could the One become the same as, or different from, itself or another.)

The argument against the One having circular motion is the following.

> Οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ το μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ᾧ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι
>
> (138c6-d2)

Essentially, the argument turns on an appeal to the assumption that the

the One has no parts. We come now to the argument against the One having linear motion.

> Ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμεῖβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται; – Εἴπερ γε δή. – Οὐκοῦν εἶναι μέν που ἔν τινι αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; – Ναί. – Ἆρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον; (d2-5)

In this initial part of the argument, Parmenides is exercising the theme "What cannot come to be". Hence, he argues: since the One cannot be anywhere, it cannot come to be anywhere. In the next stage of the argument, he contends that linear motion is movement between different places. This allows development upon the general theme. Since the One cannot be anywhere, cannot have a place, and since linear motion is movement between different places, the One cannot move linearly. At any rate, Parmenides argues,

> Εἰ ἔν τῳ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ' ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴπερ ἤδη ἐγγίγνεται; (d6-8)

An important feature of this explanation concerning how things move between places is the conflation of places and things. There is a conflation here, insofar as the explanation is intended to reveal why the One cannot come to be anywhere. Now, the conflation is not really needed for Parmenides' present purposes; but it will become fundamentally important in the second round. In any case, the One, having no place, cannot satisfy either moment of linear motion; it cannot neither come out of something (which is to say, some place), nor come into something (which is to say, some place).

What we have just now reviewed of 138b-139b provides Parmenides with a complete argument against the One having linear motion. He, though, has more to say on the matter. He further argues that only a thing which has parts can enjoy linear motion. Since the One is said to have no parts, this is an added reason why the One cannot so move.

> Εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὗ μέρη εἴη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἴη ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τε που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναί τινος μήτε ἔξω. (d8-34)

Parmenides concludes, saying-- Κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἓν ἀκίνητον (139a2-3).

The argument for the claim that the One is not at rest is integrally tied to the claim that the One has no place as well. It begins,

> Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι γέ φαναι ἔν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον
>
> (139a2-3)

This claim is quite obviously borrowed from thesis R1(N5). And from this claim, Parmenides draws the inference, Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. We may read ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ as 'in the same thing'. But since having a place has been characterized as being in something, we may further understand ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ as also meaning 'in the same place'. Now, we may grant that to be at rest is to remain in the same place. Bringing these considerations together, we arrive at this: Since the One cannot be in the same place (given that it has no place), then the One cannot be at rest. Parmenides says,

> Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὂν οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ' ἕστηκεν. (139b1)

There is one observation which we may make about the arguments for R1(N6) that marks a contrast between the arguments for R1(N6) and the arguments for R2(A6). The arguments for the former are directly dependent upon the general thesis that the One is nowhere. The arguments for the latter do not depend upon a general thesis to the contrary. That is to say, the arguments for the thesis "The One is both at rest and in motion" are not developed from the general thesis that the One is somewhere. Rather, Parmenides first argues from the claim that the One is in itself to the conclusion that the One is at rest; he then argues from the claim that the One is in another to the conclusion that the One is in motion. Simply put, the contrast is that while one and the same reason is used to argue (a) that the One is not in motion, and (b) that the One is not at rest, different reasons are needed to argue (c) that the One is at rest, and (d) that the One is in motion.

The argument for the claim that the One is at rest is,

> Ἕστηκε μέν που, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ ἑνὶ ὂν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ. —Ἔστι γάρ.—Τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ὂν ἑστὸς δήπου ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι. (145e8-146a3)

The argument contains familiar assumptions. It is assumed that something may have a place by being in itself. It is further assumed that the One is in itself, and as such has a place out of which it does not move.

Finally, there is the innocuous assumption that what is always in the same place is at rest.

The argument for the claim that the One is in motion takes its start from the other half of thesis R2(A5); the other half being "The One is in another".

Τί δέ; τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀεὶ ὂν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτ' ἐν ταὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ ὂν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἑστάναι, μὴ ἑστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι. (a3-6)

This is a very interesting dialectical argument. For, we have the remarkable claim that what is always in another thing can never be in the same (we are constrained to understand) place. I think that Parmenides has suppressed the considerationswhich might lead one to say this. Those considerations are, I submit, as follows.

(i) What is always in another is always in something different (from itself).

(ii) What is always in something different is always in a different place.

If this submission is correct, we may say that Parmenides is pressing the bucket theory of place to its utmost consequence. For (ii) reveals that having a different place is simply a matter of being something which is different from the subject of discourse. It also reveals the conflation which I mentioned in connection with R1(N6); viz., the conflation of 'places' and 'things'. An important consequence of the conflation is that ἐν ἑτέρῳ may have a double-meaning bestowed on it. The expression will now mean both 'in a different something' and 'in a different place'. This understanding of ἐν ἑτέρῳ lends plausibility to the inference that the One can never be in the same place. Indeed, there is a subsequent inference which constrains us to have this understanding of ἐν ἑτέρῳ. For the inference that the One is never at rest must depend upon the assumption that the One is never in the same place. This subsequent inference could not be possible without a double-meaning of ἐν ἑτέρῳ.

The present conflict between R1 and R2 may be referred to the conflict between R1(N5) and R2(A5). In this regard, Parmenides' intuitions are not totally misguided. The applicability of 'at rest' and 'in motion' depends upon the subject of discourse having a location. Insofar as Parmenides takes 'in itself' and 'in another' to be location-predicates, he recognizes this relation.

The conflict which is internal to R2(A6) arises from presumptions which Parmenides makes concerning the meanings of ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ and ἐν ἑτέρῳ. He presumes that ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ means both 'in the same thing' and 'in the same place', and that ἐν ἑτέρῳ means both 'in something different' and 'in a different place'. The double meaning of each allows Parmenides to make the appropriate transitions. In connection with the claim that the One is at rest, he begins from the assumption that the One is in the same thing (viz., in itself), and then by exercising the second meaning of ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ he infers that the One is at rest, since it is in the same place. And in connection with the claim that the One is in motion, he first assumes that the One is in something else (i.e., something different), and then by exercising the second meaning of ἐν ἑτέρῳ he infers that the One is on the move since it is always in a different place. A rather interesting phrase occurs in the latter argument; viz., τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀεὶ ὄν. Under the first meaning of ἐν ἑτέρῳ, this would simply mean 'what is always in something else'. And so, for example, if the One were being permanently stored in a cupboard, it would qualify for such a description. Furthermore, under the first meaning, there would be no internal conflict. There is, though, a conflict when ἐν ἑτέρῳ is shifted to its second meaning; τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀεὶ ὄν comes to mean 'what is always in a different place'.

139be *vs*. 146a-147b

These arguments mark a new dialectical phase. The previous arguments have been closely related to the issue of whether the One has parts. In the first round, the assumption that the One has no parts is essential to the arguments for the claims that the One is without limits, and has no shape, and is nowhere, etc. And in the second round, the assumption that the One has parts is essential to the arguments which purport to prove the contrary claims. The arguments which we are about to consider do not rely on either of the assumptions that relate to the issue of whether the One has parts. The most significant feature of the arguments under 139be and 146a-147b is that they treat the expressions 'same' and 'different' as if the expressions were both formal concept and material concept expressions. It is this feature which constitutes the new dialectical phase.

The conflicting theses are,

R1(N7): The One is neither the same as, nor different from itself or another.

R2(A7): The One is the same as and different from itself and the Others.

Each of these theses contains two claims which are intuitively plausible. With regard to (N7), it is intuitively plausible that the One is not different from itself, and also plausible that the One is not the same as another. With regard to (A7), it is plausible that the One is the same as itself, and also plausible that the One is different from the Others. As we will see the arguments which are given on behalf of these claims respect the formal nature of the expressions 'same' and 'different'. On the other hand, each of the above theses contains two claims which are counter-intuitive. Thesis (N7) contains the claims "The One is not different from another" and "The One is not the same as itself"; (A7) contains the claims "The One is different from itself" and "The One is the same as the Others". These claims are all counter-intuitive. In connection with the arguments which purport to prove these claims, we will see that the arguments treat 'same' and 'different' as if the expressions were material concept expressions. For within those arguments, it is assumed that 'same' and 'different' have reference to attributes.

I have already suggested that the conflict between R1(N7) and R2(A7) is a result of 'same' and 'different' being shifted between formal concept and material concept roles. The same explanation may be given of the conflict which is internal to (A7). So that we may have a clear perspective on the matter, I offer the following diagram.

Formal Concept Claims

R1	R2
(i) The One is not different from itself.	(i) The One is the same as itself.
(ii) The One is not the same as another.	(ii) The One is different from the Others.

Material Concept Claims

R1	R2
(iii) The One is not different from another.	(iii) The One is the same as the Others.
(iv) The One is not the same as itself.	(iv) The One is different from itself.

It is important to notice that the formal concept claims of R1 and R2 present no conflict. Rather, the formal claims of R1 conflict with the material claims of R2; and the material claims of R1 conflict with the formal claims of R2. Furthermore, notice that the internal conflict of R2(A7) is outlined by our division of the claims into formal claims and material claims. For within (A7), there is a two-fold conflict; on the one hand, between (i) and (iv), and on the other, between (ii) and (iii).

Let us first consider the arguments which purport to prove the formal concept claims. The relevant arguments from the first round are given in the following passage.

"Ἕτερον μέν που ἑαυτοῦ ὂν ἑνὸς ἕτερον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἕν. –Ἀληθῆ.–Καὶ μὴν ταὐτόν γε ἑτέρῳ ὂν ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη, αὐτὸ δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἕν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἑνός. –Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.–Ταὐτὸν μὲν ἄρα ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται. (139b5-c3)

We may account for the first argument in the following way. A subject cannot remain being itself, whilst suffering a change of nature (or, if you wish, change of essence). Since the nature of the One is 'to be one', and since the One would be different from what it is if it were other than itself, the One cannot be different from itself. The essential aspect of this reasoning is made explicit in the second argument, where Parmenides says ὥστε οὐδ᾽ ἂν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἕν. The second argument presupposes that if the One were the same as another, the One would be identical with that other (ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη); and hence, not the One.

The first argument respects the formal nature of 'different'. For it presupposes *a difference between* what the One is and what the One is not. The presumption makes it possible for Parmenides to argue that the One would not be itself, if it were different from what it is. The second argument respects the formal nature of 'same'. It considers and rejects the possibility of the One being *the same as* another. The point of my italizing is to remind us that 'same' and 'different' are relational expressions. This reminder will become more significant when we confront statements such as "The One is not the same (simpliciter)" and "The One is different (simpliciter)".

Turning to the second round, we find the following argument being given towards proving that the One is the same as itself.

Πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει, ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον· ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτὸν ᾖ μηδ᾽ ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τουτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη. — Φαίνεται. — Ἆρ οὖν τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν; — Ουδαμῶς. —

Οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν. - Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε. - Ἀλλ' ἆρα ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἑνὸς τὸ ἕν; - Οὐ δῆτα. - Οὐδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕτερον ἂν εἴη. - Οὐ μέντοι. - Εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερον μήτε ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ταὐτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; - Ἀνάγκη. (146b2-c4)

The thesis that anything is related to anything else by being either the same, or different, or by being related as part to whole or whole to part is not without significance. In the first place, the thesis provides Parmenides with the means for arguing what need not be argued. By rebutting the options that the One is different from itself and that it is related to itself as either part to whole or whole to part, Parmenides is left with the option that the One is the same as itself as his conclusion. In the second place, this thesis together with the concommitant rebuttal technique will be used later to argue that the One is the same as the Others.

Concerning "The One is the same as itself", we could ask whether the claim reveals a relation. Fortunately, though, we really need not answer such a tiresome question. A more appropriate question is "How is Parmenides using the expression 'same'?". In this connection, it is important to realize that the above argument contains no assumptions which would undermine the formal syntax of 'same'. That syntax is born by the sentence-frame "S is the same as P". But, the syntax can be interfered with, if it is supposed that 'sameness' is an attribute. We can observe a consequence of such interference by considering a variation upon a claim that Socrates makes in the first part of the Parmenides. Socrates claims: Things which partake of likeness come to be alike by virtue of their participation. Consider, then, the following: Things which partake of sameness come to be the same by virtue of their participation. This characterization of 'same' gives the expression the status of a 'one-place' predication. Now, if 'same' were a one-place predicate, by parity of reasoning so also would 'different' be a one-place predicate. And at this point, we come to the brink of philosophical absurdity. For, let us further suppose that 'same' and 'different', as one-place predicates, have reference to contrary attributes. A paraphrase of one of Parmenides' arguments brings forth the absurdity.

> Sameness and Difference are contrary to one another. So Sameness will never be in what is different, nor Difference in what is the same. Assuming that each thing is the same (presumably, the same as itself), then Difference can never be in anything at all.

This argument is a striking example of what may happen when 'same' and 'different' are treated as non-formal expressions. Moreover, it is a taste of things to come.

The final argument belonging under the formal claims group is as follows.

> εἴ τού τι ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἑτέρου ὄντος ἕτερον ἔσται;
> -Ἀνάγκη. - Οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἕν ἐστιν, ἅπανθ' ἕτερα τοῦ
> ἑνός, καὶ τὸ ἕν τῶν μὴ ἕν; - Πῶς δ' οὔ; - Ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν
> εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων. (146d1-5)

Assuming that ἕν is an expression which reveals the nature of the One, we may say that the argument marks a sortal difference between the One and the Others. Or, in other words, the argument may be understood as revealing a difference in kind between the One and the Others. In any case, this view of the argument allows us to say of it that it respects the formal nature of 'different'. (It should be pointed out that the argument does not necessarily mark a difference between the One and everything else. The relevant difference is between the One and the things which are not one--i.e., which do not have the nature of being one. Hence, if there are items, which while not being the One, nonetheless enjoy the nature of being one, then they will be the same in kind with the One. In order for Parmenides to establish the difference which is suggested in the above between the One and everything else, he would have to add the further assumption that the One is the only thing that is one.)

We may presently turn our attention to the difficult arguments; arguments which treat 'same' and 'different' as material concept expressions. Beginning with the first round, we have the argument for the claim that the One is not different from another.

> οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί.—Ὀρθῶς.—Τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερου· ἢ οἴει;—Οὐ δῆτα.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῆ ὂν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον.
>
> (139c4-d1)

The key assumption is contained in the claim, οὐ γὰρ ἑνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρον ἑτέρος ἄλλῳ. One commentator has argued for the soundness of the assumption. His argument is,

> To be other than something else is not the same thing as to be one. So a One which is simply one and has no second character at all, cannot have the character of being other than anything.

This, while wrong-headed, is nevertheless illuminating. It provides a clear understanding of how Parmenides is treating ἕτερον. Let us, then, ponder the claim "To be other than something else is not the same thing as to be one". This claim may well be true. But it is highly questionable whether it permits the inference that the One cannot have the character of being other than anything. Each of these points deserves further discussion.

Assuming that the claim "To be other than something else is not the same as to be one" is true, we may ask whether its opposite (viz., "To be other than something else is not different from being one") is false. I suggest that there are circumstances under which the latter is not false, but rather true. Now, of course, I fully realize that the suggestion appears to affront the dictum "Contrary claims cannot both be true". To this, my response is that the dictum does not apply because of the nature of the claims. To put things simply, I speak of them as formal concept claims. More specifically, I mean that these claims do not purport any facts in terms of which their truth or falsity may be assessed. In light of the point just made, consider

(i) The desk in the office, 4-89, is the same as the desk in the office, 4-88.

(ii) The desk in the office, 4-89, is different from the desk in the office 4-88.

Suppose the facts of the case to be that the aforementioned desks are of the same style, but in different colours. Given these facts what should we say? Should we say that (i) is true and (ii) is false, or that (i) is false and (ii) is true, or perhaps that neither is true? This question would seem to pose a dilemma. But I find the source of the dilemma more interesting than the dilemma itself. Surely the source is the insistence that the dictum "Contrary claims cannot both be true" be universally applicable so that any given claim must have a true or false counterpart. Such insistence is, I think, misguided. Indeed, the above dilemma may be resolved simply by declaring the dictum inapplicable to the case. But in doing so, we would not be rejecting the dictum, rather just restricting its use. With these considerations in mind, let us return to the two claims because of which we began our present enquiry. We can presume facts in terms of which it would make sense to say "To be other than something else is not the same thing as to be one". For example, we presume the desk in 4-89 to be brown and the desk in 4-88 to be white. In such a case, the fact that each desk is one desk has no bearing upon the claim that the brown desk is something other than the white desk. Hence, their each 'being one' is irrelevant to their difference. On the other hand, though, there are cases in which 'being one' directly relates to questions of sameness and difference. In this regard, reconsider the argument which purported to show that the One and the Others are different. In that argument, the difference between the One and the Others turns on the assumptions that the One is one and that the Others are not one. Hence, we may say that the difference of the One to the

Other is no more than the One's being one and the Others' being not one. Or in other words, the One's being other than the Other is not different from the One's being one.

I apologize for some argumentation that is no less turgid than the Parmenides itself. There is a simpler way to handle Parmenides' argument. If the inference that the One cannot have the character of being other than anything were a permissable inference, we would introduce into our ontology an attribute whose nature invites absurdity. For if there were an attribute of 'being other than something else', then any two things possessing such an attribute would be the same. It is interesting to note that Parmenides ostensibly accepts an argument which purports to show that Difference makes things the same. He then goes on to press even further. He further argues: If Difference makes things the same, Sameness must make them different. Such are the consequences of treating ἕτερον as a material concept expression.

Let us now consider the conflict between this part of the first round and its counterpart in the second. In the second, Parmenides asks,

> Οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἕν ἐστιν, ἅπανθ᾽ ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνός,
> καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἕν; (146d3-4)

Parmenides is suggesting that the One and the Others are different by virtue of the One's being one and the Others' being not one. The suggestion is philosophically viable, insofar as the difference between the One and the Others is explicated in terms of what the One is and what the Others are not. Such an explication does, of course, respect the formal nature of ἕτερον. The argument in the first round does just the opposite. By presuming ἑτέρου τινος to be an attribute, it shifts ἕτερον into a material role. And so, the conflict is engendered by shifting ἕτερον between material concept and formal concept roles.

We come now to the argument given on behalf of the claim that the One is not the same as itself. There is hereexplicit reliance on the assumption that Sameness is an attribute. For Parmenides says,

> Οὐδὲ μὴν ταὐτόν γε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται. – Πῶς δ' οὔ; – Οὐχ ἧπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὴ δήπου καὶ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ. (139d1-3)

Under this account, Sameness as an attribute would make the One many; for the One, Parmenides might say, would then have the two parts, Unity and Sameness. Parmenides, though, does not utilize this possibility, and he chooses to argue along different lines. For purposes of analysis, I will divide the further argumentation into two parts, the first of which presents an incoherent argument, and the other of which is somewhat akin to the opening of the second round.

Parmenides proceeds to argue,

> Ὅτι οὐκ, ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν γένηταί τῳ τι, ἓν γίγνεται. – Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; – Τοῖς πολλοῖς ταὐτὸν γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕν. (d3-5)

This is very misguided. A question which we may bring against the argument is: How can the claim "Whenever something becomes the same as the Many, it must become many, and not one" justify saying that whenever something becomes the same it does not become one? In fact, the claim does not justify the latter, but rather provides a model upon which the contrary of the latter may be inferred. The following claims are strictly analogous.

(iii) Whenever something becomes the same as the Many, it must become many.

(iv) Whenever something becomes the same as the One, it must become one.

Further to (iv), we may argue: Since the One is one, and since its nature is that of 'being one', anything else which acquires the nature of 'being one' will become the same as the One, and as such will become one. In other words, something can become one by becoming the same (as the One). But the real point of this lesson is that there is a disparity between Parmenides' initial assumption (viz., Οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὑτὴ δήπου καὶ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ d1-2) and his first attempt to show that the One cannot be the same. On the one hand, his initial assumption clearly marks 'same' as a material concept expression. On the other, his first argument treats 'same' as a formal concept expression. By reason of this disparity, his argument is incoherent.

Parmenides' second argument does align itself with his initial expression.

> Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὁπότε τι ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο, ἀεὶ ἂν ἓν ἔγιγνετο, καὶ ὁπότε ἕν, ταὐτόν.—Πάνυ γε.—Εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἑαυτῷ ταὐτὸν ἔσται, οὐχ ἓν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· καὶ οὕτω ἓν ὂν οὐχ ἓν ἔσται.
>
> (d6-e2)

The claim "If there were no difference between the One and the Same, whenever a thing becomes the same, it would become one, and whenever one, the same" is reminiscent of the opening of the second round, where Parmenides says, ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταὐτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἑνί. The similarity between the two passages resides in the fact that in each passage Parmenides is arguing that there is a difference between the One and some other 'purported' entity. Moreover, both passages employ the same technique; the technique being to affirm the desired conclusion in light of the undesirable consequences which supposedly follow from assuming the contrary of the desired conclusion. In the present case, it is argued that if the One were the same (i.e., if there were no difference between the One and the Same), then the One will be both one and not one (not one, presumably, by virtue of being the same). In any case, it is quite evident that the argument treats αὐτός as if it were a material concept expression.

As for explaining the conflict between the first and the second rounds as regards the above argument, our story remains the same. In the first round, αὐτός is taken to be a material concept expression, whereas in the second it is treated as a formal concept expression.

We may now turn to the remaining two arguments in the second round. The argument for the claim that the One is different from itself is as follows.

> τὸ ἑτέρωθι ὂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἑτέρωθι ἔσται; —Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. —Οὕτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἕν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν ἅμα καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ. —Ἐφάνη γάρ. —Ἕτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ταύτῃ ἂν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν. (146c4-d1)

Unlike many arguments in the Parmenides, this one contains a true assumption. Stated generally, the assumption is: (x)(y)(if x is in a place different from the place in which y is, x and y are different things). Given this assumption, Parmenides takes the line that since the One is in a different place, the One must be different from itself. Now, the further assumption that the One is in a different place is available from a previous thesis; the thesis being "The One is both in itself and in another". In connection with the thesis, we will remember that it has bestowed upon ἐν ἑτέρῳ an ambiguity, thereby allowing the phrase to mean 'in a different place'. Of course, this in itself is a violation of the formal/material concepts distinction, since it purports ἕτερον to be a location-predicate.

The final argument in this set is given towards showing that the One is the same as the Others. The argument employs the thesis that anything is related to anything by being either the same, or different, or by being related as part to whole or whole to part. And upon this thesis, Parmenides exercises a rebuttal technique, whereby two of the three options within the thesis are rejected, and the third option is taken as the conclusion of the argument. The rebutting of the option that the One and the Others are different presents a rather interesting bit of argumentation. Of particular significance is the characterization which Parmenides gives of Sameness and Difference.

Ὅρα δή· αὐτό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἆρ' οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις; – Πῶς δ' οὔ; – Ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσει ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ταὐτῷ ποτε εἶναι; – Οὐκ ἐθελήσει. – Εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἕτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν τὸ ἕτερον χρόνον οὐδένα· εἰ γὰρ όντιοῦν εἴη ἔν τῳ, ἐκεῖνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν ταὐτῷ εἴη τὸ ἕτερον. οὐχ οὕτως; – Οὕτως. – Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕτερον. – Ἀληθῆ. – Οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἓν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ἐνείη ἂν τὸ ἕτερον. – Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. – Οὐκ ἄρα τῷ ἑτέρῳ γ'αν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἓν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα. (146d5-e6)

The basic assumption that Sameness and Difference are contraries depends upon treating 'same' and 'different' as material concept expressions. This characterization allows Parmenides to bring the theory of opposites into play, with the consequence that what is said to be the same cannot also be said to be different. The consequence is then brought to bear on the assumptions that the One is the same (presumably, the same as itself), and that the Others are the same (presumably, the same as themselves), and thence Parmenides draws the inference, Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἰ τὸ ἕτερον. We should realize, though, that the introduction of assumptions no less implausible than "The One is the same" and "The Others are the same" would allow the inference of the opposite conclusion. The assumptions "The One is different" and "The Others are different" together with the theory of opposites would permit the conclusion that Sameness is never in the things that are. Furthermore, we should realize that the assumptions which would permit this are already available to Parmenides. The obvious moral of this is that Parmenides is working with assumptions that allow him to argue on behalf of any number of claims.

The explanation to be given of the conflict regarding the above argument between the first and the second rounds has been heard before. To avoid tedium, I will simply say that the conflict is engendered by shifting 'same' and 'different' between formal and material concept roles.

Finally an explanation is required for the conflict which is internal to R2(A7). Again, we may appeal to the explanation that the conflict results from the shifting of 'same' and 'different' between formal and material concept roles.

139e-140b vs. 147c-148d

The conflicting theses are,

R1(N8): The One is neither like nor unlike itself or another.

R2(A8): The One is both like and unlike itself and the Others.

In light of the fact that 'like and unlike' share certain logical properties with 'same and different', we might expect that the arguments under thesis (N8) will be similar to the arguments under (N7), and that the arguments under (A8) will be similar to the arguments under (A7). In particular, we might expect that the arguments for (N8) and (A8) will proceed along lines similar to what we noticed in the previous section, whereby we see:

Formal Concept Claims

R1	R2
(i) The One is not unlike itself.	(i) The One is like itself.
(ii) The One is not like another.	(ii) The One is unlike the Others.

Material Concept Claims

(iii) The One is not like itself.	(iii) The One is unlike itself.
(iv) The One is not unlike another.	(iv) The One is like the Others.

I am quite certain that it is within Parmenides' capabilities to devise arguments along these lines. But he does not do this. In fact, there is not one argument under either (N8) or (A8) which respects the formal nature of either 'like' or 'unlike'. All the arguments bearing the present conflict treat 'like' and 'unlike' as material concept expressions. In this connection, we may appeal to a lesson just recently learned; viz., when one treats formal expressions as if they were material expressions, one is licensed to infer contradictory claims. And, of course, Parmenides has no aversion to exercising such a license.

If Parmenides had utilized the schema proposed above there would have been eight arguments to be considered. But the set of arguments we are about to consider contains only four. Here, then, is another one of Parmenides' small mercies. In any case, the reduction of the number of arguments is managed in the following way. In the first round, one argument is devoted to showing the inapplicability of the expression 'like' to the One, and the other is devoted to showing the inapplicability of 'unlike'. And in the second, one argument purports to show the applicability of 'like' to the One and the Others, whilst the other argument purports to show the applicability of 'unlike' to the One and the Others.

A very essential feature of the four arguments is the close connection which Parmenides draws between 'like' and 'the same'. For, he offers the following definition of 'like': Ὅτι τὸ ταὐτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον. This definition is found in the first round, and is reaffirmed in the second. Accordingly, we may assign the definition the status of a common assumption.

(C8) To be like is to have the same (attribute).

As for 'unlike', its definition is the converse of (C8). This too has the status of a common assumption.

(C9) To be unlike is to have difference (or, a different attribute).

I would like to add that these definitions have been framed to allow for certain ambiguities. For, we will find that there is an ambiguity between 'like' meaning 'having the same (simpliciter)' and 'having the same attribute'. A similar ambiguity will be noticed in connection with unlike.

The argument which purports to prove that 'like' is inapplicable to the One (thereby supposedly proving that the One is not like itself nor like another) is as follows.

> Τοῦ δέ γε ἑνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταὐτόν —Ἐφάνη γάρ.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἕν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἕν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον.—Ναί.—Οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ. (139e9-140a4)

Quite obviously, the key assumption here is that the One is separate from the nature of the Same. The assumption together with the definition of 'like' permit the argument that since to be like is to have the Same, and since the One is not the Same, therefore the One is in no way like. But this simple recasting of the argument fails to appreciate a subtlety of the argument.

The above presents excellent evidence for the Separation Assumption discussed in section (E) of chapter two. We may presume in general that a separable which suffers some πάθος will suffer something which it is not. (For example, the One, if it were good, would suffer something--viz., Goodness--which it is not.) But the above argument shows further that the One, besides suffering what it is not, would also suffer something which is contrary to what it is. In Parmenides' own words, πλειώ ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἕν. Now, this consideration, when brought to bear on the theory of Forms, produces some interesting consequences. On the one hand, if the One is taken to be a Form, an advocate of the theory might feel compelled to characterize the other Forms in the way the One has been characterized. That is to say, the other Forms would not be allowed to suffer any πάθος. This consequence would, in turn, undercut the possibility of coming to know the Forms through λόγοι. For the Separation Assumption would permit only λόγοι of the form "S is S". Indeed, any λόγοι of the form "S is P" would be impossible, given the Separation Assumption. On the other hand, there is a way to avoid these difficulties. If the advocate of the theory permits himself to take the decision that there is no such Form as 'the One', he is no longer obliged to resolve the difficulties. But, of course, such a decision would not fit well with the Platonic corpus. And that, in itself, poses a problem. In any case, the above argument suggests that modification upon the theory of Forms is needed. It is, though, possible to see the argument as having a more serious consequence upon the theory.

As I have pointed out, Parmenides' definition of 'like' enjoys an ambiguity. Even though his definition appears to be similar to Aristotle's definition of 'like', the former is vague enough to allow the understanding that to be like is to be the same _simpliciter_. In fact, Parmenides' argument exploits this ambiguity. Hence, when he says, Οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτὸν πεπονθός, he does not mean that there is no attribute which the One shares with another. Rather, he means that the One and the Same are completely separate. In coming to this realization, we see that the argument does not prove what it purports to prove. It proves that the One is not the Same. It does not prove that the One is in no way 'like'. Furthermore, if the definition of 'like' were to have the ambiguity which Parmenides has bestowed on it, there would be no difference between 'being alike' and 'being the same'.

The argument for the inapplicability of 'unlike' is very similar to the preceeding argument.

Οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἕν. – Πλείω γάρ. – Τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον. – Ὀρθῶς. – Τὸ δέ γε ἕν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἐστιν οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ. (140a6-b3)

The strategy of this argument is the same as the strategy of the preceding. Just as the preceding purports to show that the One will be more than one, if it is the same, and hence if it is alike, so likewise this argument attempts to show that the One will be more than one, if it is different, and hence unlike. (It might be objected that Parmenides does not define 'unlike' in terms of 'difference _simpliciter_'; for he says, Τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον. But this may be understood in light of the characterization which is given of 'alike' in the passage. Concerning the latter, Parmenides simply says, τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον. Moreover, there is Parmenides' initial statement of claim-- Οὐδε μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἕν --in which he appears to be speaking of 'difference _simpliciter_'. Finally, by taking Parmenides to be speaking of 'difference _simpliciter_', we may take his argument for the inapplicability of 'unlike' to parallel his argument for the inapplicability of 'like'.)

Let us now consider the arguments in the second round. These arguments contain a _tour de force_ on the formal nature of 'like' and 'unlike'. I mean: even though the arguments concede that to be like is to have the same attribute and that to be unlike is to have a different attribute, Parmenides nevertheless manages to arrive at conclusions which contradict the initial concessions. We will see what I mean presently.

Ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τἆλλά που ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη.-Τί μήν;-Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μαλλον οὔτε ἧττον;

> —Τί γὰρ ἄν; —Εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὁμοίως.— Ναί.— Οὐκοῦν ᾗ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τἆλλα τῷ ἑνί. (147c2-8)

The argument presupposes that items are alike when they have the same attribute in common. Such a presupposition does concede a formal nature to 'like', in that (i) a relation is presumed to hold between the items spoken of, and (ii) the basis for the presumed relation is not revealed. Now, the claim "The One and the Others are alike" falls under both conditions. But so also does the claim "The One and the Others are different" fall under both. The fact that the latter falls under both is not without significance. For it is just this fact which Parmenides, given the above passage, would deny. Indeed, in the above, he takes 'being different' as a way of 'being alike'. In other words, Parmenides would deny that condition (ii) is applicable to the claim that the One and the Others are different. Instead, he takes himself to have revealed the presumed basis for the relation that the One and the Others are alike when he says "The One and the Others are different". This is the tour de force of which I have spoken. For it results in the absurd conclusion that,

> Ἧι δὴ τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν. (148a4-6)

Parmenides buttresses his conclusion with further argumentation. He further argues, ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς; -Ἔγωγε.- Τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ; -Ἔγωγε.- Πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύσεις οὗπέρ ἐστι τοὔνομα. ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλη αναγκη σε ταὐτὸν καὶ λέγειν ἀεί; -Τί μήν;-Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπί τινι; -Πάνυ γε.-Ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗπερ ἦν ὄνομα.-Ἀνάγκη.-Ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, δὶς τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ, ἀλλ' εἴη ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν ἧσπερ ἦν τοὔνομα. (147d1-e6)

This passage lays the basis for Linguistic Pluralism. As we have seen, the essential premise of such a position is that each word has a definite meaning by virtue of its reference to some one thing. And by applying the premise to the word 'different', Parmenides has further support for his absurd conclusion. On the other hand, though, the application of the same premise to the words 'alike' and 'same' results in rather innocuous conclusions. Moreover, the innocuous conclusions conflict with the one that Parmenides has arrived at.

140bd *vs*. 149d-151b

The conflicting theses are,

R1(N9): The One is neither equal nor unequal to itself or another.

R2(A9): The One is both equal and unequal to itself and the Others.

Under (N9), the argument for the claim that the One is not unequal is based on the contention that the One is neither greater nor smaller. Similarly, under (A9), the argument for the One's being unequal is based on the contention that it is both greater and smaller.

There are two points needing preliminary explanation. In both rounds, Parmenides is prepared to concede to 'equal' and 'unequal' their formal natures. For, in the first round, he says,

> Ἴσον μὲν ὂν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἴσον ᾖ. —Ναί.— Μεῖζον δέ που ἢ ἔλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν σύμμετρον ᾖ, τῶν μὲν ἐλλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάτω (140b7-c2)

And in the second, he says

> Ὧνπερ μεῖζόν ἐστι, πλειόνων που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν, ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν· καὶ ὧν ἔλαττον, ὡσαύτως· καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταὐτά. (151c5-7)

(Although 'unequal' is not mentioned in these statements, they nonetheless apply to it, since 'greater' and 'smaller' are to be aligned with 'unequal'.) But in any case, these concessions are rather otiose. In the first round, Parmenides applies a material concept understanding of 'same' to his formal concept understanding of 'equal'. And in doing so, he thereby undercuts his concession to the formal nature of 'equal'. As for the second round, Parmenides withholds his concession until after he has argued that the One is both equal and unequal, both greater and smaller.

The second point concerns Greatness and Smallness. Concerning them, Parmenides says,

> Οὐκοῦν ἐστόν γέ τινε τούτω εἴδη, τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίω τε ἀλλήλοιν εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐγγιγνοίσθην. -Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
>
> (149e8-150a1)

The introduction of these εἴδη allows Parmenides to assume that the One and the Others are greater by virtue of having greatness in them, and smaller by virtue of having Smallness in them. But these assumptions are at variance with the concession cited above. For the assumptions ignore the relational status of 'greater' and 'smaller'. And as we will see, the presumed non-relational status is essential to the proof for the claim that the One enjoys equality. Let us now turn to the arguments of the first round.

The proof which Parmenides offers for the claim that the One is not equal to itself or another is as follows.

> Οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωοῦν τῶν αὐτῶν; -Ἀδυνατον.- Ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὔτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν.
>
> (140c4-7)

It should be quite obvious that this argument depends upon the separation of the One and Sameness. Thus, even though Parmenides concedes that equality is 'sameness in measure', nevertheless he believes Sameness, rather than measure, to be the fundamental feature of equality. Such a belief, though, is in violation of the formal/material concepts distinction.

We may next turn our attention to the argument for the One's not being unequal. Unlike the preceding argument, the one which we are about to consider does not violate the formal/material concepts distinction. But a similar violation is possible. Parmenides could have argued in the following way: If the One is unequal, it will have a different number of measures; but the One has no Difference; therefore, it cannot have a different number of measures, and cannot be unequal. Parmenides, though, chooses a line of argumentation which respects the formal nature of 'unequal'. As we might expect, the disparity between the respective treatments of 'equal' and 'unequal' results in an unseemly consequence. Parmenides counters this unseemly consequence with a re-violation of the formal nature of 'equal'. In any case, he goes on to argue,

> Ἀλλὰ μὴν πλειόνων γε μέτρων ὂν ἢ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσωνπερ μέτρων, τοσούτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἴη· καὶ οὕτω αὖ οὐκέτι ἓν ἔσται ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα.
>
> (140c8-d2)

The conclusion that the One is neither more nor less (and consequently, not unequal) is secured by appeal to the hypothesis; or, more particularly, by appeal to Parmenides' understanding of the hypothesis. For the appeal is intended to show the One as inapplicable for the epitaph 'more or less'. Now, it seems to me that Parmenides' understanding of 'more or less' is not unreasonable. Indeed, he reveals an understanding which is not disaccordant with ours. For we say, speaking generally, that A is unequal to B where (i) A is greater than B in some measure, or (ii) A is less than B in some measure.[39]

The unseemly consequence of which I spoke arises from the possibility that the One, since it is one, could be equal to whatever else that is one. Before we consider Parmenides' argument against this possibility, we should realize that it is a result of similarly treating 'unequal' and 'equal'. Having allowed that inequality is a difference (whether the difference be greater or less) in some measure, Parmenides must allow that equality is having the same measure. His argument, then, is as follows.

> Εἰ δέ γε ἑνὸς μέτρου εἴη, ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ·
> τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη, ἴσον τῳ αὐτὸ εἶναι.
>
> (140d2-4)

Again, Parmenides has made a concession to the formal nature of 'equal'. But he also turns the force of the concession aside by reiterating his former stance on equality.

The arguments of the second round involve rather skillful exercise of various dialectical tools. The basic technique used in the proof for the claim 'the One is equal' is the rebuttal technique. Proceeding implicitly from the assumption that the One and the Others are either equal or unequal, Parmenides rebutts the option that they are unequal; thereby leaving the option that they are equal as his conclusion. A no less important technique is that of bestowing ambiguities upon 'greater' and 'smaller'. At times, 'greater' is taken to mean 'having greatness'; but at other times, it is taken to mean 'having a greater number of measures'. There is a corresponding ambiguity over 'smaller'. Accordingly, when 'greater' is taken to mean 'having greatness', 'smaller' is supposed to mean 'having smallness'; and when 'greater' is taken to mean 'having a greater number of measures', 'smaller' is supposed to mean 'having a smaller number of measures'. But beyond adopting the ambiguities, Parmenides assumes a model of participation under which the ambiguities may be played off against one another. Finally, the coup de grace is delivered by a long statement of conclusion, wherein the ambiguities are absent, and the conflicting affirmative options are offered as logical conjuncts.

Parmenides first argues that the One and the Others are equal. Now, although he does not explicitly make the assumption "The One and the Others are either equal or unequal; and if unequal, they are either greater or smaller", the assumption is revealed as being basic to his argument. For Parmenides concludes it, saying:

> Ἀρ οὖν, εἰ μήτε μεῖζον μήτε ἔλαττον τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι; — Ἀνάγκη.- Οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπέρεχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὂν ἴσον εἶναι. (150d4-8)

This conclusion makes it quite evident that Parmenides' strategy is to rebut the options under inequality, and thereby to rebut the possibility that the One and the Others are unequal.

The argument begins with characterizations of 'greater' and 'smaller' which are at variance with the concessions that Parmenides has made to the formal nature of 'unequal'. His characterizations are posed in the following question.

> εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἕν, σμικρότητα δὲ τἆλλα, ὁποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἴδει μέγεθος προσείη, μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, ᾧ δὲ σμικροτής, ἔλαττον; (149e5-8)

Parmenides has already conceded, and will concede again that the One is unequal to the Others, if it has a greater number of some measure, or a smaller number of some measure, than the Others have. But under the present characterizations, the possession of Greatness or Smallness is supposed to constitute inequality.

Parmenides continues arguing that the One cannot possess Smallness.

> Εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἤτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη. – Ἀνάγκη. – Τί δ᾽ εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δι᾽ ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό; – Δῆλον δή. – Ἆρ οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὖσα ἡ σμικρότης τῷ ἑνὶ ἴση ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων; – Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; – Δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότης ἴσην τῳ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς; – Ἀδύνατον. – Ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἑνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη σμικρότης, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει. – Ναί. – Οὐδέ γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὰ ποιήσει ἅπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζω τοῦ μέρους ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐνῇ. – Ἀνάγκη. – Οὐδενί ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ον σμικρότης, μήτ᾽ ἐν μέρει μητ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη· οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότης.
>
> (150a1-b7)

The considerations advanced in this argument can be reformulated so as to produce the conclusion that Greatness cannot be in the One. Indeed, such reformulation results in the following: If Greatness is coextensive with the One, then it will be equal to the One; or, if the One possesses

Greatness as a part, the One will be greater than Greatness, but Greatness cannot be equal to, or smaller than, anything else and so discharge, not its own function, but that of Smallness or Equality; nor can Greatness be in a part of the One, for the consequences would be the same. But, even though this further argument is possible, Parmenides will chose to argue for its conclusion on different grounds. In any case, the argument cited above depends on some covert trading between the ambiguities which have been bestowed on 'smaller' and 'greater'. Ostensibly, 'being smaller' is supposed to mean 'having Smallness'. Yet, when Parmenides asks--Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὖσα ἡ σμικρότης τῷ ἑνὶ ἴση ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων --he is suggesting that Smallness will be the same size as, or a greater size than, the One. Hence, 'smaller', when taken on parity with 'the same size' and 'a greater size', should be understood as meaning 'a smaller size'; and not as meaning 'having Smallness'. What Parmenides is doing, then, is trading his dialectical characterization of 'smaller' off against our understanding of 'equal' and 'greater'.

Parmenides continues arguing that the One cannot have Greatness.

> Οὐδ' ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέστι ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ· μεῖζον γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη ἄλλο καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὗ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ᾖ μέγα· τοῦτο δε ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἔνι. (b9-c3)

Here the trade-off is between the purported meanings of 'greater'. For, on the one hand, 'greater' is supposed to mean 'having Greatness'; but on the other, Parmenides presumes a dialectical variation on an inference made possible by our understanding of 'greater'. Our understanding of 'greater' allows us to make the inference "If A is greater than B, then B will be smaller than A". Parmenides' variation would appear to be "If A has Greatness, and if, therefore, A is greater, then there must be something (say, B) than which A is greater, and which is smaller than A". Now, it might seem that Parmenides' variation is simply a more tedious way of saying what we know and understand. Such is not the case. His way presumes that 'greater' _per se_ can be said of a subject of discourse. The presumption has the consequence that his inference is applicable even where A and B are the same thing. In fact, this consequence is evident in the above passage. For Parmenides suggests that the One, if it has Greatness (and, therefore, is greater), must also have Smallness (and, therefore, be smaller). In which case, the One will be both greater and smaller. At any rate, by first presuming that 'greater' may be said of the One without reference to something else than which the One is greater, and then by presuming that what is greater is greater than something smaller, Parmenides arrives at the consequence that the One must be both greater and smaller. Finally, by reiterating the previous conclusion that Smallness is not in the One (nor in anything else), Parmenides is able to conclude that the One is not able to meet the condition for being greater. In short, he has argued: Since, to be greater, the One must be both greater and smaller, and since the One is not smaller, it cannot be greater. This summation, though, does not reveal how Parmenides has traded our understanding of 'greater' off against his dialectical understanding of the term.

The reasons, which Parmenides has urged against the One's having Greatness or Smallness and being greater and smaller, also hold against the Others' having Greatness or Smallness and being greater and smaller. This result gives rise to the question "What can be greater or smaller?". Parmenides' answer is that only Greatness and Smallness have the power of exceeding or being exceeded with reference to one another. It is characteristic of the dialogue to allow such an absurd and disasterous consequence to stand. It is disasterous even from the viewpoint assumed in the dialogue. For it is assumed in the dialogue that Greatness and Smallness determine the measures which are possessed by the things other than Greatness and Smallness. But the consequence strips Greatness and Smallness of this function. The other side of the consequence is not only disasterous; it is also absurd. According to it, things other than Greatness and Smallness have no measure, no size.

Prima facie, Parmenides' argument proves that the One has neither Greatness nor Smallness, and is neither greater nor smaller. But Parmenides wants it to prove more than this; he wants it to prove "The One is neither greater nor smaller than itself and the Others". Even though there is a disparity between the former and latter, nonetheless Parmenides believes the latter to have been accomplished by the former. He says, τὸ ἓν οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μεῖζον ἂν οὐδ' ἔλαττον εἴη (150d2-3). And concerning the One itself, he says,

Καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό γε τὸ ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι·

μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ὂν ἴσον ἂν εἴη ἑαυτῷ. (150e1-4)

In any case, by virtue of the rebuttal technique, Parmenides takes himself to have shown that the One is both equal to itself and to the Others.

Having taken himself to have shown that the One enjoys equality, Parmenides turns to proving that the One is both greater and smaller than itself and the Others. The proofs encompassed by this aim rely on thesis R2(A5); viz., the One is both in itself and in another. One of the reasons underlying R2(A5) is brought to bear on the Others, with the result that the Others are said to be in the One. By these means, taken in conjunction with a philosophically respectable treatment of 'greater' and 'smaller', Parmenides constructs his proofs.

The first proof is simple and straight-forward, containing only one absurd assumption.

Καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτ' ἂν εἴη ἔξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ οὕτω μεῖζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν. (150e5-151a2)

The basic assumption of this is true, and in conformity with the inference "If A is greater than B, B will be smaller than A". For a container is greater than what it contains, and the contained is smaller than its container. But, of course, it is absurd to think that anything, let alone the One, could be both container and contained. Parmenides, though, does imagine that such ontological splitting of the One is possible.

The second proof also utilizes the inference "If A is greater than B, B will be smaller than A". But in this proof, the One and the Others take turns being the container and the contained.

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; – Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; – Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ τό γε ὂν ἀεί. – Ναί. – Οὐκοῦν τό γε ἓν τῳ ὂν ἐν μείζονι ἔσται ἔλαττον ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἴη. – Οὐ γάρ. – Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔστι χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἔν τῳ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι; – Φαίνεται. – Ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστι, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἓν ἔλαττον τῶν ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλάττω. (151a2-b5)

The basic issue presented by this proof is "For what reason must the Others be in the One and the One be in the Others?". Parmenides' response, as we have noticed, is that if they were not in each other, they would be nowhere. The proof, then, re-introduces the bucket theory of place, whose foundation is the assumption "To be somewhere is to be in something else". And since the One and the Others are assumed to be the only things that are, it follows that they must reciprocate the services of being container and contained. By application of our inference, Parmenides then draws together the contrary moments of the claim "The One and the Others are greater and smaller than each other". And by conjoining the two proofs, Parmenides offers the conclusion that the One is both greater and smaller than itself and the Others.

The passage which concludes the arguments under R2(A9) is as follows.

> Οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ὂν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὑτῷ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων καὶ μερῶν; -Πῶς δ' οὔ; -Ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὂν αὑτῷ ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὑτῷ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλεον, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὑτοῦ. - Φαίνεται. - Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα ὡσαύτως ἕξει τὸ ἕν; ὅτι μὲν μεῖζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ελαττον· ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις; -Ἀνάγκη. (151c8-d8)

Notice that in this passage there is not a mention of the εἴδη, το μέγεθος and ἡ σμικρότης. Notice also that it presents two reasonable inferences (viz., if the One and the Others are equal, they will have the same number of measures; and, if they are greater or smaller, they will have more or fewer measures.[40]) But, above all, notice that this passage conjoins, what we know to be, contrary options within one conclusion.

Dialectic focuses on expressions in a manner not unlike the way John Mitchell chooses to remember. In the first round, 'equal' received special treatment. There, it is closely aligned with a material concept treatment of 'same'; and in that disguise it is forced to appear in both arguments. The expressions 'greater' and 'smaller', on the other hand, are allowed to play the roles which belong to them. The second round, though, treats these three expressions quite differently. 'Equal' plays a bit-part in the second. For, it only briefly appears in the assumption "That which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be equal". 'Greater' and 'smaller', on the other hand, take the center of the stage in the second round. Perhaps my metaphor is over-extended; but its point is clear. Parmenides, by selectively choosing the roles which 'equal', 'greater', and 'smaller' are to play, manages the conclusions which dialectic dictates.

Allow me to offer a more straight-forward summary. In the first round, 'equal'--by virtue of its alignment with Sameness--is afforded a material concept role. 'Greater' and 'smaller', though, are accorded the relative status realized in our understanding of these expressions. In the second round, 'greater' and 'smaller' are each shifted between a non-relative status and a relative status. As for 'equal', its meaning and role are not at issue. The conflict between R1(N9) and R2(A9) is due to these factors.

The conflict which is internal to R2(A9) is largely a result of 'greater' and 'smaller' being shifted from non-relative roles to relative roles. Indeed, as we have seen, even the inference "If A is greater than B, B will be smaller than A" is interpreted in such a way that it appears to accord with the presumed non-relative role of 'greater' in the argument for the claim "The One is neither greater nor smaller".

140e-141e *vs*. 151e-155d

The conflicting theses are,

R1(N10): The One is neither the same age as, nor older than, nor younger than, itself or another.

R2(A10): The One is the same age as, and older than, and younger than, itself and the Others.

The argument for (N10) relies on theses R1(N7) and R1(N8). The relevant passage is,

> Ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὑτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἑνί, οὔτε ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἰσότητος. - Ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν. - Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ ἀνισότητος ου μέτεχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν. - Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. - Πῶς οὖν οἷόν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῳ τοιοῦτον ὄν; - Ουδαμῶς. (140e2-141a2)

By aligning 'the same age' under Likeness and Equality, and having concluded that the One is not like and not equal, Parmenides infers that the One is not the same age (as anything). Similarly, by aligning 'younger' and 'older' under Unlikeness and Inequality, and having concluded that the One is not unlike and not unequal, he infers that the One is neither younger nor older (than another). And so, the above passage presents Parmenides' argument for R1(N10).

Parmenides, though, continues in a manner which is not apropos of the first round. He goes on to explicate his understanding of the expressions 'becoming older' and 'becoming younger'. And he concludes this malapropoism in the following way.

Ἀνάγκη ἆρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβύτερόν τε αὑτοῦ ἅμα καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι. (141c8-d3)

It should be obvious that his conclusion belongs in an affirmative round. For Parmenides, having drawn this conclusion in the first round, immediately denies that it is of any relevance to the One. He says,

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ γε ἑνὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν. (d3-4)

Why, then, does Parmenides bother to characterize 'becoming older and younger' in the first round. It would appear that these comments of the first are designed to ready us for the second round. For in the latter, we find the following exchange

Ἆρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομενου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται; – Μεμνήμεθα. (152a5-7)

Evidently, Parmenides and Aristoteles are remembering considerations first forwarded in the previous round.

From the discussion of the first round, there emerges an assumption which is basic to the arguments under R2(A10). The assumption is "If the One exists, it will have existence in conjunction with time". Further to this, Parmenides offers a characterization of what is entailed by existing in time.

Τί οὖν; τό ἦν καὶ το γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγίγνετο οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγοντος; Καὶ μαλα.– Τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτα [του μελλοντος]; –Ναί.– Τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοὺ νῦν παρόντος; – Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. (141d7-e3)

Since this characterization of 'existing in time' is used in the second round, we may here designate a common assumption.

(C7) Whatever exists in time is something that was, was becoming, is, is becoming, will be, and will be becoming.

One of the spin-offs of (C7) is a distinction between 'being' and 'becoming'. Observing this distinction, Parmenides goes beyond R2(A10), and further offers to prove,

R2(A10'): The One is becoming the same age as, older than, and younger than the Others.

This further endeavor increases the number of arguments relevant to the conflict between the first and second rounds. Let us proceed to the arguments of the second round. As we will see, the first three arguments concern the One itself. Parmenides argues (a) that the One is becoming older than and younger than itself, (b) that the One is older than and younger than itself, and (c) that the One is and is becoming the same age as itself.

The first argument belongs under R2(A10'). It purports to prove that the One is becoming both older than and younger than itself.

Μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. – Πάνυ γε.– Οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; – Ναί.– Ἀεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον. –Ἀνάγκη.– Ἆρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται; – Μεμνημεθα.– Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἕν; νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο; - Ἀνάγκη. (152a2-b1)

This argument recalls a fuller explanation which is found in the first round. There, Parmenides argues that whatever exists in time must always be becoming older than itself. Presumably, the philosophical backing for such a claim would be (i) the assumption that the One has become older than what it was, and (ii) the identification of 'what the One is' with 'what the One was'; in which case, the One, in becoming older than what it was, is becoming older than what it is, and so it is becoming older than itself. Parmenides also argues that whatever is becoming older than itself must also be becoming younger than itself. There is, perhaps, in this latter move a rather interesting confusion. It could be that Parmenides has taken 'becoming older' and 'becoming younger' on analogy with, for example, 'growing taller' and 'growing shorter'. In connection with the latter examples, consider this point. When a tree grows taller than its supporting stake, the stake, without having changed its height, becomes shorter than the tree. But, of course, an object's age cannot remain constant in the way its height can remain constant. Therefore, it is not possible for one thing (say, A) to become younger than another (say, B), by virtue of A remaining the same age while B becomes older. And it is even more impossible for A to become younger than itself. On the other hand, though, it is not at all clear that Parmenides has engendered this confusion. What he says in this regard is not a little obscure.[41]

The next argument belongs under R2(A10). It purports to prove that the One is both younger and older than itself.

Ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἆρ' οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον ᾖ γιγνόμενον τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πορευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται το νῦν. - Οὐ γάρ. - Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδὰν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχῃ, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἔστι τότ' ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; (152b2-c2)

Parmenides then departs from the main argument, in order to speak of the past, the present, and the future. He urges a curious lesson. It is as follows. Whatever is becoming must remain in the present; for, if it were in the future, it would leave the present behind; and since it *is* in the present, it must be what it *was* becoming--presumably, if it were still what it was becoming, then it would still be where it was in the past and not keeping pace with the present; therefore, whatever is in the present stops becoming, and is what it was becoming. It would appear, then, that Parmenides wishes to place 'becoming' on either side of the present so that what is just *is*. At any rate, this lesson is applied to the One.

Καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον. - Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. - Οὐκοῦν οὗπερ ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν· ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ; - Ναί. - Ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον; - Ἔστιν. - Καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὑτοῦ ἐστι τὸ ἕν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν. (152d2-8)

Here again, it seems evident that Parmenides presumes (i) that 'being' and 'becoming' are mutually exclusive, and (ii) that the present is the realm of 'being' (with the result that what is cannot be becoming). For these presumptions permit the consequence that the One is, rather than is becoming, older.

The above also contains considerations given towards showing that the One is younger. In this connection, Parmenides utilizes an assumption, which though true, is inapplicable to the One. It is true that 'older' means 'older than a younger'. But the assumption cannot be applied to a single thing. Rather, its applicability depends upon the possibility of drawing a comparison between two *different* things. Parmenides, in purporting to draw a comparison between 'the One' and 'itself', is violating this basic condition of applicability. Besides this, we may note that he uses 'older' non-comparitively until he chooses to argue that the One is younger than itself. I mean, while Parmenides is arguing that the One is older, he nowhere mentions what the One is older *than*. Having argued this, he then concedes a comparitive use of 'older', and assumes that 'older' means 'older than a younger'. Finally, Parmenides summarizes the results of the last two arguments.

> Ἀεὶ ἄρα ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβυτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἕν. (152e2-3)

The next argument purports to prove that the One both *is* and is *becoming* the same age as itself.

> Ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ ὂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει.—Πῶς δ' οὔ;—Τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν.—Οὐ γάρ.—Τὸ

ἓν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ
ὂν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ . . . (152e5-10)

To a certain extent, this argument relies on a straight-forward consideration. It is "If S_1 and S_2 exist for the same length of time, they are the same age". But for S_1 and S_2, Parmenides wishes to substitute 'the One' and 'itself'. Now, the comparison presumed by such substitutions is not false. It is, though, needless. Since it is absurd to suppose that something could be a different age than itself, there is no conceptual need realized by supposing that each thing is the same age as itself. Of course, this lack of utility is obvious. And some will wish to have a stronger reason for discounting claims such as "Each thing is the same age as itself". A stronger reason is that such claims are merely quasi-statements of comparison. Remember that any statement which employs a C-group expression reveals only that there is a relation, and does not reveal any facts as to what that relationship is. Furthermore, remember that a statement employing a C-group expression cannot be known to be true or false until we have knowledge of the facts which pertain to the comparison; e.g., we cannot know that John and Henry are the same age unless we know that each is twenty-four years old, or (what is also possible) unless we know that each was born in the year 1951. The statement "Each thing is the same age as itself" is remarkably different from the example we have been considering. Presumably, we may know that the statement is true without having any knowledge, any facts. Allowing this to be so, we may press the question: Is the statement "Each thing is the same age as itself" one which makes a comparison? If not, the statement has a form which its purpose does not satisfy. For the statement, even though it has the form "S_1 and S_2 are the same G", it does not, it would seem, draw a comparison.[42]

Let us now consider the even more curious claim that the One is becoming the same age as itself. The expression '. . . becoming the same age', as we have previously noted, cannot be taken on analogy with '. . . becoming the same length', or '. . . becoming the same height', etc. Some examples will make the difference obvious. A son can become the same height, weight, or size that his father _is_. But the son cannot become the same age as his father _is_. So long as the father is living, the son and father will always be of different ages. On the other hand, a son may live as long as his father _did_, and become the same age as his father _was_. Of course, such a possibility requires anunfortunate circumstance. In any case, the latter example suggests that the frame into which '. . . is becoming the same age' fits is "S_1 is becoming the same age as S_2 _was_". By fitting 'the One' into this frame, we get "The One is becoming the same age as it was". Now, the statement that the One is becoming the same age as it was implies that there was a time when the One had two ages. But this inference contradicts the claim that the One is the same age as itself. It appears, then, that there is a dialectical tension between the expressions '. . . being the same age' and '. . . becoming the same age'; a tension which results from applying both expressions to the One.[43]

What I have said concerning the claim "The One is becoming the same age as itself" constitutes a criticism rather than an explanation of Parmenides' argument. Since the criticism is true, we should want an explanation which uncovers a conceptual mistake. The criticism suggests that the mistake depends on treating '. . . becoming the same age' as analogous to '. . . becoming the same length'. But notice what happens when we re-write Parmenides' argument using the latter expression.

> In becoming as long as itself, the One must acquire the same length. And if it is becoming as long as itself, it is of the same length. Therefore, the One which is becoming as long as itself neither becomes longer nor shorter than itself.

We might construe this argument as being intended to preclude the possibility that the One is becoming either longer or shorter than itself. In which case, it seems plausible to conclude that it is becoming the same length as itself. (If we allow that the One must be either becoming longer, or shorter, or the same length as itself, the rebuttal of the first two options would leave us with the conclusion that the One is becoming the same length as itself.) But, is the above argument any more plausible than the one set forth by Parmenides? I think not. For suppose that the One is becoming the same length as itself. The supposition allows us to infer that the One has different lengths. On the one hand, it has the length which it is; and on the other, it is not the length which it is (and hence it is a different length), since it is becoming the length which it is. Now, this consideration shows that the conceptual mistake does not depend upon treating '. . . becoming the same age' as analogous to '. . . becoming the same length'. In fact, the above argument appears to commit the same mistake that Parmenides' argument commits, insofar as the arguments issues have similarly absurd consequences.

In the one case, we have the consequence that the One has different ages; and in the other, we have the consequence that the One has different lengths.

The claim "The One both is and is becoming the same age as itself" violates a distinction which Parmenides himself draws. The distinction is between 'being' and 'becoming'. As we have already seen, the distinction emerges from the argumentation of 140e-141d. There, Parmenides says,

> If one thing is already different from another, there is no question of its becoming different: either they both are now, or they both have been, or they both will be different. But if one is in the process of becoming different, you cannot say that the other has been, or will be, or as yet is, different; it can only be in the process of becoming different.[44]

In general, then, whatever is becoming ϕ is not ϕ. And, conversely, whatever is ϕ cannot become ϕ. The first of these two general assumptions is given a particular use at 154c-155, where Parmenides argues that the One is always becoming (and never *is*) both younger and older than the Others. The latter assumption is also found in the second round. First, in a truncated form at 152be, we find Parmenides arguing that whatever is cannot become.[45] And then at 154bc, we read the following argumentation.

> . . . what *is* older or younger can never be becoming older or younger than what *is* younger or older, the difference in age being constant at all times. The One is or has become older, the other younger; but neither is becoming so.[46]

These various passages show two things; first, that Parmenides does indeed draw a distinction between being and becoming; and second, that the claim "The One both is and is becoming the same age as itself" violates such a distinction.

We may view the above claim as committing an error of omission. For it fails to observe Parmenides' own distinction between being and becoming. There is, though, a point of greater significance to be made in this connection. The distinction between being and becoming is basic to a number of new dialectical conflicts. Consider the three claims:

(i) The One is in motion

(ii) The One is at rest

(iii) The One is becoming in motion.

Given the distinction between being and becoming, (iii) entails that the One is not (yet) in motion. Is (iii), then, compatible with (ii)? Does (iii) entail that the One is (still) at rest?[47] These questions, insofar as they presume the distinction between being and becoming, require answers which are compatible with the distinction. Such answers, though, will conflict with the thesis affirming that the One both is and is becoming in motion.

The above considerations show that there are dialectical conflicts between R2(A10) and R2($A10^1$); conflicts which turn on Parmenides' own distinction between being and becoming. In light of this, we may reflect upon the conclusions forwarded by the first three arguments of 151e-155d. The conclusions are: (a) the One is becoming older than and younger than itself, (b) the One is older than and younger than itself, and (c) the One is and is becoming the same age as itself. The second conclusion, (b), suffers from an internal conflict which is of the sort that we are all too familiar with. The first conclusion suffers from a similar (but not the same) conflict. For it is no more possible to become both ϕ and ψ (where ϕ and ψ are contraries) than it is to be both ϕ and ψ. As for (a) and (b), when taken jointly, they constitute a conflict between being and becoming. Finally, the third conclusion suffers from an internal conflict which is made possible by the distinction between being and becoming.

As a final word on these three arguments, I should like to emphasize an earlier point. The arguments purport to reveal comparisons which can be made concerning the One and itself. Most of these comparisons (e.g., the One is older than itself) are obviously absurd. But one of them has the lean appearance of a necessary truth; viz., the One is the same age as itself. Now, if we take this claim to be a necessary truth, we might imagine that there is some utility in contrasting it with claims that are necessarily false (claims such as "The One is older than itself"). I won't attempt to discuss the viability of such a task, but I do wish to deny its rationale. I do not think that "The One is the same age as itself" is a tautology. And I suggest this not because 'the One' happens to be the subject of discourse, but rather because of the curiosities to which the expression '. . . the same age as itself' gives rise. I should like to say that the expression is meaningless, but some will claim to understand it. (Since 'understanding' is a precious commodity, it is best to leave some people with whatever understanding they are capable of.) In any case, I think that it is fair to say of the expression that it is not worth philosophizing about. I submit that such philosophizing will not help us understand the formal nature of theories, or more generally, human thought.

Having considered the various 'temporal' relations between the One and itself, Parmenides then offers to explain how such relations obtain between the One and the Others. This task encompasses six arguments. Allow me to set out the conclusions of the six arguments.

(d) The One _is_ older than the Others (and alternatively, the Others are younger than the One). 153ab
(e) The One _is_ younger than the Others (and alternatively, the Others are older than the One). 153cd
(f) The One _is_ the same age as the Others. 153de
(g) The One is not becoming either younger or older than the Others. 154ac
(h) The One is _becoming_ younger than the Others. 154c-155b
(i) The One is _becoming_ older than the Others. 155b.

The conclusion (g) and its accompanying arguments are not what we might expect. Since conclusion (c) states that the One both is and is becoming the same age as itself, we are entitled to the expectation that Parmenides will suggest that the One both is and is becoming the same age as the Others. Notice, then, that conclusion (f) satisfies part of our expectation. For it states that the One is the same age as the Others. Conclusion (g), though, does not state that the One is becoming the same age as the Others, and thus does not satisfy the other part of our expectation. Given this, we may ask the question "Are we to understand conclusion (g) to mean that the One is becoming the same age as the Others?".[48]

The argument for conclusion (d)--viz., that the One is older than the Others--involves a play on words. The point is not unimportant. For even Parmenides concedes that a different conclusion can be reached by playing on different words. The argument begins in the following way.

> Τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγει ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἕτερά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἑνός· ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὂν ἓν ἂν ἦν, ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἑνός ἐστι πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι. (151a1-4)

The point which Parmenides wishes to secure is that the things which are other than the One are more than one. But as Parmenides himself points out, this is a consequence of the manner in which we are speaking. Speaking in the singular case, speaking of something which is different than the One, we may say that the different thing is one. We will return to this consequence shortly. The argument continues,

> Πλῆθος δὲ ὂν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς. -Πῶς δ'οὔ; -Τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω; -Τα ἐλάττω. -Τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον· τοῦτο δ'ἔστι τὸ ἕν. ἦ γάρ; -Ναί. - .... Πρῶτον δέ γε οἶμαι γεγονὸς πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον, τὰ δ' ὕστερον γεγόντα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος . (153a4-b6)

The key assumption of the above is that the things other than the One are more than one. This assumption, when conjoined with the assumptions that the One is one and that of number the lesser part comes first and so is earlier, leads to the conclusion that the One is older than the Others. On the other hand, though, we may arrive at a contrary result by describing the Others singularly. Speaking not of 'the Others', but rather of 'another', we may say of that which is another that it is one; in which case, the reason which Parmenides gives for saying the One comes first is a reason which is no less applicable to another which is one. These considerations suggest that if the One is older than the Others taken collectively, then it will be the same age as the Others taken individually. This suggestion is realized. The argument for (f)--viz., the conclusion "The One is the same age as the Others" relies on a comparison between the One and the 'individual' Others.

In the above argument, the One is characterized as 'a part'--indeed, as 'a lesser part'. In the next argument it is characterized as 'a whole'.

> Οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; -Τί μήν; - Καὶ [illegible]ὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι πάντα τἆλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο τῆ τελευτῆ γεγονέναι ἕν τε καὶ ὅλον.- Φήσομεν γάρ.- Τελευτὴ δέ γε οἶμαι ὕστατον γίγνεται, τούτῳ δ᾽ ἅμα τὸ ἓν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι·
>
> (153c3-d1)

Since the whole does not come into existence until the last part is added to the Others, the One (as characterized as a whole) is younger than the Others.

We come now to the argument which completes the present trilogy. As I have already pointed out, the Others are here granted the same status as the One. Each of the Others, like the One, is said to be one.

ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὁτιοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, ἀναγκαῖον ἓν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν; —Ἀνάγκη.— Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὅτιπερ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὁτῳοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἓν γένηται... Πᾶσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει τὸ ἕν· (153d5-e6)

The final trilogy of arguments raises issues concerning 'relative differences in age'. The argument for (g) is quite straightforward.

Οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὂν τοῦ [ἑνὸς] ὄντος γίγνοιτ' ἂν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ' οὔ. —Ἀληθῆ.— Καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται. (154b6-c4)

This argument represents one of the few times Parmenides employs assumptions which may be recognized as belonging to our common understanding. In particular, the argument relies on two assumptions belonging to our common understanding. First, it is assumed that claims of the form "S_1 is older than S_2" entail that there is a difference in age between the two things. And second, it is assumed that the difference in age remains the same during the history of co-existence. These assumptions are obviously basic to the following sort of reasoning: Harry is older than Herb; in fact, he is twelve years older; now, Harry is thirty-eight; therefore Herb must be twenty-six. In any case, the above argument does conform to our common understanding.

Our understanding is challenged by the next two arguments. Indeed, Parmenides taking no pause at all immediately proceeds to say Ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται But in connection with (h), Parmenides appears to argue only that the One, which is older, is becoming younger than the Others. For the conclusion of the argument is as follows.

> τὸ μὲν ἓν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὂν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ὕστερα γέγονε. (155a7-b2)

Obviously, this conclusion does not contain what is also required by (h); viz., that the One is becoming older than the Others. Nevertheless, the contrary moments of (h) may be developed from the contrary moments of the earlier thesis that the One is both older and younger than the Others. The development would proceed thusly: since the claim "The One is older than the Others" is taken to be a reason for inferring that the Others are becoming younger than the One (in which case--and this provides the contrary moment required by (h)--the One is becoming older than the Others). Is there, though, evidence indicating that Parmenides would accept this development? Of course there is. He begins the argument for (h) with the following observation: Ἧι τό τε ἓν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβυτερον καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός.

The argument introduces an assumption concerning 'the diminishing relative difference in age'. In this regard, I wish to suggest that Parmenides completely misinterprets the notion of 'diminishing relative difference'.

> Πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι κρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἆρα τῷ ἴσω μορίῳ διοίσει τὸ πλέον του ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ; – Σμικροτέρῳ. – Οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται, ὅτιπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τἆλλα ἡλικίᾳ διαφέρον τὸ ἕν, τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλαττον ἀεὶ τῃ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρότερον· ἢ οὔ; – Ναί. – Οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρον ἡλικίᾳ πρός τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον; – Νεώτερον. (154d1-e3)

Quite obviously, the notion of 'diminishing relative difference' is not the corrupting influence in the above argumentation. After all, the notion is basic to the following sort of reasoning. When Harry was sixteen years old, he was twice as old as Herb; but now Harry is older than Herb by one-half of Herb's age; so Harry must be twenty-four years old and Herb sixteen years old. An important feature of this reasoning is that the diminishing relative difference in age does not vitiate the fact that Harry has been and remains eight years older than Herb. The corrupting influence is the interpretation which Parmenides places upon this sort of reasoning. He interprets this reasoning to mean that the difference in age is always less (ἔλαττον ἀεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει); in which case it would seem plausible to infer that that which differs from another by becoming less in age must be becoming younger than the other. But it is quite remarkable that this interpretation is offered given that the interpretation concedes that the reasoning requires the assumption, ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον.

Parmenides continues the argument with an appeal to the theory of contrariety.

> Εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἓν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον; —Πάνυ γε. (154e3-4)

The presumption here is that where two things are related by virtue of each possessing a contrary, then an alteration of one of those things with respect to its contrary will lead to an alteration of the other thing with respect to its contrary. Accordingly, Parmenides wishes to argue that if the One (even though it be older) is becoming younger than the Others, the Others (even though they be younger) are becoming older than the One.[49] Furthermore, if this argument holds for the One when it is assumed that the One is older, a strictly parallel argument will hold for the Others when it is assumed that the Others are older.

The final conclusion of the preceding paragraph indicates that it is not really necessary to argue for (i). Parmenides, realizing that such an argument would be strictly parallel, says,

> Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἴσχει ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καί πρότερα γεγονότα (155b2-4)

We may now turn to questions which concern the conflicts between 140e-141d and 151e-155c. The conflicts are centered around the assumption that to be is to be in time. Now 'being in time' is taken to mean 'being either younger and older or the same age, or becoming either younger and older or the same age'. In the first round, then, Parmenides wishes to deny that the One is in time, since the One is there found to be neither younger nor older nor the same age as itself or another; in which case, it is possible to make the further denial that the One does not exist. Parmenides says,

> Εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἓν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ' ἐγίγνετο οὔτ' ἦν ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτ' ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτε ἔσται.—Ἀληθέστατα.—Ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; —Οὐκ ἔστιν.
>
> (141e3-8)

The counter-arguments of the second round are prefaced with the following comment.

> Ἀρ οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἕν, καὶ ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερόν τι καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετεχον; —Πῶς; — Εἶναι μέν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἕν ἔστιν. (151e3-7)

This comment contains an obvious appeal to Parmenides' second understanding of the hypotheis. Parmenides is saying "Since the One is one, it exists". Allowing this, and given the assumption that to be is to be in time, we may infer that the One exists in time; in which case, the dialectical schema will require arguments purporting to prove that, the One both is and is becoming younger and older than, and the same age as, itself and the Others.

The conflicts which are internal to the second round, for the most part, fall into the classifications we have drawn elsewhere. There is, though, one argument which is especially petty. At 152e-153b, Parmenides argues that the One is older than the Others by being the first in number. He suggests that the One by virtue of being first comes earlier so that the Others, coming later, are younger. By similar reasoning, we could argue that the man who comes to the party first will be the earliest at the party, and so will be the oldest man at the party.

The concluding remarks of the first round are,

> . Οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα.- Οὐ φαίνεται.- Οὐδ' ονομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται.- Οὐκ ἔοικεν. :-Ἦ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἓν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; (142a3-7)

The concluding remarks of the second round are

> . Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν. :-Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.- Καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἕν ἔστιν.- Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως. (155d6-e3)

An Interlude

155e-157b

This passage is a joint appendix to the first and second rounds.[50] For the passage begins, with Parmenides asking,

> τὸ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἕν τε ὂν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἕν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας; (155e4-8)

The suggestion that the One is neither one, nor many, nor existent is borrowed from the conclusions of the first round. And the suggestion that the One is both one and many, and also existent, is borrowed from the second round.

The above question betrays the real nature of this passage. Even though the question appears to indicate a willingness to compound the absurdity inherent in the affirmative theses by conjoining such theses with the contrary negative theses, such is *not* the case. Even though it looks as if Parmenides is prepared to hold, for example, not just that the One is both one and many, but also that the One is both one and many and neither one nor many, nevertheless the passage really does have a quite different nature. The purpose of the passage is to answer the question "Under what *separate* conditions can the One satisfy the contrary descriptions which have been given of it?". In this passage, Parmenides acknowledges (what he will later deny) that the claims "The One is neither one nor many" and "The One is both one and many" cannot both be true of the One. Furthermore, he also acknowledges that the claims "The One is one" and "The One is many" cannot both be true of the One. In general, Parmenides acknowledges, first, that the contrary moments of the affirmative theses will be separately true under separate conditions; and second, that the negative theses will be true under a condition which is separate from those which are required by the contrary moments of the affirmative theses. In short, this passage achieves a modicum of rationality.

The passage may be divided into two parts. In the first part, 155e-156b, Parmenides describes the conditions under which the contraries will be separately, and not jointly, true of the One. In the second, 156c-157b, he describes a condition wherein the negative theses will be true of the One.

155e-156b

Parmenides' first conclusion issues from a series of questions. He asks Aristoteles the following:

> Ἀρ' οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἷόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν; ....(Ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνιως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι.–Ὀρθῶς.–) Οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάτεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μή ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ

καὶ ἀφίῃ; .... Τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἆρα γε οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; (155e8-156a5)

Having been led through these questions, Aristoteles dutifully accedes to the following conclusion.

Τὸ ἓν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιὲν οὐσίαν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται. (156a7-b1)

This conclusion concedes that the One cannot, at the same time, both be and not be. Further to this, Parmenides takes the pairings 'one/many' and 'like/unlike' on analogy with 'being/not-being'. Consequently, he infers that the One cannot be many while it is one; not one while it is many; nor unlike, while it is like; nor like, while it is unlike. Generalizing upon all this, we may say (on Parmenides' behalf) that where ϕ and ψ are contraries, a necessary condition of the One being ϕ is that it has ceased to be ψ. In particular, Parmenides concedes that 'having ceased to be many' is a condition of 'being one'; and vice versa; and similarly for the pairing 'like/unlike'.

156c-157b

In this part, Parmenides describes a condition under which all the negative theses may be true, and none of the affirmative theses can be true. His description proceeds from an example.

Ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἵστηται καὶ ὅταν ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δήπου αὐτό γε μηδ' ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. – Πῶς δή; – Ἑστός τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ

> πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἑστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν. – Πῶς γάρ; Χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἷόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἑστάναι. – Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. – Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν. – Οὐκ εἰκός. – Πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλειν; οὔτε γὰρ ἑστὸς ὂν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν. .... Καὶ τὸ ἓν δή, εἴπερ ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κ. μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα – μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ – μεταβάλλον δ'ἐξαιφνῆς μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρονῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινοῖτ' ἂν τότε, οὐδ' ἂν σταίη. (156c1-e7)

The condition under which all the negative theses can hold true is that of 'the instant'. For, as Parmenides goes on to say, at the instant when the One changes from one to many, it is neither one nor many; or when changing from like to unlike, it is neither like nor unlike; or, in light of the example cited above, when changing from in motion to at rest, the One is neither at motion nor at rest. In his own words, Parmenides says,

> Κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλα ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἓν οὔτε ἓν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὅμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν. (157a4-b3)

But, the rationality of this whole passage is spoiled by Parmenides' concluding remark. He says,

> Ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ᾽ ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἕν, εἰ ἔστιν. (b3-4)

It should be quite evident that this remark conflicts with both parts of the passage. As for the first part, the comment conflicts with the pronouncement that the One cannot both have and not have being. And since the second part characterizes 'being' and 'non-being' as states not obtainable in the instant, the conclusion conflicts with it as well.[51]

The Third Round vs. The Fourth Round

The third round is an analogue of the second. Whereas the second offers to show that the One enjoys the contraries encapsuled by the affirmative theses, the third offers to show that such contraries are enjoyed by the Others. And as the third stands to the second, the fourth stands to the first. Whereas the first denies the contraries of the One, the fourth denies such contraries of the Others. Now, even though the third and fourth rounds have aims similar to those of the first and second, they (along with the remaining four rounds) are tactically different from the first two rounds. Unlike the first two rounds, the last six rounds do not contain the full complement of arguments that are possible given the dialectical schema of the second part of the Parmenides. Parmenides, though, still wishes to assert the full complement of theses.[52] The tactical change, then, is that Parmenides, after having argued for the applicability or inapplicability of two or three sets of contraries, takes himself to have shown 'in principle' the applicability or inapplicability of all the sets of contraries. Accordingly, at the end of the third round, he says,

> Οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὑτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη. – Οὕτως. – Καὶ ταὐτὰ δὴ καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἑστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὑρήσομεν πεπονθότα τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα. (159a5-b1)

I suppose that this shows that while Parmenides feels no aversion to the incoherence of the dialectical process, even he feels constrainted by the tedium of the task.

The arguments of the third round purport to prove three theses. In contrast to this, the arguments of the fourth purport to prove only two theses. The theses are as follows. Under R3, we have:

(A1) The Others are both one and many.

(A2) The Others are both limited and unlimited.

(A3) The Others are both like and unlike.

And Under R4, we have:

(N1) The Others are neither one nor many.

(N2) The Others are neither like nor unlike.

There are, then, no arguments given on behalf of the 'possible' thesis R4(Nx): The Others are neither limited nor unlimited. In view of this, and for the sake of symmetry, I will try to show how the arguments for

R4(N1) can be extended towards proving that the Others are neither limited nor unlimited. But before we inspect any of these arguments, we must first consider Parmenides' different understandings of the hypothesis as manifested in the third and fourth rounds.

156bc vs. 159bd

Parmenides' understanding of the hypothesis, as it relates to the third round, is found in the following passage.

> Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν ἐστι τἆλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν. – Ὀρθῶς. – Οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τἆλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ. – Πῇ δή; – Ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη. (157b8-c4)

Implicit in this passage is a distinction between 'being perfectly (παντελῶς) one' and 'being imperfectly one'. Accordingly, we may presume that Parmenides understands the hypothesis "The One is one" to mean that the One is _perfectly_ one. Moreover, there is a claim within the above which offers an explication of what is meant by the notion of 'perfectly one'. When Parmenides says about the Others that εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη, he also implies that the One is perfectly one by virtue of having no parts. Now, this understanding of the hypothesis accords with the understanding of the first round, wherein Parmenides argues that the One has no parts insofar as it is one and not many. On the other hand, though, the first round makes no accomodation for the notion of 'being imperfectly one'. For the opening of the first round sets out exclusive options between 'being one and without parts' and 'being many with parts'. The first does not countenance the possibility of something being one whilst having parts. The third round, though, gives scope to such a possibility by means of the notion of 'being imperfectly one'. For it allows that what is imperfectly one both is one and has parts.[53]

The notion of 'being imperfectly one' is basic to the conflict between the opening of the third round and the opening of the fourth. For the conflict turns on the fact that while the third implements this notion, the fourth denies it outright. At the opening of the fourth, we read

> Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι; -Τί δή; -Ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, ὃ ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τοῦ ἑνός, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων· πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῇ τό τε ἓν καὶ τἆλλα. -Πάντα γάρ. - Οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἔστιν ἕτερον τούτων, ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἓν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τἆλλα. - Οὐ γάρ. - Οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταὐτῷ ἐστι τὸ ἓν τἆλλα. (159b6-c4)

Although this statement does not, by itself, constitute a denial of the notion of 'being imperfectly one', the statement presents the basis upon which such a denial will be made. Moreover, the statement, as a basis for such a denial, gives the conflict between the third and fourth rounds a significance which bears upon the theory of Forms. But this is something which we will consider after we have considered the denial of the notion of 'being imperfectly one'. Parmenides proceeds to argue thusly:

> Οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν. –Πῶς γάρ; – Οὔτ ἄρα ὅλον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τε ἔστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει. –Πῶς γάρ; – Οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα (159c5-d2)

The denial relies on the assumption that the Others can have unity, only if the One has parts. For it would be the possession of such parts by the Others that would allow us to say of the Others that they have unity and are one. But, of course, Parmenides denies that the One, as truly one, is capable of supplying parts of itself to the Others. Hence, the conclusion that the Others are in no way one, not even imperfectly one. Parmenides' own words are, Οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἓν τἆλλα ἐστιν.

The conflict between the third and fourth rounds may be viewed as a conflict between different elements of the theory of Forms. The third round presumes that the Others can participate (and Parmenides does speak of μετέχοντα) in the One. On the other hand, though, the fourth round urges that the separation of the One (and Parmenides does say χωρίς) makes its nature unavailable to the Others.[54] Quite simply, then, the third and fourth rounds reveal a conflict between participation and separation. It must, though, be conceded that the conflict is largely made possible by the model of participation which Parmenides is here using; the model being "Participation is the possession of parts derived from a separable nature". Perhaps the conflict does not arise under a different model. Nonetheless, the philosophical tension between participation and separation, as educed by the third and fourth rounds, is quite evident.

Since the conflicting understandings of the hypothesis are basic to the subsequent development of the respective rounds, allow me to summarize the important differences between the understandings. In the third, the expression ἕν is understood to have two meanings; viz., 'perfectly one', and 'imperfectly one'. The former is applicable to the One, the latter to the Others. But in the fourth, the applicability of the latter is denied to the Others. Hence, in the fourth, Parmenides' understanding of the hypothesis "The One is one" precludes saying ἕν of the Others. Let us now consider the theses and arguments of the respective rounds.

157c-158a vs. 159de

The conflicting theses are,

R3(A1): The Others are both one and many.

R4(N1): The Others are neither one nor many.

There are four arguments under (A1); together they purport to show that the Others are collectively and individually one, and collectively and individually many. Quite obviously, then, the thesis is meant to be understood as having internal conflicts. (It is possible to have an innocuous understanding of "The Others are both one and many". For it is possible to take the thesis as meaning "The Others are individually one and collectively many". But, then, it would be unlike the other affirmative theses of the dialogue, in that it would not include any internal tensions.)

The argument which Parmenides offers towards proving that the Others are collectively one is quite short and simple. He argues,

> Μόρια δέ γε φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾖ. —Φαμὲν γάρ.— Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὗ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου. (157c4-8)

The chief assumption of this argument (viz., that parts are parts of a whole, indeed of one whole) has already been seen in the second round; where, as we will remember, it is used to argue that the One, even though it is supposed to be infinitely complex, is nevertheless one whole, and hence limited. In any case, on the basis of the above, Parmenides may claim that the Others are collectively one. There is, though, more. Parmenides proceeds to further argumentation in support of the claim that the Others are one. But we will not consider that passage here. For besides being an extremely tortuous passage, it is also otiose. And so, I have placed my comments on it in a note.[55]

Parmenides argues that each of the Others is individually one in the following way.

> εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριόν ἐστι, τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἓν δήπου σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται. —Ὀρθῶς.— Μετέχοι δέ γε ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο ὂν ἢ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν αὐτὸ ἕν. νῦν δὲ ἑνὶ μὲν εἶναι πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀδύνατόν που.—

δέ γε τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ὅλον ἔσται, οὗ μόρια τὰ μόρια· τὸ δ' αὖ ἕκαστον ἓν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ ἂν ᾖ μόριον ὅλου. (158a1-b1)

This argument contains a consideration which deserves discussion. It is that when we speak of 'each part of the Others' we speak of individual things which have Unity and Being independently of the rest of the Others. Let us suppose that the Others are homogeneous. In fact, let us imagine the Others to be not unlike a jug of milk. Given this supposition, we may ask: What sense may be attached to saying "Each part of the Others is distinct from the rest of the Others"?. Moreover, we may also ask: Is a part of the Others distinctly identifiable independently of the rest? Our analogy between the Others and a jug of milk does shed some light on these questions. Prior to pouring a glass of milk from the jug, it is not possible to uniquely identify that part of the jug of milk which is to become the glass of milk. Indeed, it is the act of pouring, rather than any differences found in the contents of the jug, which makes possible the identification of 'each glass from this jug'. These considerations demonstrate, I believe, that Parmenides' argument does not apply to items which are homogeneous. Hence, when Parmenides says εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον ἐστι, τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἓν δήπου σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται, we presume that he is speaking of the Others as heterogeneous items. This model for speaking of the Others (i.e., the heterogeneity model) is indirectly challenged by the argument purporting to show that the Others are individually many.

To this point, we have inspected the argument offered to show that the Others are collectively one and individually one. We may now peruse the arguments given on behalf of the claims that the Others are collectively many and individually many. (When we speak of the Others as individually many, we may take that to mean that each of the Others is many.) Parmenides first argues that the Others are collectively many.

Οὐκοῦν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς μεθεξεί τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ; -Πῶς δ' οὔ; - Τὰ δ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἓν μήτε ἑνὸς πλείω εἴη τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη. (158b1-4)

This argument exploits a technique belonging to the theory of opposites. In a general form, the technique is "S is either ϕ or ψ; for if it is neither, it is nothing". And in this case, the technique is allowed to operate over the pairing 'one/many', such that the argument presents the options that either the Others are one, or they are many. In view of this, we may presume that the claim "Things which have a share in the One will be different from the One" is intended to rebutt the option that the Others are one, and thereby also intended to allow the inference that they are many. Now, if this analysis of the argument is correct, Parmenides has reneged on the assumption that the Others are imperfectly one. For, in the first place the technique does not permit the triad "perfectly one/ imperfectly one/many". And in the second place, the above argument seems to rely on the suppressed considerations that since the nature of the One is to be one, and since the Others are different from the One, the Others, then, will have a nature other than the nature of 'being one'. Thence, with the application of the technique, the conclusion that the Others are many may be drawn. But, of course, such suppressed considerations are in opposition to the assumption that the Others partake of the One.

We should remember that we noticed a similarity between Parmenides' understandings of the hypothesis in the first and third rounds. In particular, we should remember that the notion of 'being perfectly one' accords with the status bestowed on the One in the first round. The One was granted that status after Parmenides had exercised the technique which is used in the above argument. Now, if these observations are correct, there is a full-fledged conflict between 157bc and 158b of the third round. Indeed, the latter passage appears to presuppose considerations which contradict the three-fold distinction "perfectly one/imperfectly one/many" accepted in the former passage.

The final argument under thesis R3(A1) offers to show that the Others are individually many. More precisely, Parmenides argues that each portion of the Others is indefinitely complex. In order to get this argument off the ground, Parmenides must introduce the notion of 'acquiring unity'. This notion allows him to suggest that the Others, in advance of acquiring unity, are πλήθει ἄπειρα. He, then, proceeds to argue as follows.

εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἷοί τε ἔσμεν ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ μετέχοι, πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἕν; – Ἀνάγκη. – Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοποῦντες αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς ἀεὶ ὁρῶμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει; – Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. (158c2-7)

Quite obviously, the basic assumption of the argument is that whatever does not possess unity is a πλήθη, which by nature is ἄπειρα. Moreover it would appear that this assumption has been inspired by the preceding argument, wherein Parmenides has covertly re-introduced his original understanding of the pairing 'one/many'. On that understanding, to be one is to be truly unitary. Accordingly, by analogy, to be many is to be truly complex. In any case, the above argument does attempt to draw a sharp line between 'being unitary' and 'being multitudinous'. For Parmenides does argue that a multitude, unless it possesses unity, will by nature be indefinitely complex.

Let us now consider the above argument in light of its affirmative counter. Towards proving that the Others are individually one, Parmenides assumes that it is possible to say 'each' of the individual Others, and that 'each' means 'one'.[56] Now, the above argument has the effect of denying that it is possible to say 'each' of the Others' components. Furthermore, the argument explicitly denies that the components are one (πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἕν). This much reveals the conflict. As for the source of the conflict, it would appear that on the one side of it, Parmenides is simply assuming that a rather simple linguistic relation is applicable to the Others. I mean, given the assumption that it is possible to say 'each' of the Others' components, and since 'each' may be said of things which are one, the conclusion that the Others are individually one is not implausible. It is, though, not possible to say 'each' of all things. Insofar as homogeneous substances cannot be individuated, 'each' cannot be said of such things. (For example, we do not individuate milk per se, but rather glasses or jugs of milk. Accordingly, we can speak of 'each glass of milk' and 'one can of milk'. But we cannot speak of 'each milk' or 'one milk', where milk per se is the subject of discourse.) These facts suggest the possibility that the conflict arises from alternately viewing the Others as composed of heterogeneous items or as composed of homogeneous items. This possibility is in some ways attractive. Unfortunately, on Parmenides' account, the Others are not homogeneous.[57] For homogeneous items are not indefinitely complex. More exactly, I mean that the characterization which Parmenides gives of the Others, when he says that they are πλήθη ἄπειρα, will not fit homogeneous substances. The other side of the conflict is, I think, a result of assumptions concerning the meaning of 'one' and 'many'. We are quite familiar with one of those assumptions; viz., 'one' and 'many' are contraries. A further assumption is: Since 'one' and 'many' are contraries, what is truly one is without parts and is in no way plural, and what is truly many has no units within it and is in no way unitary. Now, it should be quite obvious that this understanding of 'many' accords perfectly with Parmenides' latter characterization of the Others.

Allow me to summarize our findings. In arguing that the Others are individually one, Parmenides appeals to the notion of 'being imperfectly one'. This notion permits the suggestion that the Others are composed of unitary parts, of which we may say 'each' and 'one'. On this account, the Others are a set of unitary items. On the other hand, though, in arguing that the Others are individually many, Parmenides covertly denies the notion of 'being imperfectly one'. Proceeding from the assumption that the Others are many, he further assumes, it would appear, that what is truly many can have no units within it. On this latter account, any portion of the Others will be without limit of multitude.

We may now turn our attention to arguments of the fourth round. We will find that the assumption "To be truly one is to be without parts" is a basic point of departure for arguing that the Others are neither one nor many. Concerning the assumption, Parmenides says,

> Οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν. – Πῶς γάρ; – Οὔτ' ἄρα ὅλον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τε ἔστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει. (159c5-7)

From this point, Parmenides proceeds to argue,

> Οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα. – Οὐκ ἔοικεν. – Οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἓν τἆλλα ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἓν οὐδέν. (159d1-4)

No doubt, Parmenides is here presuming that something other than the One can be one, only if it has part of the One. But since the One, by virtue of being truly one, has been precluded from having parts, the things other than the One thereby have been precluded from being one.[58]

An interesting feature of the fourth round is that whereas the notion of 'being perfectly one' is used so that the Others are not one, the quite ordinary notions of both 'one' and 'many' are utilized in the argument which is offered proving that the Others are not many. In speaking of the ordinary notions of 'one' and 'many', I mean (i) where the expression 'one' is used to individuate or count something, we have an ordinary use of the expression, and (ii) where the expression 'many' is used to indicate that a set to which an indefinite number of items belong is being spoken of, we have an ordinary use of the expression. In any case, an inspection of Parmenides' argument reveals that he is using 'one' and 'many' in conformity with the ordinary senses of these expressions.

Οὐδ' ἄρα πολλά ἐστι τἆλλα· ἓν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἓν οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μόριά ἐστι τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει. (159d4-7)

Notice that Parmenides' use of ἕν presupposes the possibility of individuating the parts of the Others. For he argues that if the Others were many, each of them would be one. Furthermore, the denial that they are one, then makes the ordinary sense of many inapplicable to the Others. And so, the denial that they are many depends upon the presupposition that they cannot be counted.

The lesson which we may draw from the above argument is that Parmenides is quite prepared to use expressions in their ordinary senses, when so doing allows him to draw conclusions which fit the over-all dialectical schema. In fact, had Parmenides employed his philosophical sense of 'many', he could have drawn a conclusion contrary to the one drawn in the above. He could have argued in the following way: If the Others have no unity, then any portion of the Others will be a multitude, and an indefinite multitude at that. For lacking unity and thereby lacking any limit on their multitudinous nature, the Others and any portion of the Others will be πλήθη ἄπειρα. Such an argument as this is supposed to express the nature of 'being truly many'. However, since the argument does not produce the conclusion which is required by the dialectic schema, Parmenides has chosen to frame an argument which will produce the appropriate conclusion.

We may now review these findings, and consider the conflict between R3(A1) and R4(N1). As we have seen, the arguments employ various trade-offs on the meanings of 'one' and 'many'. In arguing that the Others are (collectively and individually) one, Parmenides employs the notion of 'being imperfectly one'. Now, this notion appears to approximate what we mean by 'one', insofar as Parmenides uses it to individuate the Others as a whole, even as *one* whole; and he also uses it to individuate the parts of the Others, so that he may speak of the parts as each being *one*. In the counter-argument of the fourth round, Parmenides urges that only the One can be one. His reasons for this conclusion presuppose a philosophical sense of 'one'--viz., to be truly one is to be without parts. Now, although this philosophical sense does not by itself preclude an ordinary sense of 'one', Parmenides nevertheless uses it in conjunction with an assumption concerning participation to arrive at the conclusion that the Others are in no way one. Furthermore, the argument has the consequence that things cannot be ordinarily, or even imperfectly, one. Clearly, then, this part of the conflict between R3(A1) and R4(N1) involves trading-off different senses of 'one'. The other part of the conflict involves trading-off different senses of 'many'. In the third round, Parmenides presumes a philosophical sense of 'many', whereby a thing is truly many only if it is in no way unitary and has no units within it. This sense of 'many' is, of course, the converse of the philosophical sense of 'one'. And as we have seen, both are made possible by the techniques belonging to the theory of opposites. The counter-argument of the fourth round uses the ordinary sense of 'many', in accordance with which things that are many form a collection of units.

158cd

As I have already pointed out, the fourth round does not contain a counter-argument against the thesis that the Others are both limited and unlimited. It is, though, quite easy to see how a counter-argument could be developed. And so, this is something which we will consider. In any case, the argument for the thesis that the Others are both limited and unlimited is as follows.

εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἷοί τε ἐσμεν ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ μετέχοι, πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἕν; —Ἀνάγκη.— .... Καὶ μὴν ἐπειδάν γε ἓν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται, πέρας ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. .... Οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρα τε εστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει. (158c2-d8)

This argument extends the previous thesis towards the desired conclusion. On the basis of the claim that the others can become (and therefore, can be) individually one, Parmenides infers that the Others are limited both with respect to another and with respect to the whole that they form.[59]

On the other hand, though, Parmenides appeals to the claim that the Others are indefinitely multitudinous in nature. From this latter claim, he infers that the Others are unlimited by virtue of their nature.

Two critical points can be made against the above argument. First, if the Others are by nature indefinitely multitudinous, then the imposition of unity upon them would be a violation of their nature. In which case, the imposition of unity should be something which is not possible. Second, even if the imposition of unity were possible, and even if it were possible for the Others to become limited, nevertheless they could not concurrently be both limited and unlimited. The imposition of unity would make it impossible for them to be unlimited. With regard to the first objection, it is important to remember that Parmenides does state arguments whose basic theme is "Violations against a subject's nature are not possible". Quite obviously, then, Parmenides has chosen to ignore such a theme in the above argument. Presumably, his motive for ignoring it is that the observation of the theme would interfere with the development of the dialectical schema. For the schema dictates that the affirmative theses contain contrary options.

One of the differences between the Others as characterized in the third round and the Others of the fourth round is that while the former have parts, the latter have none. Now, the assumption that the Others have no parts can be used as a basis for arguing that the Others are neither limited nor unlimited. The argument is analogous to one found in the first round. It is,

> If the Others have no parts, they cannot have a beginning, or an end, or a middle; for such things would be parts. Further, the beginning and end of thing are its limits. Therefore, the Others, if they have neither beginning nor end, cannot have a limit. Also, they are not unlimited. For what is unlimited contains an infinite number of parts. But the Others have no parts. Therefore, they are neither limited nor unlimited.

Although Parmenides does not develop the conflict which ensues from the argument which I have just now offered, it is quite evident that it is well within his capabilities to have done so. Moreover, the conflict would have been inspired by his different understandings of the hypothesis. For the understanding of the hypothesis which he adopts in the third round bestows parts and portions on the Others. But in the fourth, such things are denied to the Others.

158e-159b vs. 159d-160b

The conflicting theses are,

R3(A3): The Others are both like and unlike.

R4(N2): The Others are neither like nor unlike.

Thesis (A3) relies on the previous thesis that the One is both limited and unlimited. And (N2) relies on the thesis that the Others are neither one nor many.

The argument for (A3) is as follows.

Ἧι μέν που ἄπειρά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταὐτὸν πεπονθότα ἂν εἴη ταύτῃ. — Πάνυ γε. — Καὶ μὴν ᾗ γε ἅπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτῃ παντ' ἂν εἴη ταὔτον πεπονθότα. — Πῶς δ' οὔ; Ἧι δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πέπονθεν. — Ναί. —

Τὰ δ' ἐναντία γε ὡς οἷον τε ἀνομοιότατα. – Τί μήν; – Κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἑκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὅμοια ἂν εἴη αὐτά τε αὑτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ' ἀμφότερα αμφοτέρως εναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα. (158e2-159a4)

A rather interesting feature of this argument is that it clearly acknowledges the formal nature of 'like'. For it defends the claim that the Others are alike by employing the assumption "S1 will be like S2, if both are Ø". Notice, though, that there are two grounds on which the assumption may be used. In the first place, it may be used by virtue of the Others being limited. But in the second place, it may be used by virtue of the Others being unlimited. Now, these facts put Parmenides in somewhat of a bind. For the facts preclude his using the assumption "S1 will be unlike S2, if one of them is Ø, and the other not Ø". I mean, since the Others are said to be both limited and unlimited, Parmenides cannot argue for the conclusion that the Others are unlike one another by offering the reason that some of the Others are limited and others of them not limited. The upshot of this is that Parmenides must forge a different kind of assumption in order to argue that the Others are unlike. Parmenides does, of course, oblige us in this matter. He introduces the assumption that the attributes 'limited' and 'unlimited' are unlike. And presumably, these two attributes then bestow their 'unlikeness' on the things which possess them--viz., the Others. But this constitutes a violation of the formal nature of 'unlike'. For, if we try to merge the two assumptions we have been considering, we have this result. The attribute 'limited' is unlike the attribute 'unlimited', since the former is (dare we say) limited, and the former not limited. But insofar as the Others are limited, they are like the attribute 'limited'. Furthermore, each attribute will become unlike the Others, insofar as the Others possess an attribute which is contrary to each. In which case, the attributes themselves can be said to be both like and unlike. But, as we have seen so many times before, this kind of argumentation is generally symptomatic of a formal concept expression being mistreated. If that view is applicable here, then Parmenides is playing a formal use of 'like' against a non-formal use of 'unlike'.

Parmenides' argument for the claim "The Others are neither like nor unlike" proceeds from the thesis that they are neither one nor many. And under that thesis, he adds a further assumption.

> Οὐδ' ἄρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς πανταχῇ στέρεται. (159d7-e1)

Parmenides, then, argues:

> Οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης· εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἴη ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἴδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός. (159e2-6)

This argument is reminiscent of one found in the first round, where it is argued that if the One were like or unlike, it would have the attribute of Sameness or the attribute of Difference, and in either case the One would supposedly be more than one.[60] (Presumably, in either case the One would be two.) In any case, the above argument clearly treats 'like' and 'unlike' as if the expressions were material concept expressions. For, in the first place, it presumes that Likeness and Unlikeness are εἴδη; and in the second, it presumes that they are contrary ἐναντία.

The further assumption which I have cited in the above is used by Parmenides to claim that the Others are nothing whatsoever. He says,

> εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι ὑπόμεναι τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον ἐθάνη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός γε πάντῃ πάντως στερομένοις. (160a6-b1)

On the basis of this, Parmenides may defend any of the theses which are possible under the dialectical schema, and which are not mentioned in the fourth round.

The Fifth Round vs. The Sixth Round

The fifth round is affirmative; the sixth is negative. And the former is the third longest round. For it contains a fairly large (but by no means complete) complement of arguments and theses. Yet, even though the fifth round is fairly extensive, it does not explicitly meet all the requirements of the dialectical schema. There are two examples of its failure to meet such requirements. First, Parmenides argues only that the One (which is not) and the Others are different. He does not argue that the One is both the same as and different from itself and the Others. Second, he does not argue that the One (which is not) is both like and unlike itself and the Others. Rather, he argues that the One is like itself, and unlike the Others.[61] Despite these failings, the fifth round is nevertheless in accord with the general purpose of the dialectical schema. For it characterizes the One (which is not) as being both existent and non-existent, as both one and many, as both in motion and at rest, etc.; and in short, the purpose of the round is to show that the One suffers the contraries which have been cited in the previous affirmative theses. The sixth round, on the other hand, has as its purpose that of denying the contraries of the One (which is not).

The reader may have noticed the introduction of a new set of contraries; viz., 'existent/non-existent'. Now, it seems to me that Parmenides has introduced this pairing so that he may construct theses which challenge the hypothesis "The One is not". Such theses are analogous to those which challenge the hypothesis "The One is one". The analogy which I have in mind is as follows: Just as the first and second rounds respectively permit the construction of the theses (i) that the One is neither one nor many, and (ii) that the One is both one and many, so likewise the fifth and sixth rounds respectively permit the construction of the theses (iii) that the One (which is not) is both existent and non-existent, and (iv) that the One (which is not) is neither existent nor non-existent. More generally, the negative rounds contain theses which challenge the hypotheses by denying what the hypotheses assert of the One, and the affirmative rounds challenge the hypotheses by affirming of the One expressions which are contrary to those supposed in the hypotheses. The lesson which we may draw from these observations is that the purpose of the last four rounds is the same as the purpose of the first four rounds. Indeed, each set of rounds gives the wild horse of dialectic its head.

160be *vs*. 163bc

We have already discussed how these respective passages offer different understandings of the hypothesis "The One is not". In view of the previous discussion, we may proceed from summaries of our previous findings.[62]

At the beginning of the fifth round, Parmenides argues thusly: Since the hypothesis is meaningful, we must know what we mean when we say "The One is not"; in which case the One which is not must be something knowable; furthermore, if it is knowable, it must be different from other things. Parmenides himself presents a summary of this argument. He says,

> πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. (160d4-6)

Parmenides then goes on to extract conclusions such as "The One is different from the Others, and the Others different from the One", "The One is a *this*", and even "The One exists *in some sense*". As we have seen, the basis for these conclusions is Linguistic Pluralism, whereby it is held that if an expression is meaningful, then it must mean *something*.[63]

In our previous discussion of the fifth round, we discussed Parmenides' formulations of the hypothesis. We paid particular attention to the formulation, εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν. With regard to this formulation

I argued:

(i) That τὸ ἓν be understood to be the subject of εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν.

(ii) That we read the formulation as "The one One is not".

(iii) That ἓν may be understood as revealing the essence of the subject of discourse.

Point (iii) obviously bears upon Parmenides' contention that the One, even though it does not exist, is knowable. Moreover, the point also reveals that in the fifth Parmenides' main concern with the hypothesis is that of hypothesizing about the One. Now, if this view of the fifth round is correct, then there is a sharp contrast between it and the sixth round. For in the sixth, Parmenides is not at all concerned with hypothesizing about something which is one. More specifically, he focuses on the moment of saying μὴ ἔστιν. About this moment, Parmenides asks the following questions.

> Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἆρα μή τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι; .... Πότερον οὖν, ὅταν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναι φαμεν αὐτό, πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἁπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδὲ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε ὄν; (163c2-7)

These questions threaten an important conclusion of the fifth round; the conclusion being "The One, which is not, exists in some sense". Moreover, Aristoteles' response to the questions (Ἁπλούστατα μὲν οὖν) indicates that the conclusion of the fifth is being rejected outright. And so, this conflict between the rounds is constituted by the different understandings which Parmenides has of the hypotheis. For on the one hand, the fifth round depends upon assumptions which characterize the moment of saying ἕν, when one says ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. On the other, the sixth depends upon an assumption which characterizes the moment of saying μὴ ἔστιν.

The structure of the sixth round poses an exegetical problem. Heretofore, our analytic format has allowed us to do two things. First, it has made it possible for us to follow the development of the individual rounds. And second, it has allowed us to follow the development of the conflicts between the rounds. The structure of the sixth, though, forces us to choose between following either the development of the fifth and sixth rounds, or the development of the conflicts between the two rounds. If we choose the latter, if we choose to utilize our analytic format, then we must rearrange the argumentation of the sixth in order to align the counter-arguments alongside one another. Now, we are forced to this choice, because the last affirmative thesis of the fifth is countered by the first negative of the sixth. Thus, if we choose to follow the development of the conflicts, we will have considered the argument for the first negative thesis last of all. Needless to say, this choice would involve ignoring, to a certain extent, the role that the first negative thesis plays in the development of the sixth round.

I have decided to choose the course of following the development of the rounds. My chief reason for making this decision is that the conflicts between the two rounds are not so numerous as to require a rearrangement of the argumentation in the sixth. Moreover, the understanding of the hypothesis which Parmenides adopts in the sixth is a basic source of those conflicts. Indeed, the assumption that μὴ ἔστιν indicates a total absence of Being makes the theses of the sixth round foregone conclusions.

160e-161a

I wish to impute to this passage the purpose of demonstrating the thesis that the non-existent One is both one and many. I say 'impute', simply because Parmenides does not announce the thesis. Nonetheless, the passage does permit us to contract it on his behalf. For it offers to show that the non-existent One is many. This claim, when taken in conjunction with Parmenides' understanding of the hypothesis, warrants the construction of the thesis "The One, which is not, is both one and many". In any case, Parmenides offers the following argument.

> Καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐλέγετο οὐδ᾽ ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνῳ ἄν τι ἦν οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνου, οὐδ᾽ ἄν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων. —Ὀρθως.— Εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἑνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. (160e2-161a2)

Allow me to chart the considerations which culminate in this argument. Since the non-existent One is what it is (viz., one), it is knowable; and since it is knowable, it is different from other things; and if different, then it is a 'this' and a 'something'; and if different, it is also related to other things. Hence the One is many, insofar as it has the attributes of being 'this', a 'something', 'related to other things' and 'different'. Now, notice that this chain of reasoning, even though it culminates in the claim that the One is many, begins from the assumption that the non-existent One is what it is (viz., one). There is, though, another interesting feature of this argument. It seems to me that the chain depends upon the central link that τοῦ ἐκείνου, τοῦ τινὸς, etc. are things of which τὸ μὴ ὂν ἓν μετέχει; from which follows the conclusion μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει.

We may ask for a rationale of the central link. I think that Linguistic Pluralism affords such a rationale. We will remember that Parmenides has urged the view that any word will stand for something, and furthermore that when we use a word, we thereby refer to that some one thing for which the word is the name. By applying this view to the expressions ἐκείνος, τι, etc., we arrive at the following position. Since ἕν, ἐκείνος, τι, etc. are different words, they must stand for different things. But since they are all said of the One, it is not simply the case that they stand for different things, rather they must stand for different things which the One has. And so, the non-existent One has many things, and therefore it is many.[64]

161ac

In this passage, Parmenides offers to show that the One is like itself and unlike the Others. As I have already mentioned, this thesis is dialectically incomplete, in as much as it should include the further claims "The One is unlike itself" and "The One is like the Others". Parmenides, though, does offer to show later on that the One becomes both like and unlike itself, and both like and unlike the Others. In any case, he presently argues for the claim "The One is unlike the Others" in the following way.

> Καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα ἑτεροῖα καὶ   ἄν. - Ναί. - Τα δ'ἑτεροῖα οὐκ ἀλλοῖα; - Πῶς δ'οὔ; - Τα δ'ἀλλοῖα οὐκ ἀνόμοια; - Ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν. - Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνόμοια ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη. - Δῆλον. - Εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν. (161a6-b4)

Initially, this argument is rather innocuous. The assumption that things which are different are unlike is, of course, trivially true. But the argument then takes a turn toward the conclusion that the One possesses Unlikeness with respect to the Others. And it is suggested that the One and the Others are unlike by virtue of the One's having Unlikeness. The suggestion permits the possibility of further argumentation ending in the conclusion that the One and the Others are like. We have seen such argumentation already. Briefly, it proceeds thusly: If the Others are unlike the One, the One will be unlike the Others; hence, the One and the Others possess Unlikeness; therefore the One and the Others possess the same attribute; but things which possess the same attribute are like. Now, since argumentation such as this is quite frequent in the dialogue, it is somewhat surprising that Parmenides does not choose to develop it in the above. On the other hand, though, the lack of it might well be further evidence of flagging zeal.

Let us now consider the argument given towards showing that the One is like itself.

> Εἰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; -Πῶς; -Εἰ ἑνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι τῷ ἑνί, οὐκ ἂν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οἵου τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἑνός. (161b4-8)

It would appear that this argument relies on the assumption that things which are unlike are different. Accordingly, if the One were unlike itself, it would be different from itself. But in that case, the One would not be such as the One is, and οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις ειη περὶ ἑνός. I offer this explanation, because the argument, to my mind, is reminiscent of one found in the first round; wherein Parmenides argues that if the One were different from itself, it would be other than one, and so not one.[65] On the other hand, the argument, depending as it does on the theory of opposites (as evidenced by Εἰ ἑνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι τῷ ἑνί . . .), permits the possibility of an argument purporting that Likeness makes the One and the Others unlike. Such argumentation would parallel an argument of the second round, where Parmenides argues that since Difference makes the One and the Others like, Sameness will make then unlike.[66]

161ce

This passage achieves the standard of dialectical incoherence. It purports to show that the One is both unequal and equal. And towards showing the latter, Parmenides argues that the One is both great and small. The argument for the claim that the One is unequal is as follows.

> Καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὖ ἴσον γ' ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἴσον, εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα. ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατ εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν. -Ἀδύνατα.- Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι; -Ἀνάγκη.- Τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα; -Ναί.- Τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα; - Πῶς δ' οὔ; - Καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἕν, πρὸς ἣν τἆλλα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἄνισα; Μετέχει.

This argument, in part, relies on the hypothesis "The One is not". But it also relies on the theory of opposites. In this regard, the key assumption is that things which are not equal are unequal. Given this assumption, Parmenides rebuts the possibility that the One is equal to the Others by arguing that the equality of the One with the Others would imply the existence of the One, which ex hypothesi is not possible. Yet if equality in size, or length, or weight implies the existence of the One, so also does inequality imply its existence. For if the One weighs one pound, and the Others weigh twenty, then the existence of the One will be a by-product of its inequality with the Others. And so, the conclusion "The One is unequal to the Others" is no less incompatible with the hypothesis than is the claim "The One is equal to the Others".

We may take a slightly different perspective on the above argument. In it, Parmenides is pressing the theory of opposites beyond its limiting cases. There are subjects of discourse to which 'equal' and 'unequal' do not apply. Justice, Beauty, and Virtue have no size, length, or weight. And by reason of that Justic is neither equal nor unequal in size to the desk upon which I am writing. But, if the assumption "Things which are not equal are unequal" were true, it would warrant the inference that Justice does not exist, since Justice is neither equal nor unequal. There are two lessons to be learned from this. First, even if the theory of opposites were true, it would still not have the universal applicability which is suggested by claimssuch as "Whatever is is either equal or unequal". Second, if the theory were universally applicable, Parmenides' proviso that the non-existence of a subject disqualifies it from equality would have to be extended to include the presumption that non-existence also disqualifies a subject from inequality. The latter point reiterates our finding that the conclusion of the above argument is incompatible with the hypothesis "The One is not".

It is not infrequently the case in the Parmenides that an argument will proceed to its conclusion from a claim which is contrary to the conclusion of the argument. We are about to consider such a case. Parmenides argues from the claim that the One has inequality to the conclusion that it has equality.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γε ἔστι μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης.—Ἔστι γάρ.—Ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μεγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἑνί;—Κινδυνεύει.—Μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν.—Πάνυ γε.—Μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν ἀεὶ ἐστιν.—Ἔστιν.—Ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα;—Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.—Ὅτω ἄρα ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ μεταξὺ τούτοιν οὖσα. (161d1-8)

There is half a kernel of truth in this argument. For we may attach a 'reasonable' sense to "Inequality is greatness and smallness". If A is greater than B, they are unequal. And if B is smaller than C, they also are unequal. This, we can understand. As for the argument itself, there are a number of critical points which might be brought against it. I, though, wish to develop only two points. The argument appears to anticipate Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Now, Aristotle's doctrine is, I think, a rather more sophisticated version of the theory of opposites; a version of the theory, in that the notion of contrariety is absolutely basic to the doctrine; but more sophisticated, in the notion of a mean permits theory of change. On the other hand, though, Aristotle's doctrine begins to crack the shell of the theory of opposites from the inside. The above argument offers a case in point. If equality is the mean between greatness and smallness, then equality can be neither great nor small. In other words, the mean will constitute ground upon which neither contrary can visit. The immediate upshot of this is that contraries will no longer come in two's, but in three's. The point can be applied to the above argument. The One, besides suffering the two pairs of contraries, 'inequality and equality' and 'greatness and smallness', will also suffer two further pairs of contraries; viz., 'equality and greatness' and 'equality and smallness'. This is the first point.

The second point is of greater importance. Some have taken 'great' to be an indefinite way of saying, for example, 'five hundred miles' and 'small' to be an indefinite way of saying, for example, 'two feet'. Such a view, besides being false, is incredibly misguided. When one says "The distance between Edmonton and Winnipeg is great", one has not said what that distance is. Nor does one state the distance between Edmonton and St. Albert, when one says "The distance is small". One states such distances by saying "Eight hundred miles" or "Four miles". These facts suggest an appropriate response to Parmenides' argument. When Parmenides says "The One has equality", we should demand to know to what, and in what way, and to what extent the One is equal. An appropriate answer (but not necessarily a correct answer) to our demand would be "The One is equal to the Others in weight, since the One weighs seven pounds and the Others weigh seven pounds". But nowhere in the dialogue do we find such answers. More importantly, the veil of contradiction which enshrouds this dialogue is woven out of claims which, in simple terms, have no empirical value.

161e-162b

This passage presents what is, perhaps, the most tortured argument in the whole of the dialogue. Ostensibly, its purpose is to show that the non-existent One has being in a way (οὐσίας δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ, 161e3). But the argument also purports the added benefit that 'what-is' has non-being.

Even though the argument is, to say the least, tedious and turgid, it is not without philosophical interest. The general ploy of the argument is to play a variation upon the theme "We cannot speak truly of what is not". Now, since the hypothesis is "The One is not", the manner in which Parmenides accommodates our speaking truly of the non-existent One under the themeshould hold our interest. Parmenides introduces the theme at the outset of the argument.

> Ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἓν μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐκ οὕτως; - Οὕτω μὲν οὖν. - Ἐπειδὴ δὲ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν. (161e4-162a1)

The argumentation here constitutes a ground for rejecting the assumption that to speak truly is to speak of things which are. Assuming that we speak truly when we say "The One is not", we then have a counter-example against the assumption that to speak truly is to speak of things which are. Parmenides, though, does not see things quite this way. Holding to the assumptions that the One does not exist and that to speak truly is to speak of things which are, he further argues,

> Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν οὐκ ὄν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλά πῃ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν (161a1-3)

The syntactical structure of Ἔστιν ἄρα κτλ. is rather interesting. In particular, consider the placement of οὐκ. It would appear that two purposes are served by this placement. First, we may presume that οὐκ, being alongside ὄν, is supposed to cast its shadow over ὄν. Second, οὐκ, being widely separated from ἔστιν, is not supposed to darken the meaning of ἔστιν. In any case, the argumentation at a1-3 is the basis upon which Parmenides will develop the two prongs of his argument. The claim that the One is not-being is developed towards showing that the One has the being of non-being. And on the other side, the claim "If the One is not not-being, it will be", is developed towards showing that what-is has the non-being of non-existence. I, though, do not think that we need attempt to forge our way through the thick thought of such argumentation. Accordingly, I relegate my further comments to a note.

We may further consider the theme "We cannot speak truly of what is not". In the Sophist, Plato develops a different variation upon this theme. As we know, the variation concerns the counter-part of speaking truly. It concerns speaking falsely. And by means of the variation, Plato has the Eleatic Stranger pose the problem "How is falsehood possible?". Now, there is a conflict between these two variations upon the basic theme. On the one hand, where it is assumed that we may speak truly of the non-existent One, it is argued that the truth of such a claim entails that the One somehow exists. On the other hand, though, where it is assumed that we cannot speak truly of what is not, it is argued that to speak of what is not is to speak of nothing at all; from this, it supposedly follows that one has not said anything at all when one says that something does not exist. It is important to realize that this conflict is made possible by the basic theme. If we are to speak truly of non-existent things, it is required that they somehow be existent. If, though, such existence is too absurd to contemplate, then we cannot even speak of non-existent things.

The conflict which we have been considering is present in the Parmenides. In the sixth round, Parmenides argues the following.

> τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἢ τὸ τὶ ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ το τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν των ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται;–Οὐκ ἔσται. (164a7-b3)

It is obvious that this argument offers the consequences which arise from the second variation.

162b-163b

In this passage, the thesis that the One is both existent and non-existent is utilized in various ways towards showing that the non-existent One is both in motion and at rest. The argument for the claim that the One is in motion is as follows.

> Οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως;–Οὐκ οἷόν τε.–Πᾶν ἄρα τό τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ.–Πῶς δ'οὔ;–Μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις· ἢ τι φήσομεν;–Κίνησις.–Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὂν ἐφάνη;–Ναί.–Οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐκ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται.–Ἔοικεν.–Καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἓν πέφανται, ἐπείπερ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον. (162b9-c6)

Clearly, Parmenides wishes to base the conclusion that the One moves by virtue of changing from being to non-being upon the thesis "The One is both existent and non-existent". But, the thesis will not support such a conclusion. For, if the One is existent, as is presumed by the thesis, then it already is what it is supposed to come to be. Quite simply, the One cannot change from being existent to being non-existent. If, though, Parmenides had assumed that the One is, at certafn times, non-existent, and existent at other times, his argument would have some plausibility. But the basic assumption of the above argument is that the One _is_ both existent and non-existent.

It seems to me that Parmenides has attempted to circumvent the difficulty which I have raised. Consider again the question which begins the above argument. Οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης ἕξεως; Allowing that existence and non-existence are states between which change is possible, it would appear that Parmenides is suggesting that the One suffers change by virtue of possessing the states between which a change may occur. Against this suggestion, my criticism does, of course, still stand.

The argument for the claim that the One is at rest relies on the central assumption that the One is either in motion or at rest. (τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν)* By rebutting the possible ways in which the One might be in motion, Parmenides arrives at the conclusion that the One is at rest. There are three possibilities rebutted. They are (i) local motion, (ii) circular motion, and (iii) change of nature. The rebuttals of (i) and (ii) depend upon the hypothesis the One is not.

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*162e1-2

Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γε ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίσταιτό ποθέν ποι. —Πῶς γάρ; —Οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῖτ' ἄν. —Οὐ γάρ. —Οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν στρέφοιτο· ταὐτοῦ γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ ἅπτεται. ὂν γάρ ἐστὶ τὸ ταὐτόν· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν ἔν τῳ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι. —Ἀδύνατον γάρ. —Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἕν γε μὴ ὂν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν. (162c6-d5)

These rebuttals presuppose assumptions found in the first round. In that round, having a place is characterized as being in something; local motion is characterized as change from place to place (which, by virtue of the former, then means change out of one thing into another); and circular motion is characterized as revolving in the same place. In any case, notice that Parmenides appeals to the hypothesis to deny that the One is anywhere. Accordingly, if the One is nowhere, there is no place (i.e., no thing) in which the One could be. And so, the One cannot move out of one thing into another; it cannot change from place to place. As for circular motion, since the One cannot be in anything that exists, it cannot be in the same place.

We may turn our attention to the last rebuttal.

Οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται που τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὄν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἠλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τίνος. (162d5-8)

This is reminiscent of an argument found in the first round.[67] In any case, the most significant feature of the above is the claim that the One is what it is independently of its being existent or non-existent. And so, the claim presents further justification for the view which we hold concerning Parmenides' interpretation of the hypothesis.[68]

Let us now consider the conflict which is internal to 162be. The conflict turns on the claim that the non-existent One exists. Parmenides utilizes the thesis "The One is both existent and non-existent" to argue that the One is in motion. But, on the other side of the conflict, the argument for the claim "The One is at rest" ignores, first, one half of the thesis (it ignores "The One is existent"); and second, it ignores the whole of the thesis, while purporting to show that the One cannot change its nature.

162c-163a

The purpose of this passage appears to be two-fold. In the first place, Parmenides offers to prove that the One becomes both like and unlike. Besides this, though, his argument prepares the way for the final conclusion of this round.

The argument presented in this passage proceeds from the previous thesis.

> Καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· ὅπῃ γὰρ ἄν τι κινηθῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκέθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ ἑτέρως. – Οὕτως. – Κινούμενον δὴ τὸ ἓν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται. – Ναί. – Καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον ουδαμῇ ἂν ἀλλοιοῖτο. (162e4-163a4)

Notice that the internal conflict of the previous thesis is further developed. For here Parmenides says, κινούμενον δὴ τὸ ἓν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται. And this conflicts with his claim that the One must be at rest, lest it suffer ἀλλοίωσις. In any case, Parmenides argues that the One becomes unlike on the basis of the claim "The One is in motion". He, then, argues that the One becomes like on the basis of the claim "The One is at rest".

As for Parmenides' treatment of 'like' and 'unlike', he does respect the formal nature of these terms. But in so treating these terms, he ignores the contradiction between the claims which allow him to infer, on the one hand, that the One becomes unlike, and on the other, that the One becomes like. Concerning the first of these points, I mean the following. It is possible to draw a comparison between what something is and what it was, using as a basis for such a comparison claims concerning whether the thing has changed its place or condition. For example, a Londoner might wish to argue that what is called 'London Bridge' is unlike what it used to be; presumably, he would defend his claim by urging that no bridge in Arizona can be like the London Bridge. Conversely, he might argue that London Bridge can be like itself only in London. Now, such 'pub' arguments have, at least, one interesting feature. These comparisons between 'what the London Bridge is' and 'what the bridge was' depend on various facts concerning where the bridge is or was. More importantly, we can apply a similar point to Parmenides' present arguments. The comparisons between 'what the One is' and 'what the One was' depend on presumptions concerning whether the One has moved or has remained at rest. By appeal to such presumptions, Parmenides respects the formal nature of 'like' and 'unlike'. But this brings us to the second point. The claims which are presumed by the comparisons (viz., "The One is in motion" and "The One is at rest") are contradictory. Consequently, the present arguments perpetuate the conflict of the preceding thesis.

Having given his arguments for the thesis "The One becomes both like and unlike", Parmenides goes on to reformulate the thesis. The reformulation is then used towards arguing the final conclusions of the fifth round. The reformulation is offered as follows.

> Ἧι μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἓν ἀλλοιοῦται· ᾗ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.– Οὐ γάρ.– Τὸ ἓν ἄρα μὴ ὂν ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται. (163a4-7)

By virtue of this, the comparisons which Parmenides draws in the final argument will involve, not 'becoming like and becoming unlike', but rather 'becoming not unlike and becoming unlike'. His final argument is,

> Τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε γίγνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι;– Ἀνάγκη.– Καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα μὴ ὂν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν μὴ ὂν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ' ἀπόλλυται (163a7-b5)

As in the previous case, this argument develops the preceding thesis.

It also shares two other similarities with the preceding. First, it ostensibly respects the formal nature of 'unlike' and 'different'. Second, it arrives at a conclusion which ignores some rather basic presumptions.

There is some sense to be made of the claim "What becomes unlike must come to be different from what it was, and must cease to be as it was". For we can draw comparisons between 'what a thing is' and 'what it was'. Notice, then, that Parmenides initially concedes our point. He concedes that whatever becomes unlike (presumably, itself) comes to be different from what it was. In spite of this apparent concession, though, Parmenides manages a dialectical *tour de force.* He concludes: The One which is not, in becoming unlike, comes to be (simpliciter) and ceases to be (simpliciter). This conclusion ignores the presumptions which are relevant to 'becoming unlike'. The presumptions of which I speak underlie the following qualifications. The One which is not, in becoming unlike *itself*, comes to be *what it is*, and ceases to be *what it was*. Ignoring such qualifications on the one hand, Parmenides ignores them on the other as well. For he also concludes that the One, in not becoming unlike, neither comes to be nor ceases to be. Upon this, the relevant qualifications would be "The One, in not becoming unlike *itself*, neither comes to be *what it is*, nor ceases to be *what it was*".

The Sixth Round

The basic conflict between the fifth and the sixth round is, I believe, between the two theses,

R5: The One (which is not) both exists and does not exist.

R6: The One (which is not) neither exists nor does not exist.

Strangely enough, there is one assumption which is at the center of this conflict. It is "Of whatever does not exist, we cannot speak". As we have seen, the fifth round utilizes the converse of this assumption. For there, Parmenides argues, "Since we may speak of the One which is not, it must exist in some way". The sixth, though, trades with the face of this coin. Here, Parmenides will argue: Since the One does not exist, we cannot speak of it.

The sixth round attacks the theses of the fifth in reverse order. Accordingly, its first argument conflicts with the final thesis of the fifth.

> Τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μή τι ἄλλο ἦν ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν; - Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. - Ὧι δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὔδ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό. - Πῶς γάρ; - Τῷ ἑνὶ ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὔτε ἑκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς. - Εἰκός. - Οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὂν ἓν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπείπερ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας. (163d1-8)

There appears to be one point of agreement between the counter-theses. The thesis from the fifth is "The One which is not both comes to be and ceases to be, and neither comes to be and ceases to be. And the above offers "The One which is not neither comes to be nor ceases to be". The agreement is only apparent. The two theses come to the same claim via different reasons. More importantly, those reasons conflict. In the former round, Parmenides argues that the One, in not becoming unlike, neither comes to be nor ceases to be. Now, the status which is suggested by his argument can be confered upon whatever is what it is all the time. An eternal, immutable object would have this status. (And I suppose more prosiac objects might enjoy such status every now and then.) But, in any case, the status requires that that which neither comes to be nor ceases to be have existence. With regard to eternal objects, the lesson is clear. Such an object can never come to be what it is, since it always is what it is; nor can it ever cease to be what it is, since it is never what it is not. For lesser objects, the story is a bit different. In either case, though, existence is a condition of enjoying the status. The sixth round, on the other hand, emphatically denies existence to the One.

Allow me to offer a variation of the above argument. Whatever must suffer a complete absence of being cannot come to be or cease to be. For, if on the one hand, it comes to be, it will no longer suffer an absence of being. And, on the other, since it never has had being, it cannot lose what it has never had. Notice that the key notion in this argument is 'a complete absence of being'. Now, this notion is also basic to the interpretation which Parmenides gives of the hypothesis in the sixth round. By taking the words 'is not' to mean 'a complete absence of being', Parmenides understands the hypothesis to mean "The

One can exist in no way at all". Thus, it appears evident that the argument for the thesis "The One which is not neither comes to be nor ceases to be" relies on an understanding of the hypothesis.[69]

163e

This passage presents a generalization upon the preceding thesis. For Parmenides argues that if the One cannot be, then it cannot be anything.

> Οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὂν ἓν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπείπερ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας. – Οὐ φαίνεται. – Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῇ· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται τοῦτο πάσχον. (163d7-e2)

This reasoning is the immediate basis for the thesis,

R6(N2): The One is neither in motion nor at rest.

Motion is characterized as requiring a change in character. Parmenides asks,

> Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι (e2-3)

And rest is characterized as requiring Sameness (which is, presumably, a character).

> Οὐδὲ μὴν ἑστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν· (e4)

In the former case, the One would have to be something from which it is changing. In the latter, the One would simply be something.

164a

This passage also is underwritten by the dictum that the One cannot be anything, since it cannot be. In particular, it sets forth the thesis

R6(N3): The One cannot be either greater than, or smaller than, or equal to itself or the Others.

Parmenides argues in the following way.

Οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης οὔτε ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν.– Οὐ γάρ.– Οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοιότης γε οὐδὲ ἑτεροιότης οὔτε πρὸς αὑτὸ οὔτε πρὸς τἆλλα εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ. (164a1-4)

Parmenides then continues in this manner, listing other attributes the non-existent One cannot have. He specifically mentions 'like and unlike' and 'same and different'.

It is quite evident that Parmenides sees R6(N2) and (N3) as being closely related to R6(A1). In view of this, we may say that there is only one major conflict between the fifth and sixth rounds. That conflict focuses on the significance of saying ἕν as opposed to the significance of saying μὴ ἔστιν.

164ab

Herein we find Parmenides concluding remark to the sixth round. It is very reminescent of the concluding remark in the first round.

τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἢ τὸ τὶ ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται; – Οὐκ ἔσται. – Οὕτω δὴ ἓν οὐκ ὂν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ. (164a7-b3)

The Seventh Round *vs*. The Eighth Round

I wish to emphasize three features of the argumentation in these rounds. The first concerns Linguistic Pluralism and our ability to speak of the Others. With regard to the second feature, we will pay special attention to Parmenides' 'multi-conception' of the expression

And finally, since we are about to observe the appearance of a distinction between appearance and reality, we should wish to emphasize those considerations which lead Parmenides to introduce the distinction. Allow me to offer some introductory remarks concerning each of these features.

Linguistic Pluralism requires the existence of that of which we speak. Allowing (as Parmenides allows in the seventh) that we may speak truly of the Others, we may infer that the Others exist. But their existence must be circumscribed in view of the hypothesis that the One does not exist. Since Linguistic Pluralism demands an ability to distinguish that of which we speak from something else of which we might speak,[70] and since the hypothesis "The One does not exist" suggests that the One fails to satisfy this requirement of Linguistic Pluralism, Parmenides must immediately face the problem of showing how the Others are different and distinguishable.[71] Parmenides' solution to this problem leads into his distinction between appearance and reality. He proposes to consider the Others as different from each other; in which case the Others, as different from one another, may be considered to be collectively many. Collections, though, may be divided into units But the possibility suggests that each of the Others is one. The distinction between appearance and reality is introduced to forestall the reality of such a possibility.

Many of the conflicts found in the preceding rounds depend on a trade-off between two notions of unity. On the one hand, there is the philosophic notion of unity by which Parmenides urges that to be truly unitary is to be purely and simply one; in which case, the One (as truly one) can have no parts, and cannot be susceptible to conceptual division. On the other hand, there is the notion of unity which approximates our understanding of 'one'; by which notion we understand that whatever may be individuated, that whatever may be counted, is one.[72] Now, as we have already seen, Parmenides has parallel notions for 'many'. We have also seen that there are trade-offs between the two.[73] In any case, on the one hand there is the notion which leads Parmenides to suppose that the Others have a nature that is dialectically opposed to the nature of the One. In accordance with this notion, it is suggested that the Others (as many) are truly complex, even indefinitely complex. On the other, though, there is the notion whereby 'many' means 'more than one'. Constitutional complexity is in no way relevant to the use of the latter notion. In as much as the seventh and eighth rounds will use both notions of 'one' and both notions of 'many', the preceding serves to remind us of what we may expect. But beyond the arguments we have come to expect, the two rounds raise an issue of greater significance.

The issue is "Can the notion of indefinite complexity be coherently explicated?". The argumentation does suggest that the notion is incoherent. Let us here and now approach this issue on our own. Let us suppose that the Others are indefinitely complex, and by virtue of that also suppose them to have no unity whatsoever. Consider, then, this question: Can the Others (taken collectively) be said to be composed of parts? Allow that they are composed of parts. In which case, the Others are divisible; and each part resulting from such division may be said to be 'one'. But this result is inconsistent with the supposition that the Others (whether they are taken collectively or individually) have no unity whatsoever. In other words, the Others cannot be composed of items which would be recognized as 'units'. There is a further point relevant to this consideration. Parmenides, on a number of occasions, has said that parts are (necessarily) parts of a whole.[74] The import of this statement is respected in the seventh round. For he speaks of the Others as being composed, not of μέρη, but rather of ὄγκοι. (Cornford translates ὄγκος as 'mass'.[75] I think that 'heap' would be an equally good means of translation.) We come now to a point of some importance. Since the Others cannot be composed of units, the Others when taken 'individually' must be just as the Others are when they are considered collectively. Finally, these considerations bear upon the introduction of the distinction between appearance and reality. If an ὄγκος is said to be one, that remark captures, not reality, but an appearance.

The distinction between appearance and reality depends upon an assumption which Parmenides aligns with the hypothesis. He assumes that the existence of the One is a condition of anything being one. If the assumption is allowed, a consequence of hypothesizing that the One is not is that nothing is one. So, if nothing really is one, the Others cannot be one. The best that they can do is to appear to be one.

164bc vs. 165e

The purpose of 164bc is to establish the basis on which the contraries may be said of the Others. So, of course, the purpose of 165e is to establish the basis on which the contraries may be denied of the Others. The latter passage, though, offers an argument for the thesis,

R8(N1): The Others are neither one nor many.

R8(N1) is immediately followed by the further thesis,

R8(N1'): The Others do not appear as either one or many.

Now, R8(N1') conflicts with,

R7(A1): The Others appear to be both one and many.

It would seem, then, that the opening passages of the respective rounds are directed towards the conflict between R7(A1) and R8(N1').

Round seven begins in the following way.

Ἔτι δὴ λεγώμεν, ἓν ει μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι.
.–Λέγωμεν γάρ.–Ἄλλα μέν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εί γὰρ μηδὲ
ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο. (164b5-7)

Two assumptions of some interest emerge from these lines. The first is that of whatever we may speak, it exists.[76] As we have seen before, the point is basic to Linguistic Pluralism. The second assumption has been previously considered as well. It is, "In naming that of which we speak, we also reveal the sort of thing of which we speak". Or in other terms, a name does not simply indicate that we take ourselves to be speaking of something, but it also reveals the essence of that of which we speak. The evidence for the second assumption resides in the fact concerning the placement of μηδέ in εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν. The phrase must be read as meaning "If the Others were not other . . .". I suggest that this 'counterfactual' would have us entertain the possibility that the Others might not be what they are. Now, this understanding of the seventh fits with our understanding of the fifth round. In connection with the latter, and with regard to the hypothesis "The One is not", we understand Parmenides to believe that he can reveal what the One is (viz., one) even when he is hypothesizing that the One is not. And I have argued that Parmenides believes (at least in the fifth) that it is possible to recover the moment of saying what the One is even in the face of saying that the One is not. Allow me to rest this reminder with a question. How would Parmenides justify his belief that the One which is not is knowable, if he did not believe that when uttering the expression 'the One' he both names something and reveals the essence of the thing named? With regard to the seventh, our view is strictly analogous. In speaking of the Others, Parmenides takes himself to have done more than named certain things. He also takes himself to have revealed what those things of which he is speaking are; viz., other.

The next point in the argument breaks one of the links in Linguistic Pluralism.

Εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, τά γε ἄλλα ἕτερά ἐστιν.

ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἕτερον;—Ἔγωγε. (164b8-c1)

This admission does not weaken the chain; it merely shortens it. For the admission denies only that each word is a name of something different. It does not deny the assumption that each word is a name.

We come now to the statement which prepares the way for what is to follow.

Ἕτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου;—Ναί.—Καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὗ ἄλλα ἔσται.—Ἀνάγκη.—Τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε.—Οὐ γάρ.—Ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστί· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις. (164c1-6)

The important point in this argumentation is that the non-existence of the One makes it possible for the Others (considered individually) to be different from one another by being different units in the totality called 'the Others'. (Nay, it is misleading to speak of an Other as 'one' or 'another'. Allow me, then, to suggest a model which might well ease our conceptual difficulty. Let us imagine the Others as being 'an'* enormous, indefinitely enormous, heap of indivisible, but malleable, rubbery goo. There are, of course, no parts to the goo. But we can grab hold of pieces of the mother-rubber. We can stretch and tie off a piece, thereby making it look as if we have a part of the heap. Nevertheless, it is merely the appearance of unity. For the perfect elasticity of the mother-rubber allows her to repulse even the gentlest touch of the lightest knife. So, no piece of the heap can ever be truly individuated. Once we remove the tie that separates, the forlorn piece oozes back into the boundless goo. Furthermore, whatever we might do to acquire a piece can also be performed on the piece such that we get 'a piece of a piece', and so on. Now, it is possible that this is what Parmenides had in mind.)

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*This word 'an' suggests that the Others are one. It is unfortunate that such a little word should get in the way of a finer philosophic conception.

165e

The opening statement of claim in the eighth round purports to show that in order for the Others to be many they must be a collection of units.

Οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τἆλλα. - Πῶς γάρ; - Ουδὲ μὴν πολλά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἕν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἕν, ἅπαντα οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν πολλὰ εἴη. - Ἀληθῆ. - Μὴ ἐνόντος δὲ ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ἕν ἐστι τἆλλα. (165e4-8)

This argument squarely sets the issue concerning plurality. If unity is said to be that which has no parts, then plurality could be said to be either that which has parts or that which has no unity. The characterization given of the Others in the seventh round falls under the second option. It is a significant consequence of this latter option that there will be no things to which the name 'part' might belong. Under this option, neither the One nor the Others have parts. Presumably, the following reason could be given in defence of the option. If the Others were composed of parts, they would be composed of things which are unitary; but the Others can have no unity, thus they cannot have parts. There is, though, one point of agreement between 164bc and 165e. It is that nothing can be one, if the One does not exist. Even so, the agreement is preparatory to the conflict. For the seventh argues that the Others will be many because there is no one among them. And the eighth argues that the Others cannot be many, since there is no one among them.

164ce *vs*. 166ab

The conflicting theses are,

R7(A1): The Others appear to be both one and many.

R8(N1'): The Others do not appear to be both one and many.

The argument for (A1) begins with the reiteration of the point established by 164bc.

> Κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστί· κατὰ ἓν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἷά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἑνός. (164c7-8)

If we allow that the Others do not differ from one another by being individuals, and if we further allow that the Others *must* in some way differ from one another, the proposed consequence that they differ by virtue of being pluralities is at least consistent with our initial admissions. But the proposed consequence gives rise to the conclusion that each of the Others (ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων) is as constitutionally complex as the Others (taken *in toto*) are. Parmenides' argument for this conclusion is,

ἀλλ' ἕκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἄπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, κἂν τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβῃ τις, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀντὶ ἑνὸς δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ Καὶ ἀντὶ σμικρότατου παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ.—Ὀρθότατα.— Τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τἆλλα εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν. (164c8-d6)

Allow me to repeat, and thereby emphasize, Parmenides' own words: ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἄπειρός ἐστι πλήθει. In any case, the above argumentation is relevant to the claim that each ὄγκος will appear many. (It is noteworthy that Parmenides uses the word ἕκαστος.) Our model of mother-rubber will help us here. Any piece of mother-rubber can be stretched so that we acquire a piece of the piece; similarly, a piece of the piece can be stretched so that we acquire a piece of the piece of the piece; and so on. In other words, what we took to be one now appears to be many. The next stage of the argumentation purports to prove that the ὄγκοι will appear to be one.

Οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἷς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὢν δὲ οὔ, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται; - Οὕτω.- Καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων. - Πανύ γε.- Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται. (164d6-e3)

Here, the appearance of unity is supposed to contrast with the reality of plurality. We may capture such reality by imagining the following. The mother-rubber is so indefinite in her infinite complexity that we cannot begin to count her component pieces. Our conceptual inability in this regard is very elementary. It is not that we don't know how to count. Rather, we don't know what counts as a piece. (Was she, or wasn't she?)

The distinction between appearance and reality is challenged in the eighth round.

> Οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά. – Τί δή; – Ὅτι τἆλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῴ ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν. (165e8-166a4)

The two rounds do agree on this much; viz., that the Others can have no parts since the One does not exist. The eighth round, though, takes this point of agreement as a reason why the Others cannot appear to be either one or many.

> Οὐδ' ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστίν οὐδὲ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. – Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. – Ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεταί τι τῶν ἄλλων ἓν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἑνὸς πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον. (166a4-b2)

We may now determine the sources of conflict between the two rounds. Round seven quite obviously depends upon a philosophical notion of 'many'. The round assumes that to be (truly) many is to have no unity at all. Round eight may rest its challenge on either another philosophic notion of 'many' or an ordinary notion of 'many'. If 'many' is understood to mean 'that which has parts' (where by 'parts' we take outselves to be speaking of units), then the non-existence of the One will make the collectivity of the Others impossible. The preceding point indicates a way in which Parmenides could have drawn the conflict more sharply. The way is this: If the Others are a collection of units, then the non-existence of the One entails that the Others do not exist; in which case, the Others cannot appear to be anything, let alone appear to be one or many. A similar conflict is possible with the ordinary notion of 'many'. Taking 'many' to mean 'more than one', we may foresee the argument that the Others cannot be a collection of units, since there is no one among them. Besides observing this conflict, it is also important to notice the role that the One plays. Both rounds presume that nothing can be one, if the One does not exist. Thus, the non-existence of the One is allowed to interfere with our ability to use the ordinary notion 'one'. For Parmenides suggests that its non-existence would make us unable to individuate, distinguish, identify, or count things which are other than the One. (Let me just say that I would not call Parmenides' mistake a formal concept confusion. Similar mistakes have occured with respect to material concepts. Consider, for example, the suggestion "If the color Red did not exist, nothing could be red".)

164e-165a

This passage does not have a counter-argument in the eighth round. Nevertheless, its conclusion conflicts with the final statement of the eighth.[77] The relevant thesis is,

R7(A2): The Others appear to be smaller than, and larger than, and equal to, one another.

The conceptual experiment proposed by this passage contains two stages. First, it is allowed that we may momentarily identify some piece of the Others as the smallest piece. Second, it is allowed that we may go on to acquire a smaller piece of the piece which we momentarily identified as the smallest piece. The conclusion that the Others appear to be equal will emerge from these stages.

The argument for R7(A2) is as follows.

> Καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμεν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι· φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μέγελα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων. – Πῶς δ' οὔ; – Καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετεβαίνειν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν, τοῦτο δ' εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος. (164e7-165a5)

Parmenides is taking Equality to be the intermediate between Greatness and Smallness; in which case, the paradoxical reasoning does not turn on the possibility of finding a smaller in the smallest. Rather, the reasoning here is much more akin to 149e-151a, where he argues that the One possesses Smallness, Greatness, and Equality.

165ac

As with the previous passage, this one as well does not have a counter-argument in the eighth round. But its conclusion also conflicts with the final statement of the eighth. In any case, the passage purports to prove this thesis:

R7(A3): The Others appear to be both limited and unlimited.

The argument given on behalf of the claim that the Others are limited is short and simple. In fact, it is so short that it is easily unnoticed.

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκος πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε πρὸς αὑτὸν... (165a5-6)

The contrast between πρὸς ἄλλον and πρὸς αὑτόν is important. If it is allowed that the ὄγκοι may be individuated, it follows that they will be limited with respect to one another. But Parmenides goes on, and offers to compare each ὄγκος with itself. In this regard, he argues that each is unlimited.

> αὐτός γε πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων; -Πῇ δή; -Ὅτι ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη ἀεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἔν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύναισθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἑκάστων λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνός. -Αληθέστατα.- θρύπτεσθαι δὴ οἶμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἄν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἑνὸς ἀεὶ λαμβάνοιτ' ἄν. (165a6-b6)

This argument does, perhaps, present a variation on Zeno's wood-shavings; the difference being that while Zeno chops wood, Parmenides squeezes mother-rubber. In any case, the argument has an interesting connection with a much earlier assumption concerning 'parts'. In the first round, Parmenides there assumes that whatever has parts will have parts which go by the names 'the beginning', 'the middle', and 'the end'. Here, he is arguing that the Others are unlimited and incapable of division, not because they lack the parts which would result from division, but rather because they lack the special parts known as 'the beginning', 'the middle', and 'the end'. This reason, though, need not be restricted to mother-rubber. Indeed, if this reason were true, it would be impossible for anything to have limits, and also impossible for anything to be divided. In which case, anything which is not truly one would be unlimited.

The arguments for R7(A3) do not cover 'all the bases'. They 'show' that the ὄγκοι appear both limited and unlimited. But what about the Others when they are considered _in toto_? Presumably, the latter argument may be extended to cover the case of the Others _in toto_. But the first argument cannot be similarly extended. Since it depends upon the possibility of comparing different ὄγκοι, and since the Others, considered _in toto_, would comprise all such ὄγκοι, there will be nothing to which the Others could be compared.

166bc

Herein we find the concluding statement of the eighth round. Since this passage offers a general response to 164e-165a and 165ac, I should like to discuss it presently.

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἴποιμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποιμεν; – Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. (166b7-c2)

We have seen how Linguistic Pluralism provides Parmenides with a ground on which to say that the Others exist. Now, existence is a necessary condition for those things which appear to be what they are not. Thus, the above denial can be seen as undercutting a necessary condition for the truth of R7(A2) and (A3).

165cd *vs*. 166b

The conflicting theses are

R7(A4): The Others appear both like and unlike.

R8(A2): The Others cannot appear to be either like or unlike.

Thesis R8(A2) is simply urged and not argued. It appears that Parmenides would have us take the concluding remark of the eighth to be a sufficient reason for the thesis.[78]

The argument for R7(A4) is one from analogy. It is,

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι; - Πῇ δή; - Οἷον ἐσκιαγραφήμενα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἓν πάντα φαινόμενα ταὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι. - Πάνυ γε. - Προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς. (165c6-d2)

165de *vs*. 166b

The purpose of 165de is to assert that various other contraries appear to be true of the Others. The purpose of 166b is to deny that various other contraries can appear to be true of the Others.[79]

The Concluding Remark

Εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἓν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. -Ἀληθέστατα. (166c2-5)

This remark does, of course, rely on the Zenonian technique of summing contradictory results.

The re-telling of a story can be judged on either of two grounds. The story has been retold with added interest, or it has been made more understandable. I hope that I have succeeded at the latter.

Notes to Chapter Four

1. cf. 143a4-5.
2. See 145b, where (C2) is explicitly stated. Given the identity thesis (see p.20) assumed by this argument of the second round, (C2) provides an option under which the One can have being without being (or, without being the same as) Being.
3. 139be.
4. Cf. also 139e-140a, where Parmenides argues that if the One were to suffer (i.e., have the πάθος) the same, it would be more than one.
5. Every now and then, the Greeks are faulted for failing to observe distinctions which we take to be important. And it is suggested that they would not have philosophized as they have, if they had known about such distinctions. This kind of attitude is a disservice to them. A more serious attitude to their philosophizing would allow that they might deny and argue against our distinctions.
6. Cf. 129cd.
7. Parmenides continues μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη. ...Καὶ μὴν τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἑκάστου. So, the beginning and end would be both limits and parts of the One. Cf., Owen's "Zeno and the Mathematicians", (in Zeno's Paradoxes, ed. Salmon), pp. 151-152.
8. See Ryle, p. 367.
9. R.E. Allen argues that '. . . Parmenides is dealing, not with one but with two kinds of infinity: a dense infinite allied to that of continuity, typical of extensive magnitudes, and the infinity of

succession, typical of number'. (The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 28, p. 699). According to Allen, the argument at 142bd characterizes the One as a dense infinite, and the argument at 143e-145a characterizes the One as a successive infinite. This account is offered towards removing the apparent redundancy of two proofs for the claim that the One is infinite. There is, though, a much simpler way to remove the redundancy. The first argument aligns itself with the thesis that the One is both one and (infinitely) many; the second aligns itself with the thesis that the One is both limited and unlimited. Moreover, Allen's view is generous to the point of being very uncritical. The most important feature of both arguments (viz., Linguistic Pluralism) goes unnoticed in Allen's view. In the first case, Linguistic Pluralism gives rise to an infinite regression (the density of which is due to the impenetrability it presents to our intellects). And in the second case, it gives rise to an infinite progression. But it is overly generous to say that Parmenides is dealing with two kinds of infinity.

10. 143a4.

11. See P&P, p. 144.

12. Cf. 145a.

13. See P&P, p. 141; also Allen's "Unity and Infinity", pp. 708-725; and most other commentaries as well.

14. The philosophical stipulations here imagined are not unlike stipulations underlying a measurement system. Those who brought the metric system into existence began the system's existence with the stipu-

lation "This is the metre (itself)". Notice, though, that the stipulation would have to rest on the presumption that the thing spoken of has a length. Is a similar presumption available with respect to the stipulation "This (i.e. the set (one)) is the number one"? I suggest that without such a presumption the endeavor becomes abstruse. At issue is whether the set (one) can be presumed to have a number. For such a presumption is needed to license the inference "Whatever has the same number as the set (one) is also one".

15. 144c1-2.

16. Cf. Aristotle's Physics, 209b.

17. Parmenides' parts are in contradistinction to Aristotle's parts. Each of Aristotle's parts will have a middle by virtue of which further division is possible. But for Parmenides, a middle is itself a part, indeed an indivisible part.

18. The middle is a special part as well. It is the point at which division may occur.

19. At 138d4, Parmenides asks, Οὐκοῦν εἶναι μέν που ἔν τινι αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; Aristoteles answers Ναί. And Parmenides then asks, Ἆρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον; to which Aristoteles answers, Οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ. The key words are in the first question. They are, of course, που ἔν τινι.

20. See. pp. 4.37-.38 below.

21. The claim "The One is the same as itself" does satisfy a necessary condition relevant to the sentence-frame, since the expressions 'the One' and 'itself' are different expressions. But how and in

what ways is the One the same as itself? I suggest that even though the claim appears to indicate a relation, nonetheless we cannot go on to say what that relation is.

22. 129a.

23. Cf. 146de.

24. P&P, pp. 123-124.

25. Some philosophers have found enjoyment in the refining of senses of 'same'. Allowing that there are these different senses, then (i) will at times be true, other times false depending on the particular sense in use. Similarly for (ii).

26. It seems to me that (i) and (ii) are not unlike promises. In promising, it is the performance of the promise which entitles one to say 'I spoke truly when I promised to do . . .'. As for either (i) or (ii), here too the truth is not revealed until one goes on to say in what way the desks are the same or different.

27. I.e., 146d1-5.

28. See 148ab.

29. Presumably, the assumptions could be taken from the conclusions at 146cd. Also, the argument at 143ab could serve as a basis for these assumptions.

30. Cf. Parmenides' definition of 'like', given at 139e.

31. 139e8.

32. See 147c6-8.

33. This ambiguity allows Parmenides, when he so chooses, to either violate or concede the formal/material concept distinction. But,

what is more, he manages to violate the distinction even while conceding that to be like is to have the same attribute. By assuming that difference is an attribute, he argues that difference may make things alike.

34. See Peck's interpretation of the Parmenides for a defense of this view; Classical Quarterly, N.S. III, p. 126 ff. Cf. Runciman's paper, SPM, pp. 173-175.

35. Rejection rather than modification would be the more serious consequence.

36. Metaphysics, 1018a15.

37. See Cornford's reading of 139e8, P&P, p. 125. This translation simply obscures the ambiguity which Parmenides wishes to exploit.

38. For example, we may arrive at the conclusion "Insofar as the One is the same as the Others and the Others are the same as the One, just in respect of having the character 'same' the One and the Others have precisely the same attribute, and therefore they are the same".

39. But Parmenides wishes to say more than this. On the basis of the claim "A has more measures than B", he would further say that A has as many parts as measures. His interest in this further saying is obviously relevant to his understanding of the hypothesis.

40. There are, though, three grounds on which the passage is quite objectionable. First, it presumes that we can make autonomous comparisons between the One and itself. Second, it suggests that the One will have as many parts as it has measures. And

finally, it suggests that the autonomous comparison between the One and its parts permits us to infer that the One is equal to itself.

41. See 141a7-b3.

42. Statements such as "Each thing is the same as itself" are not, I submit, tautologies. Rather they are philosophical curiosities. Indeed, the above statement is totally irrelevant to 'real-world' issues of identity. For example, no magistrate, when presiding over a charge of pickpocketing, would ever ask the key witness in the case "Is your wallet the same as itself?". But, even if the magistrate were to ask "Is this wallet the same as your wallet?", an affirmative answer would not provide the relevant evidence. The relevant evidence is given only by answers to the question "Is this your wallet?". Friedman, an economist, has spoken of tautologies as being 'logical filing cabinets'. I take this idea to be very perceptive. Should we accept the idea, we have to say that "Each thing is the same as itself" files nothing simply because it indiscriminately files everything.

43. Parmenides appears to be aware of the different aspects of this tension. See 154ac, where he argues that the difference in age between the One and the Others always remains constant; and see 154c-155b, where he argues just the reverse.

44. Cornford's translation. P&P, pp. 127-8.

45. In the argumentation at 152be, Parmenides offers a quite general reason against 'becoming'. The reason is that whenever something happens to be in the present, it must be, and cannot be becoming.

46. From P&P, p. 190.

47. Cf. 155e-157b.

48. Perhaps Parmenides takes himself to have shown that the One is becoming the same age as the Others by having rebutted the options that the One is becoming neither younger nor older than the Others. See his statement of the over-all conclusion of these arguments, 155c.

49. See 154e4-155a7.

50. This passage is sometimes thought of as an appendix to (only) the second round. See P&P, pp. 194-196; also Forrester's "Plato's Parmenides: . . .", The Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 10.

51. See 156e-157a.

52. See 159ab (R3), 160ab (R4), 163e-164b (R6), 165ce (R7), and 166bc (R8). R5 contains a fairly full, but by no means complete, complement of arguments.

53. The contrast between 'being perfectly one' and 'being imperfectly one', is one which I offer on Parmenides' behalf. The contrast which Parmenides himself draws is between 'being perfectly one' and 'being one in some way'. So, when I speak of the notion of 'being imperfectly one', we may understand it as meaning 'being one in some way'.

54. See 159b6, c4, and c7. And at 159d1, Parmenides urges the conclusion, Οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός...

55. The further argument is meant to rebut a possibility which stands in the way of concluding that the Others are part of one whole. The possibility is that the Others could be parts of 'a many'. By 'a many', let us assume that Parmenides takes himself to be speaking of a set of discrete entities. This assumption, it seems, provides us with a means for understanding the following:

> Εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δήπου μόριον ἔσται, ὃ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων.
>
> (157c8-d2)

As for how the argument goes on, it would seem that the assumption "A part of the many must be a part of all including itself" directs the argument towards the conclusion that parts cannot be parts of a many.

56. 157e-158a.

57. This possibility might well be aligned with a conflict in Pre-Socratic philosophizing. On some accounts, 'what-is' appears to be ἄπειρα by virtue of its homogeneity. On other accounts, though, 'what-is' appears to be ἄπειρα by reason of a never ending heterogeneity.

58. Cf. 137d. See 4.9.

59. Cf. 144e-145a.

60. Cf. 139e-140b.

61. Parmenides, though, does argue that the One becomes both like and unlike itself and the Others. See 162e-163a.

62. See section (B), chpt. 2.

63. See section (F), chpt. 2.

64. Parmenides adds a further argument on behalf of the conclusion. It is highly suggestive of Linguistic Pluralism. See 161a2-5.

65. Cf. 140ab.

66. Cf. 158ac.

67. Cf. 138c.

68. If neither existence nor non-existence can alter the nature of the One, then the hypothesis "The One does not exist" does not preclude the possibility of revealing the essence of the One.

69. Cf. 166ab; there Parmenides takes the One's complete lack of Being to be a reason for the Others' inability to appear to be anything.

70. See 160c5-d2 and 161e3-162a1 in the fifth round.

71. Speaking more fully, the problem is this: Since the One does not exist; we cannot speak of it; nor can we distinguish what does exist (viz., the Others) from the One. Thus, if the Others are not different from the One, they must be different from one another.

72. See, for example, 143d.

73. See 158bc and 158cd, where such a trade-off occurs.

74. See 142d, 144e, 145b, 157c.

75. P&P, p. 237.

76. The claim "The Others are others" is analogous to "The One is one". And in either case, there is an existential presupposition.

77. The final statement of the eighth round is, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν

ἐστιν (166c1). In which case, the Others cast their lot with τὸ μὴ ὄν. Presumably, only what-is can appear to be what-it-is-not.

78. See 166b3-c2.

79. 165de asserts 'same and different', 'in contact and apart', 'in motion and at rest', 'coming to be' and ceasing to be' and πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦτα of the Others. 166b denies 'same and different', 'in contact and apart', etc. to the Others.

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